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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with long run developments in energy systems. It considers the 
implications of developments in economics related to path dependence and lock-in for 
climate change mitigation policies. Path dependence can arise when markets, technological 
systems and institutions co-evolve and are subject to increasing returns to adoption. This 
can have the effect of entrenching incumbent technologies and systems, which can 
preclude the emergence of alternative technologies or systems. This lock-in by historical 
events is argued to be particularly acute in the energy system. This thesis uses energy 
system scenario modelling to explore the potential for path dependence to create mutually 
exclusive low carbon energy futures. It concludes that radically different configurations of 
energy technologies are equally able to deliver low carbon energy. It finds that there are 
good reasons to expect that development will be path dependent. This matters because the 
literature on path dependence also highlights the potential for lock-in to a sub-optimal 
outcome. However the thesis also finds that it is possible to maintain a variety of emerging 
options until more is known about their potential. Policy needs to create the conditions that 
allow a variety of low carbon options to emerge and prosper. But, perhaps paradoxically, 
over time policies will also need to ensure that the most promising low carbon options can 
themselves benefit from increasing returns to adoption. The same processes that created 
lock-in to a high carbon energy system can be harnessed to reduce the costs and improve 
the performance of low carbon technologies. The thesis argues that the conceptual 
underpinnings of environmental policy intervention need to be fundamentally reassessed in 
the light path dependence, lock-in and increasing returns effects. The orthodox approach to 
environmental policy analysis uses a `static equilibrium' paradigm which considers only 
extant externalities. Internalising external costs is important, but orthodox economic theory 
does not provide policymakers with any information about the processes which created the 
current energy system, nor the options needed to allow economies to extricate themselves 
from `carbon lock-in'. Increasing returns could be harnessed to overcome carbon lock-in, if 
policymakers engage directly with issues related to technology choice and technological 
strategy. Along the way some important shibboleths of existing economic policy will need 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the long run changes to the energy system that will be 
required to deliver deep cuts in CO2 emissions. It considers a reduction in CO2 emissions 
of at least 60% relative to year 2000 levels in the UK; the current UK Government goal 
(DTI 2003a; DTI 2003b; DTI 2007b) '. This will require substantial changes to energy 
sources, energy transmission, storage and delivery, end use devices and human behaviour. 
The range of low carbon options has been extensively reviewed (Anderson & Gross 
2003; PIU 2001b; UNDPIWEC 2000). Numerous scenarios and modelling exercises have 
shown that cuts in emissions of this order of magnitude appear feasible and have outlined 
the combinations of technologies and societal changes and that might deliver them, and 
their costs (DTI 2003a; DTI 2003b; PIU 2001b; RECP 2000; Shell 1996). The UK 
Government's review of the economics of climate change, undertaken by Sir Nicholas 
Stern and his team from the UK Treasury concluded that the cost of action would be lower 
than the cost of inaction, based in part on analysis that uses future technology scenarios 
(Stem 2006). 
It is also clear from such scenarios that the range of low carbon futures is wide and 
diverse. Indeed many scenario exercises (both in the UK and elsewhere) have explicitly 
sought to demonstrate that substantial reductions in emissions can be secured in a variety 
of ways, or to test sensitivity to the availability of certain technologies (DTI 2003b; Elders 
et al. 2006; IEA & OECD 2003; IPCC 2000; PIU 2001b; RECP 2000; Shell 1996). Some 
scenario exercises have sought to highlight the advantages of one particular vision or type 
of low carbon system over alternatives (WADE 2006). Other analysts have emphasised 
that there are choices and trade offs between particular types of low carbon technology or 
system (Mitchell & Woodman 2006). 
Either implicitly or explicitly, analysis of system choices and trade offs draws upon an 
important strand of economic analysis (and considerable debate) that has focused on 
1 This `target' originated with the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution based on a conception of 
`contraction and convergence' where rich countries are subject to earlier and deeper cuts than developing 
countries, and where global atmospheric C02 concentrations are stabilised below 550ppm. It was 
subsequently adopted in UK policy (DTI 2003a; RECP 2000). More recent analysis suggests that 550ppm 
may be an upper bound (Stern 2006). This thesis is not proffering a view on the appropriateness of this or any 
other target and merely uses 60% to inform a debate related to energy system development. 
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technological `lock-in' and `path dependency' (Arthur 1989; Arthur 1994; David 
2000; Liebowitz & Margolis 1995a). Recent authors highlight the importance of such 
concepts to energy technologies and systems (Cowan 1990; Unruh 2000). These analysts 
suggest that markets, technological systems and institutions co-evolve and are subject to 
increasing returns to adoption; the more consumers adopt a particular technology/system 
the more attractive/cost effective/convenient it becomes. Importantly, this form of positive 
feedback has the effect of entrenching incumbent technologies and systems, which can 
preclude the emergence of alternative technologies or systems. This effect is noted in Ch. 
16 of the Stern Review, where the danger of `lock-in' to high carbon is presented as part of 
the rationale for innovation policies (Stern 2006). 
A number of important outcomes are associated with increasing returns and path 
dependence. First, a dominant design/configuration may `capture' a market/sector, even if 
a range of options might have been equally feasible when a new system or market began to 
emerge2. Second, the timing of development matters since early developments are more 
significant in defining the development path than later ones. Third, particularly where a 
network or an infrastructure that is tailored to the dominant design emerges, infrastructural 
lock-in can result; over time it becomes very difficult and costly to change the system. 
Finally, the dominant design may not be the best, as relatively unimportant early events 
may shape developments and hence the `locked-in' system or technology might turn out to 
be suboptimal in some way. 
Increasing returns arise for a range of reasons ((following (Pierson 2000) see Ch. 4 for a 
full discussion): Scale economies and learning effects: increasing production leads to a fall 
in the unit price. Network externalities: also described as co-ordination effects, these occur 
where technologies are linked and need to be compatible, or a system is required. 
Examples include computer hardware and software, video tape or DVD formats, road 
vehicles and refuelling systems. Adaptive expectations: As a leading design emerges 
consumer uncertainty is reduced and more consumers are encouraged to adopt the leading 
design, further encouraging its adoption and hence feeding back into yet more widespread 
2 No judgement is made here regarding the desirability of such phenomena. Indeed there are economic 
efficiencies to be gained from the emergence of a single vehicle fuel/type, transport/power/fuelling 
infrastructure, computer operating system, HDD TV or video tape format. These issues are intimately bound 
up with the discussion of path dependency provided in Ch 4. 
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use. Investors and producers are also subject to adaptive expectations. A closely linked 
concept relates to the mental frames that individuals from technology developers to end 
consumers use to consider possibilities and evaluate performance. 
Energy systems appear to be subject to all these categories of increasing return, and may 
exhibit a particularly acute form of lock-in (Unruh 2000). Assets are long lived and capital 
intensive, incumbent technologies have benefited from decades of development, and the 
system has co-evolved into compatible networks of fuels, end use devices, vehicles, 
delivery infrastructure and institutions. It is also argued that the system we are locked into 
emerged before the carbon problem was recognised and/or low carbon alternatives could 
be promulgated. We are locked into a carbon intensive energy system (Ibid). There are a 
range of reasons for increasing returns and considerable debate over the conceptual 
foundations and economic significance of path dependency, which is analysed in Ch. 4. 
The primary issue for this thesis is that path dependence suggests both that it is impossible 
for markedly different energy systems to co-exist and that a dominant system will emerge. 
The thesis seeks to explore the extent and implications of such lock-in for the future 
development of the energy system and for current policies. 
The very diversity of low carbon options/scenarios, when considered in the light of the 
literature on path dependency, at least suggests that history matters because the systems 
that we lock into will be determined in large part by technologies that appeared attractive 
or gained market dominance at some point in the past. 
We are a long way from knowing exactly what form a low carbon system will take; which 
technologies will progress furthest, and how markets, consumer choice, policy and 
innovation will interact to shape the development of the energy system over coming 
decades. Any path dependence in the energy system is therefore accompanied by another 
important attribute - uncertainty. Uncertainties include the long run relative costs or 
feasibility of emerging technologies (Anderson et al. 2001); emergence of entirely new 
technologies; consumer behaviour and preferences (new energy end uses, willingness to 
adopt energy efficient practices, etc); and geopolitical uncertainty, which may affect fuel 
prices or the political acceptability of some technologies or fuels such as nuclear power or 
natural gas. The implications of climate change are of themselves uncertain and will affect 
the scale of emissions reductions expected in future, energy demands as a result of 
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adaptation (e. g. desalination, air conditioning, etc) and the viability of some energy sources 
or locations (coastal sites may flood, cooling water from rivers run dry, wind or other 
resources change). 
1.1 Focus of work 
The initial contentions of this thesis are that more than one low carbon energy system can 
be envisaged, and that substantively different energy system configurations might each be 
equally well able to deliver low carbon energy services. Moreover, these different energy 
systems have the potential to be at least to some degree mutually exclusive. Some examples 
are listed below in Table 1. The table focuses on `network externalities', though the 
network and institutional effects it illustrates are only one facet of path dependence (see 
Ch. 4). 
Table 1-1: Examples of different needs of technologies and infrastructures 
Low carbon technology options Mutually exclusive or competing developments 
widely adopted/expanded Needed Not needed 
Low carbon vehicles powered by Hydrogen production and Battery exchange/charging 
hydrogen produced using carbon delivery, CCS infrastructure. facilities. Additional electrical 
capture and storage. Associated laws, standards and capacity. Associated laws, 
skilled personnel. standards and skilled personnel. 
Low carbon vehicles powered by Battery exchange/charging Hydrogen production and 
batteries. facilities. Additional electrical delivery, CCS infrastructure. 
capacity. Associated laws, Associated laws, standards and 
standards and skilled personnel. skilled personnel. 
Micro CHP and small scale Active and upgraded distribution Transmission network extension 
renewable electricity generation. networks. Associated regulation, and upgrading. Associated 
charging arrangements, and planning consents, charging 
skilled personnel. arrangements, regulation. 
Offshore wind and wave power Transmission network extension Active and upgraded distribution 
for electricity generation. and upgrading. Associated networks. Associated regulation, 
planning consents, charging charging arrangements, and 
arrangements, regulation. skilled personnel. 
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Whilst we can envisage any number of hypothetical low-carbon energy system scenarios it 
would not make sense to suggest that we can realise all of them, certainly not all at once in 
one place. 
This thesis focuses on the stationary sectors - direct use of fuels in buildings and factories, 
and electricity production, distribution and use. It also focuses on one particular aspect of 
energy system development - the `choice' between decentralised/small scale generation 
and conversion technologies and large scale options (WADE 2006). Decentralised options 
convert fossil or renewable energy into usable heat and power close to the end use, whilst 
large scale conversion systems are normally located a long distance from centres of 
demand. Some commentators suggest that a decentralised energy system is likely to 
emerge in the near future, based upon a combination of the investment drivers in 
liberalised markets and new technologies (Patterson 1999). Yet several recent analyses 
emphasise the prospective importance of carbon capture and storage, the British and US 
governments have both reiterated their recent interest in nuclear power and, at least in 
Britain targets for renewable energy are predicated on development of remote (offshore) 
renewables (Centrica Plc 2006; DTI 2006e; Orange 2006). None of these options are either 
small scale or decentralised. 
It may be that expansion of large scale options and of decentralised generation are in fact 
quite compatible, any `choice' is illusory or of little significance. Perhaps, given adequate 
and appropriate investment in infrastructure we could have both. Perhaps we actually need 
both. A recent scenario exercise takes just such an approach, developing combinations of 
decentralised and remote options in scenarios differentiated in terms of economic growth 
and technical change (Elders, Ault, Galloway, McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & Lampaditou 
2006). One goal for this thesis is to explore the extent of any incompatibility. However, 
given the rather different network, regulatory, institutional and intellectual/skills 
requirements of large scale relative to decentralised energy, this `big vs small' dichotomy 
appears to be a sensible starting proposition for this thesis. It is explained in more detail in 
chapters 2,5 and 6. 
This focus does not by any means imply that the scale of energy conversion is the only 
prospective path dependent choice in the energy system. There may be many others in the 
stationary sector and there is also the potential for path dependence in the transport sector; 
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for example in the development of new transport fuels such as hydrogen. Thorough 
investigation of transport issues is not the object of this thesis. However the importance of 
decarbonisation in the transport sector is discussed, options for doing so reviewed, and 
contribution to emissions reduction represented quantitatively (See Ch. 6). 
It is extremely important to note that it is by no means certain that expansion of either 
decentralised energy or of the main large scale low carbon options will be sufficient to 
deliver a 60% reduction in carbon emissions relative to 2000 levels. For example whilst 
gas fired combined heat and power (CHP) offers efficiency gains it is not a zero carbon 
technology. Similarly, whilst nuclear power can deliver low carbon electricity it cannot 
contribute to emissions reductions in the domestic heating sector unless use of electrical 
heating also expands and displaces heating using fossil fuels. In order to better understand 
the combination of technologies that would be needed to deliver a 60% reduction in 
emissions it is necessary to model the energy system in detail. This must take a view on 
energy demand and determine how different components of demand are to be met by the 
technologies and systems under consideration. Ch. 6 attempts to do this using both 
descriptive scenarios and a quantitative model of the energy system. 
1.2 Policy issues 
Why should path dependency in the energy system matter to policymakers and policy 
analysts? As noted above, policy needs to be made in the face of considerable uncertainty 
about the development of future technologies, systems and markets. Irrespective of path 
dependence, policy will affect the development of future energy systems. There are three 
inter-related reasons for this: 
- First, policy provides the framework conditions within which new technologies 
compete - through regulations that require CO2 and other pollutant emissions to be 
reduced or through measures to price such emissions (taxes and tradable permits). In 
broad terms, the tighter the regulatory environment, or the higher the price on carbon, 
the more attractive low carbon and more efficient options become and the greater the 
incentives to develop new low carbon options. Policy can also help to overcome a 
variety of market barriers that can hinder the adoption of new technologies once they 
become cost competitive (PIU 2002b; Stern 2006). 
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- Second, policy will have a direct influence on the creation and adoption of new 
technologies. Technology, or innovation, policies can provide support when 
technologies are in an early stage of development - through support for research, 
development and demonstration (RD&D) and through the creation of niche markets 
that allow developers to refine and improve new products before they can compete 
with more established options (Anderson, Clark, Foxon, Gross, & Jacobs 2001). 
- Third, policy can have a direct influence on the type of infrastructures that emerge in 
the energy system. Historical examples include the development of the electricity and 
natural gas grids in the UK, both of which were made possible in large part through the 
consolidation of regional companies and boards at a time when energy utilities were 
brought into public ownership. However, policy influence does not cease as a result of 
privatisation since the regulatory environment plays an important role in infrastructural 
investment. For example, the DTI together with the Regulator (Ofgem) and industry 
bodies, is in the process of assessing what regulatory changes are needed to facilitate 
greater use of decentralised electricity generation (DTI 2006e; DTI & Ofgem 2007). 
Yet the existence of path dependence (should it arise), combined with uncertainty leads to 
three inter-related dilemmas: 
- The first policymakers' dilemma consists of how to avoid premature path choices when 
the relative long term merits of different technologies are unknown. This is because if 
systems are path dependent there is a danger that the `wrong choice' might lead to 
lock-in to sub-optimal options and systems. 
- On the other hand policymakers may also wish to avoid excessive delay, such that low 
carbon options are locked out because strategic decisions about new infrastructures and 
systems are not taken, so lock-in to whatever the market preferred at the time decisions 
were not taken happens `by default'. 
- Finally, the literature on path dependence also suggests that development may be non- 
linear - by which is meant that small changes in the near future give rise to much larger 
long term impacts (Arthur 1989; David 2000). The issue for policy is that a relatively 
small amount of early intervention (subsidy, regulation, R&D etc) may be sufficient to 
`tip' the energy system in a particular direction. This may be both less costly and more 
practical/successful than delayed intervention, but early action risks a direct conflict 
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with dilemma one, above. Again, we explore this notion in more depth below (Ch. 4, 
Ch. 7). 
In short, policymakers face complex choices in the face of uncertainty combined with path 
dependence; some of the above considerations favour early action or strong intervention, 
others delay and a more incremental approach. Moreover, policymakers in the UK at least 
have a long standing aversion to `picking winners' (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007; PIU 
2002b), yet if early choices are made that prove correct (for example to promote a new 
infrastructure), carbon abatement may be achieved at lower cost. This thesis therefore 
seeks to understand both the extent to which energy system development might proceed in 
a path dependent fashion, and what this implies for policy actions. The relationship 
between this thesis and existing literature is considered in Sect 1.5. 
1.3 Aints and objectives 
Based on the above considerations, the aims and objectives for this thesis are as follows: 
Aims: 
- To explore the potential for and extent of path dependence in the stationary 
sectors of the energy system 
- To consider the implications of path dependence for current policy 
Objectives: 
- To review and analyse the conceptual and empirical literatures related to path 
dependency and lock-in, and relate this to the scenarios developed for this thesis. 
- To develop some form of `test' for path dependence that can be applied to scenarios. 
- To review and discuss the range of low carbon technologies, their potential, 
characteristics and systemic implications with a view to assessing path dependence. 
- To develop energy scenarios to explore the range of possible low carbon energy 
systems. Scenarios will be quantified in order to test the contribution to CO2 emission 
reduction of various technologies and system configurations. This in turn requires the 
development of a detailed energy system model. 
- To assess the infrastructural and systemic characteristics of the energy scenarios. 
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- To `test' the scenarios with reference to their potential to exhibit path dependency, and 
to consider where and how path dependency might arise. 
- To discuss the policy implications of the outcomes of all the above, but particularly the 
presence and nature of path dependent differences between scenarios. 
- To suggest policy responses to path dependent processes and lock-in. 
1.4 The contributions of this thesis 
As discussed, many scenario exercises indicate that there is a diverse range of possible low 
carbon futures, and some explore scenarios that appear likely to be mutually exclusive. 
However few, if any, scenarios set out to explicitly examine the extent to which path 
dependency is likely and what this means for policy. 
The relationship between path dependence and the range of possible low carbon futures 
found in the scenarios literature has not been explored by path dependency theorists. The 
relationship between path dependence and energy systems has been assessed in the context 
of understanding how the current energy system arose and carbon lock-in may be 
`escaped' (Unruh 2000; Unruh 2002). But as yet there has been limited attention to the 
potential for similar effects to shape the direction of future systems. This is important as it 
suggests that policy must pay attention to path dependence with a view to the future as well 
as the present and the past. This concern with path dependence is implicit in a number of 
recent studies that assess the potential for policy to choose the `wrong' low carbon options 
(Mitchell & Woodman 2006; WADE 2006). This thesis seeks to make the linkage between 
path dependence in future energy systems and policy explicit. 
The first contribution of this thesis is therefore to explicitly `join up' the scenarios and 
modelling literatures with those on path dependence and lock-in. It seeks to explicitly use 
scenarios to explore the potential for path dependence and lock-in, not to the existing 
energy system but to different forms of future low carbon systems. As far as the author can 
ascertain there is novelty in assessing the extent to which each scenario explored in this 
thesis might be subject to path dependent development, which may create and reinforce a 
mutual exclusion between the scenarios. The approach it takes to scenario development is 
(it is hoped) also novel, in that it seeks to explicitly quantify whether, and the extent to 
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which decentralised energy and the development of large scale and remote primary sources 
are incompatible, and why. 
The second contribution is in the domain of technological system modelling. As noted in 
Sect. 1.3 it is by no means certain that, for example, unspecified `expansion' of small scale 
CHP, or nuclear power, will deliver the emissions reductions that this thesis has taken as 
its objective. The means by which different energy service demands are met, how such 
demands change over time, and the precise configuration of different energy system 
components must be considered in detail. The thesis therefore develops and models 
scenarios that show how both small scale/decentralised and large scale low carbon energy 
systems might be configured. This allows the relative roles of specific low carbon options 
to be quantified and allows for an explicit comparison to be drawn between genuinely low- 
carbon `large scale' and `small scale' systems. 
The third important contribution is in the policy domain. As noted in Sect. 1.3 it is possible 
to identify three strands of energy and environmental policy that relate to the emergence of 
low carbon energy systems. The `conventional' economic approach is concerned with the 
justification and means by which to internalise the external costs of pollution, in the 
current context CO2. This literature is concerned with application, efficiency and 
interaction of taxes, regulation and market based instruments such as permit 
trading(Anderson, Clark, Foxon, Gross, & Jacobs 2001; Pearce et al. 1989; PIU 
2002a; Sorrell & Sijm 2003; Stern 2006). Policy also needs to ensure that emerging options 
are adopted, overcoming any market barriers that might exist (PIU 2002a; Stern 2006). A 
more recent approach, `innovation systems' encompasses the policy issues associated with 
innovation, how innovation systems work and the sociology, economics, history and 
engineering of technical change (Anderson, Clark, Foxon, Gross, & Jacobs 2001; Foxon 
2003; Foxon & Gross 2003; Kemp, Schot, & Hoogma 1998; Unruh 2000). This broad 
literature is concerned with understanding and encouraging technological innovation in 
order to tackle environmental problems, particularly climate change mitigation. Some of 
this literature explicitly engages with path dependency theory, and seeks to determine 
policy frameworks that will encourage option creation and the emergence of new 
technologies (Kemp, Schot, & Hoogma 1998) (Marechal 2007). However, neither this 
approach nor the `conventional' economic approaches have paid particular attention to the 
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potential for path dependence in the emergence of future energy systems. It is hoped that 
doing so will be an important contribution for this thesis. 
Moreover, the contention of this thesis is that the potential for diverse and path dependent 
low carbon energy scenarios in future means that strategic decision making (whether 
deliberate or otherwise) plays a key role of in shaping the path of future energy systems. In 
the context of this thesis, `strategic decision making' means the promotion of new 
infrastructures such as gas or power grids, or decentralised generation, or an explicit policy 
to favour specific technologies. The potential tensions between policies to maintain 
flexibility in the face of uncertainty about emerging technologies and policies that harness 
increasing returns to `tip' the development of the energy system were explained in Sect. 
1.2. The reason that path dependence may create the need for such choices is explained in 
Ch. 4. These policy choices affect private investment, since regulation frames investment 
decisions and it can facilitate (or obstruct) the development of new infrastructure. 
1.5 Summary of goals and contributions and the structure of the thesis 
In summary, the principal contributions of this thesis are to understand path dependence 
and lock-in in future energy scenarios. In order to do this to it explores the extent to which 
different low carbon energy systems can be envisaged, and how widely they differ. It does 
this with a focus on the stationary sector, and contrasts decentralised energy and large scale 
low carbon solutions. It also seeks to add a new dimension to policy analysis by adding the 
issues that surround path dependence to externalities and innovation policy. The thesis is 
structured as follows3 : 
Chapter 2 provides a description and discussion of the analytical techniques used in the 
thesis and explains the rationale behind its structure. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the evidence related to the need to reduce CO2 emissions 
and an introduction to the technical options available to do so. It introduces policy 
3 Chapters 4,5 and 6 contain material or use techniques that derive from work undertaken by the author and 
colleagues in a number of earlier research and policy projects, including work for the 2002 Energy Review, 
Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and DTI Renewables Innovation Review. The primary references are fully 
cited in the text and the principal publications that arose from this work are listed above. 
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responses to climate change. It also provides a non-technical introduction to path 
dependency and lock-in. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on path dependency, discussing the technical debate on the 
topic amongst economic theorists and developing `criteria' for assessing path dependence. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the range of options for decarbonising the provision of 
energy services in order to identify the most promising options and review the 
characteristics of each that are relevant to path dependency. 
Chapter 6 develops two qualitative and quantitative low carbon energy system scenarios, 
using a detailed numerical model to ensure that energy demand and supply are in balance 
and to assess the contribution of different technologies to meeting emission reduction 
goals. The infrastructural differences between the scenarios and possible implications for 
path dependence are discussed with reference to the engineering literature. 
Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the scenario exercise for path dependence, and 
explores the potential origins of path dependence in each scenario and how these differ by 
scenano. 
Chapter 8 discusses policy implications and provides recommendations for policy. 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of main findings, issues for further work and reflects upon 




This section describes the analytical and exploratory techniques used to address the key 
issues set out in Ch. 1. The primary goal of the thesis overall is to provide a better 
understanding of the extent to which developments in the energy system might be path 
dependent and relate this to policy choices. Hence the thesis does not have a single 
methodology, `model', empirical examination or experiment at its analytic core, neither is 
it rooted in a single academic discipline. Instead the thesis combines economic analysis, 
techno-economic assessment, scenario development and modelling, and policy analysis 
based upon economic principles and innovation systems theory. Academically it is rooted 
largely in economics, though several of the key issues at stake can only be properly 
understood on the basis of engineering knowledge and principles. Moreover the economic 
theory that is utilised draws upon a school of economic analysis that has been seen by 
some as a challenge to conventional economic thought (Liebowitz & Margolis 1995a), and 
by others as a part of a set of conceptual developments described as `evolutionary', `path 
dependent' and related to induced technical change (Ruttan 1997). The scenarios are of a 
particular form, and the energy model utilised to quantify the scenarios has particular 
characteristics. In each case existing literature has been utilised in developing the tools 
used in the chapters that follow. The literature has been critiqued and existing work 
extended as necessary. In what follows the epistemology of the thesis is explored and the 
structure of the thesis and the techniques utilised within each of its component parts are 
described in more detail. 
2.2 Underlying epistemology 
Epistemologically (crudely defined in terms of `how do we know what we know? '), this 
thesis has a number of diverse elements. It encompasses four core areas of analysis: 
assessments of technical feasibility based in engineering; discussion of the future using 
scenarios; a discussion of path dependence that is rooted in economics but deals with 
events that occur sequentially in time; and policy analysis. In what follows the general 
epistemological issues that each of these areas of endeavour throws up are discussed. 
These issues are what might be defined as `problems in applied epistemology' - such as 
how to make judgements about the future or assess the validity of propositions that cannot 
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be falsified - it is not a discussion of epistemology per se as found in philosophical 
discourse (see e. g. (Klein 2005)). 
Qualitative research 
This thesis is concerned with the engineering feasibility of energy systems, but is analysing 
energy systems that do not yet exist. Hence its technical analysis has both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. It quantifies energy supply, carbon emissions and systemic 
requirements (transmission lines, numbers of power stations, etc), but it does so on the 
basis of descriptions of hypothetical energy systems; scenarios. These scenarios are the 
product of a qualitative assessment of what might be possible and of what technical 
combinations are interesting to explore in order to seek out path dependence. Qualitative 
work in the social sciences focuses on understanding human behaviour, within a particular 
context (Marshall & Rossman 2006). It may seek to understand observed social 
relationships (for example in terms of economic power) and psychological or other drivers 
for actions. The thesis is concerned with some aspects of behaviour, in particular a range of 
issues related to `adaptive expectations', an important source of lock-in to particular 
technologies and systems (see Ch. 4). However it is not analysing such relationships and 
drivers in detail, nor making empirical observations about them in the field. Moreover, the 
thesis is less concerned with the behavioural and socio-economic forces that might shape 
the future than with the processes by which potential futures might become `locked-in'. 
Hence detailed attention to the literature on lock-in and path dependence, and its 
epistemology, is important for the thesis (see below and Ch 4), but attention to the 
methodological niceties of qualitative research is not. Moreover there does not appear to be 
any particular reason to become embroiled in any debates over `qualitative vs quantitative' 
research; which are apparently prevalent in social science 
(http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Quantitative_method). The thesis uses both. 
Quantitative research 
In very simple terms, the discussion of energy technologies and the development of the 
energy system scenarios are largely quantitative, but also speculative. The discussion of 
path dependence and lock-in, both in essence (Ch. 4) and in its application to the scenarios 
(Ch. 7,8) is fundamentally qualitative. Within the scenarios quantitative modelling informs 
qualitative assessment. This is a common approach to thinking about the future, with a goal 
of informing choices made now. It does not appear particularly problematic, provided the 
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limitations of scenarios are understood (discussed below and in Ch. 4). Moreover 
quantification is used to assess broad categories of technical and systemic characteristic 
that might give rise to path dependence, for example sources of increasing returns to 
adoption (see Ch. 4 and Ch. 7). Quantification does not need to be overly precise to meet 
this objective since all that is required are broad `ballparks' - such as that scenario X 
requires energy storage and active management of distribution networks, scenario Y does 
not. Also, given that the thesis seeks to analyse path dependence in the face of uncertainty, 
quantification does not need to be `right' about the future. The relationships within the 
model need to be right (e. g. how much carbon will be saved by replacing technology X 
with technology Y) but the analysis it informs does not depend upon the author making a 
correct projection of any future state. A common criticism of energy modelling is that 
however accurate the model is in representing energy systems or economics they are 
susceptible to incorrect input assumptions, so called `garbage in garbage out'. For 
example, cost optimisation models are highly sensitive to assumptions about future costs 
that cannot be known with any degree of certainty (see e. g. (DTI 2003b)). This is not to 
suggest such models are not useful, rather that they are sensitive to inputs based on 
judgements; they are not `prediction machines'. In this respect the approach taken here 
appears to be relatively robust, since the modelling does not seek to determine what 
emissions in 2050 will be or what the combination of technologies deployed should be. 
Instead, it seeks to assess what emissions would be given particular sets of technological 
assumptions that are both technically feasible and meet emissions constraints, and inform a 
qualitative discussion of path dependence. 
Techno-economic assessment and energy system modelling 
In Ch. 5a range of technical options able to provide low carbon energy are reviewed in 
some detail. This work is a combination of engineering principle, engineering based 
literature on technology performance and expectations for its future development, 
informed by a discussion of the literature on costs, market drivers and other broadly 
`economic' factors. Systemic factors are also discussed from an engineering perspective, 
for example the ability of electricity networks to accommodate the output of `intermittent' 
renewables like wind power. Again, economic factors are linked to engineering 
requirements and constraints in order to provide a technical and economic assessment of 
potential for development. These analyses are linked to path dependence in a qualitative 
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fashion. Developments with the potential to exclude one another (such alternative fuelling 
systems) are introduced and explained. 
In Ch. 6a numerical model is utilised to link the prospects for the technologies reviewed in 
Ch. 5 to a nominal level of energy demand, itself a product of a numerical model that links 
rising demand for energy services to technical improvements in energy conversion and end 
use technologies. The model ensures that energy service demands (heat, end use of 
electricity, transport) are met by an appropriate mix of supply side technologies (including 
`end user' options such as small scale combined heat and power, CHP). Based on the 
energy mix the model calculates carbon emissions, and installed capacities. The modelling 
work and its limitations is discussed in more depth in Ch. 6. 
Scenarios 
This thesis is concerned with the future. Dealing with the future creates an epistemological 
challenge for analysts. How can we make meaningful judgements about a realm that is by 
definition unknowable in most respects? A large literature on scenarios has emerged in 
large part in an attempt to address this question (Aligica 2005; Borjeson et al. 
2006; Foresight 2001; IEA & OECD 2003; IPCC 2000; Kahn & Weiner 1967; Shell 2003). 
Some of the energy and climate related literature is reviewed in Ch. 6. The `science' (or 
art) of scenarios is in itself an emerging field of academic endeavour; there is what is 
referred to as a `Futures' literature (Aligica 2005), whether it yet constitutes a discipline is 
not something the author feels qualified to judge. Scenarios seek to address some of the 
criticisms of the projections made by energy analysts in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, which 
some commentators on the energy sector believe to have turned out to be so misleading as 
to render any attempt at projection largely worthless (Smil 2003). A common mistake, 
highlighted in commentary on the usefulness of scenarios is to conflate scenario with 
projections (Shell 2003). It is therefore probably worth noting the caveat on all the scenario 
work in this thesis; it is about what might happen, not what will, or should happen. 
Nevertheless its policy relevance does have a normative dimension; the thesis seeks to 
understand what should be done now, given uncertainty about the future and the possibility 
of lock-in. 
A typology of scenarios developed by (Borjeson, Hojer, Dreborg, Ekvall, & Finnveden 
2006), includes predictive, exploratory and normative scenarios, definitions explained in 
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more detail in Ch. 6. The scenarios developed in Ch. 6 take a form also referred to as 
`normative', in that an objective (emissions constraint) is stipulated, or imposed upon each 
scenario. Again this does not mean that this is the right target, or that such a target will be 
achieved. The goal is merely to ascertain how it could be achieved. Normative scenarios 
can be distinguished from the `exploratory' approach where a set of drivers is posited, the 
influence of which on future developments can be explored (Shell 2003). Both types are 
common in energy analyses. 
Scenarios are rather curious epistemologically; exploring as it were the factual content and 
interactions between factors in an entirely imaginary realm (Aligica 2005). However, even 
whilst noting their epistemological challenges Aligica confirms their widespread utility in 
commercial and military decision making (Ibid). Scenarios are used in energy policy 
analyses, and this thesis is concerned with extending their usefulness rather than 
challenging their legitimacy. Moreover, from a methodological perspective it is important 
to note that this thesis is not overly concerned with the social and economic dimensions 
often at the heart of scenario building. Scenarios often seek to represent and understand the 
impact of social choices and economic developments, which can be complex to achieve. 
Societal drivers or economic conditions associated with each scenario are not considered in 
depth in Ch. 6. This is not because such issues are unimportant, indeed the social and 
technological interact in complex ways to drive both societal and technological 
development and change (see e. g. (Hughes 1987)). However the objective for the scenario 
work in this thesis is to explore technological issues related to path dependence. Hence the 
scenarios developed in Ch. 6 are primarily technological sketches; they seek to develop 
technological systems that make sense in terms of ensuring that supplies meet energy 
demands and that each energy system stands scrutiny technologically. These sketches can 
then be explored for path dependence, which is the task attempted in Ch. 7. Economic, 
social and psychological factors are then considered in Ch. 7, for example in terms of the 
institutions and market arrangements that each scenario might require. 
Path dependence 
The literature on path dependence is relatively new, having been given a formal definition 
in the early 1980s (Arthur 1989; Arthur 1994), though it draws upon important phenomena 
associated with increasing returns to adoption first discussed systematically by economists 
in the 1960s (Arrow 1962), who in turn drew upon older empirical work (Wright 1936). It 
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has been linked with evolutionary economics (Ruttan 1997), some view it as a branch of 
evolutionary economic thinking (Marechal 2007) and it shares some epistemological 
topics of interest with evolutionary biology (Nelson 1995). One example of a shared debate 
concerns whether markets or natural selection lead to `optimal' outcomes (the logic of both 
evolutionary biology and evolutionary economics being that any current state is a product 
of its antecedents and whilst perhaps `fittest' in terms of the particular path followed, is not 
the `best' in an absolute sense). Path dependence has its critics and criticisms have a 
normative and policy relevant dimension (Pierson 2000). It has also been argued that 
because path dependent analysis moves economics away from a teleological approach to 
one where `history matters', it has been misunderstood by conventional economists, rooted 
in a teleological paradigm (David 2000). In order to clarify concepts and explore 
controversies the literature on path dependence and a range of epistemological and other 
conceptual and practical issues related to it are discussed at length in Ch. 4. The approach 
taken is one of straightforward critical analysis of propositions and principles, based upon 
a literature review undertaken by the author. The analysis provided in Ch. 4 does not 
attempt a definitive response to the debate around path dependence, but does point up its 
primary advantages, taking the pragmatic view that notwithstanding any debate over path 
dependence it is of interest to apply it to energy scenarios. 
Overall, the thesis seeks to steer an informed course around many of the epistemological 
problems that are associated with each of the intellectual or conceptual schools it draws 
upon. In general it takes a pragmatic approach; noting conflict and debate and the 
limitations inherent in various approaches but without getting excessively embroiled in 
ongoing debate. The methodological limitations of the thesis overall are returned to below. 
2.3 Thesis structure 
The storyline of the thesis proceeds from background analysis relating to the scale of the 
challenge of responding to climate change and the role of and prospects for technology in 
curbing emissions. This leads to the concept of path dependency in scenarios of long term 
possibilities. A technical review of the leading low carbon options - the `components' of 
future energy systems - is used to inform scenarios. Scenarios are developed and modelled 
quantitatively in order to explore key uncertainties. This allows us to consider the extent to 
28 
which developments may be path dependent. Finally, the overarching implications for 
policy are explored. 
The relationship between the thesis structure and the key questions it seeks to address 
(right hand text) and a `decision tree' linking path dependence and policy is illustrated 
below (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2-1: Path dependence, scenarios and policy: Decision tree and key questions 
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2.4 Summary of techniques and methodology 
In sum, the approach taken in the thesis is multi-faceted, reflecting the problems it seeks to 
address. The thesis attempts to combine the economics of path dependence, assessment of 
technologies, scenario development and economic and policy analysis. Thus the study 
provides a synthesis of assessment and appraisal of many different types of issue: 
technological - to do with costs and prospects for emerging technology options; related 
systemic issues to do with infrastructural requirements and opportunities; and the 
assessment of related policy requirements and problems. All of this is set against a 
backdrop of uncertainty about future developments, which is partially addressed and 
explored through scenario development. The study therefore provides an integrated 
appraisal of path dependency and policy in the energy system and a range of tools and 
techniques are applied in order to facilitate analysis at each analytical stage of the 
storyline. These are as follows: 
- Dynamic processes such as increasing returns in economics. 
- Review of technologies: techno-economic assessment based upon learning curves and 
engineering assessment. This work draws upon detailed analysis carried out by the 
author for the UK Cabinet Office (PIU 2001 d) and subsequently (Anderson & Gross 
2003, Gross, Leach and & Bauen 2003, Gross et al 2006). 
- Scenarios: scenario development is an analytical tool in itself. However scenarios differ 
and the approach taken here is normative, technologically driven and used for back- 
casting in order to explore path dependence. 
- Modelling of energy demand by end use and of supply options to ensure that the 
systems predicated in the scenarios are realistic and coherent. This draws upon a 
model initially developed by the PIU Energy Review team. 
- Discussion of the engineering limitations on each scenario (intermittency, network 
requirements etc) based upon existing literature. 
- What might be described as `conceptual economics and policy': the relationship 
between economic models and the principles of environmental policy is discussed. 
- Policy analysis: economic theory is applied in order to discuss externalities - both 
positive and negative. Innovation systems theory is applied to the definition and 
development of policy, and to the importance of creating options. 
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2.5 Limitations 
The approaches taken in the thesis are subject to the following limitations, some of which 
could be addressed through subsequent additional analysis. 
Demand side scenario: Only one energy service demand and energy efficiency scenario is 
explored (see Ch. 6 for details). Whilst this permits a detailed examination of the supply 
side combinations and path dependency of interest for the thesis it precludes a detailed 
examination of the impact of energy efficiency on path dependence. Further work might be 
able to assess whether higher levels of demand increase path dependence and whether 
demand constraint reduces it. Similarly, deeper cuts in emissions could be assessed. 
Engineering constraints related to power flows: The energy system model deals only with 
average energy outputs and imputed values for installed capacity. Power flows and related 
issues, such as transmission upgrading, system balancing and system margin are discussed 
with reference to existing analyses, but additional analysis could utilise electrical 
engineering models directly to consider these aspects in more depth. 
Other engineering constraints: This is not an engineering led thesis; however it would be 
possible to develop similar ideas with a more detailed assessment of the technological 
issues at stake. For example the heat and power flows from CHP might be assessed in 
more depth, and the technical challenges required to bring new and emerging technologies 
to market could be considered in more detail. The latter consideration might yield new and 
more detailed insights related to path dependence, for example if new materials might be 
required or if aspects of the education and training institutions may need to be expanded. 
Transport sector impacts: Assumptions are made about transport sector energy service 
demands and carbon intensity. Whilst simple sensitivities are tested in the scenario 
modelling, path dependence in the transport sector is not considered in detail. This would 
be possible through additional work, but doing so would require a scale of effort similar to 
that undertaken here, perhaps it could form a subsequent PhD thesis. 
UK Centric: The analysis is focused on the UK, but important phenomena, such as 
technology learning effects and fuel markets are international. 
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3 Background: C02 emission reduction, the role of technology, policy responses 
and path dependence 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief review of the evidence related the environmental imperatives 
surrounding climate change and C02 reduction, the scale of the challenge in reducing 
emissions whilst sustaining global economic growth and the main issues for energy system 
change. It also provides a brief and non-technical introduction to path dependency and lock 
in. The objective of the chapter is to provide some background and context rather than to 
review either technologies and systems, or path dependence in detail. These topics are 
returned to in chapters 4 and 5. The chapter draws a considerable amount of its material 
from the author's report with Prof. Anderson (PhD supervisor) for the Prime Minister on 
technology options to address climate change, his work on the PIU Energy Review 
(Anderson & Gross 2003; PIU 2001b; PIU 2001d) and some associated papers (Gross 
2004; Gross, Leach, & Bauen 2003). All other sources are referenced in the text, with the 
permission of co-authors where appropriate. 
3.2 Climate stabilisation and emission reduction 
Increasing scientific concern about the implications of greenhouse gas emissions on the 
stability of the global climate has lead to widespread international acceptance of the need 
to tackle this problem. This is reflected in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which 180 countries are signatories, and the work of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, sets 
binding greenhouse gas emission targets on developed countries and establishes 
mechanisms for accounting for and trading emissions. Although the USA has refused to 
ratify, all OECD countries (including the US), and many developing nations, have policies 
to constrain C02 emissions growth and/or to promote the development of lower carbon 
technologies and systems. Many of these policies target energy production and use, which 
is responsible for 85% of total greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries 
(IEA/OECD 2000). The most significant greenhouse gas arising from energy production is 
carbon dioxide (CO2), indeed energy related emissions amount to 95% of CO2 emissions 
(PIU 2002b). For this reason, energy system change will be central to CO2 emission 
abatement. 
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Unabated growth in emissions will result in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 that are far 
above most scientific judgement of what might be required to avoid the worst excesses of 
climate change in coming centuries (IPCC 2000). Many climate models indicate that 
stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at above 550 parts per million (ppm) could have 
catastrophic implications in the very long term, and that stabilisation even at 450 to 500 
ppm could have quite severe implications (RECP 2000). Yet stabilisation in this range 
would eventually require deep cuts in emissions relative to current OECD levels, and even 
deeper cuts relative to future emissions assuming that the emissions growth follows current 
and historic trends (IPCC 2000). Energy systems are comprised of many long lived 
investments, and change will take decades, but how rapidly emissions are reduced, and 
how this will be shared between nations, are subject of debate and uncertainty. However, 
with a view to the need to stabilise below 550 ppm, the UK government has adopted a UK 
`target' of 60% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 (Defra 2007; DTI 2003a; DTI 2007b). 
This level of emissions and this timeframe are therefore adopted for this study. 
3.3 Energy needs: the scale of the challenge 
Despite a 10-fold expansion of world energy consumption in the 20`h century (RECP 
2000), all the evidence points to continuing expansion in the present century, largely 
because growth in developing countries means that they will account for a greatly 
increased share of world energy markets (Anderson & Gross 2003). Energy markets in the 
OECD, which accounted for the bulk of growth in the last century, are maturing. Economic 
changes, combined with rising efficiency and the saturation of markets for some energy 
using products, mean that the growth of energy use is now slow and declining in some 
sectors, though this is less true in some electricity markets. But in South and East Asia, 
Africa and Latin America all energy markets are far from saturated and growth rates are 
three times higher than those of the OECD (UNDP/WEC 2000). 
Per capita energy consumption in low and middle-income countries is one sixth of that of 
the industrialised countries, and oil consumption one tenth, as Table 2.1 indicates. 1.6 
billion people are without access to modem energy forms (IEA 2002b), populations are set 
to increase by another 3-4 billion people, and energy demands are growing very rapidly. If 
developing countries are to achieve prosperity, large expansions of energy supplies will be 
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necessary; no country has been able to raise its per capita incomes from low levels without 
increasing its use of commercial energy (Smil 2003). 
Table 3-1: Populations, income and energy consumption c20004 
Low and Middle Income High Income Countries 
Countries 
Population, millions 5,200 900 
Gross National Income, $ 6,300 25,000 
billions 
Per Capita Incomes, $ 1,250 26,000 
Total energy use, million tonnes 4800 4900 
of oil equivalent 
Oil consumption, tonnes per 0.25 2.4 
capita 
Average electricity consumption, 1,200 9,800 
kWh per capita 
People without access to 2,000 0 
electricity, millions (in 1996) 
Increase in energy demand per 70 % 20 % 
decade (1990s) 
CO2 emissions from commercial 2.3 12.6 
energy use, tonnes per capita 
Source: (Anderson & Gross 2003). Citing World Development Report, World Bank (2000) and BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy (2001) 
Estimates of the precise magnitude of the likely expansion vary. But assuming reasonable 
improvements in energy efficiency, per capita energy consumption of low and middle- 
income countries might approach saturation at roughly half of that of the OECD countries 
today. This would require around 8000 GW of new electricity generating capacity - over 
ten times that installed in the United States and 120 times the capacity installed in the UK 
or France, for example. Their oil consumption would also rise, unless some alternative to 
oil is found, from 1.2 billion tonnes today, to over 10 billion tonnes - over seven times the 
combined consumption of the United States and Europe today (Anderson & Gross 2003). 
4 Estimates rounded. Low and middle-income countries here include economies in transition, including the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which have relatively high levels of energy consumption. 
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Overall, emissions in developing regions could become three or four times greater than 
those of the OECD countries today. Without development and use of low carbon 
technologies, global CO2 emissions will grow several-fold in the next 50 years. Such 
estimates indicate the magnitude of the task of addressing the problem of climate change 
whilst developing regions achieve economic prosperity. Figure 3.1 shows the LEA's 
`reference' (business as usual) scenario of growth in CO2 emissions across the different 
regions of the world without policy intervention and technology shifts. 
Figure 3-1: Scenario of growth in CO2 global emissions by region 
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Yet both industry and academic scenarios suggest that it is possible (though far from 
inevitable) to combine environmental improvement with an expansion of commercial 
energy use ((IPCC 2000), (Grubb et al. 1993; Shell 1996), (World Bank 1992)). Figure 3.2 
shows the range of CO2 scenarios reviewed by the IPCC (IPCC 2000). In some cases CO2 
emissions are seen to rise exponentially to 10 or more times today's levels; others conclude 
that a stabilisation and then a reduction of emissions to below today's levels or zero is 
possible over the long-term. 
Figure 3-2: The range of scenarios for CO2 emissions in the 21" century 
(IPCC 2000) 
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What explains such disparate estimates? The high emission scenarios assume continued 
and expanding use of fossil fuels particularly coal. The low emission scenarios all assume 
a long-term transition to low carbon energy forms and more rapid and far-reaching 
improvements in energy efficiency. In other words, the key to reducing emissions is the 
development and adoption of low carbon technology. 
3.4 Infrastructures and technology options 
Many environmental problems associated with energy production and use have been 
successfully addressed, with emissions and impacts eliminated or substantially reduced 
(Anderson, Clark, Foxon, Gross, & Jacobs 2001). Examples include the reduction of acid 
gases from power stations and harmful emissions from vehicle exhausts, and the 
elimination of wintertime urban smog in the richer countries. In almost every case the 
development of low-emission technologies and practices was the reason, usually with the 
incentive of environmental policies (Ibid). 
It will be more difficult to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil fuels, as 
carbon is inherent in all fossil fuels and they provide around 90% of primary energy. 
Nevertheless, in the long term, as the studies just cited have shown, deep cuts in the 
amount of C02 associated with delivering adequate `energy services' - heat, light, 
appliance services and motive power - appear feasible technologically. This is because 
emission reduction is possible at each stage of the `energy chain' linking primary energy 
sources to end uses, illustrated in Figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3-3: The `Energy Chain' 
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Carbon emissions can be reduced in each link of the energy chain, through: 
" Technologies to exploit low carbon primary sources such as renewables and nuclear 
power, or avoid CO-, emissions from fossil fuels escaping into the atmosphere through 
C02 capture and storage; 
9 Improved efficiency in conversion of primary energy; 
0 Improved efficiency in the transport and transmission of energy, and the introduction 
of new energy vectors such as hydrogen that provide zero emissions in use; 
0 Improved efficiency in end use technologies 
The prospects for emissions reduction at each stage are returned to in Chapter 4 
3.5 Policy responses to the carbon problem 
Policymakers have a long history of intervention in energy markets, indeed for much of the 
twentieth century, in most countries, electricity and gas markets were in public ownership. 
Coal industries were often also nationalised, subsidised or regulated and there is a tradition 
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of military and other interventions linked to security of oil supplies. The rationale for 
intervention has been as follows (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007): 
- Market failure, such as the `natural monopoly' status of electricity networks, 
environmental externalities and the positive externalities of innovation. 
- Social equity concerns such as access to electricity for poor consumers. 
- Security of supply and geopolitical concerns, such as dependence on unstable regimes 
for fuel and proliferation of nuclear materials. 
Since the late 1980s increasing scientific concern about climate change has moved climate 
change to the centre of energy policy in many countries, and to the top of the energy policy 
agenda in the UK (DTI 2003a; DTI 2007b; Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). 
Internationally, co-ordination of efforts to address climate change has taken place under 
the auspices of the UNFCCC, notably through the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1998). 
The country specific response to the carbon problem has varied by country, for a review of 
national policies see e. g. (IEA 2003; IEA 2004). Interventions generally fall into three 
categories (following Stern 2006): measures to price carbon (levies, taxes and permit 
trading schemes); measures (primarily regulations) to overcome non-price or `behavioural' 
barriers to the adoption of low carbon options; measures to promote innovation directly 
(RD&D subsidies, measures to create markets). Examples include: 
" Fiscal measures such as carbon taxes, energy taxes and road fuel and vehicle duties 
" Direct regulation to reduce emissions, switch to lower carbon fuels or improve 
efficiency - appliance and building standards are good examples 
" Tradable emission allowances, or `permit trading' schemes -a form of regulation 
which combines a regulatory cap with tradable certificates to allow flexible compliance 
" Subsidies for energy efficient technologies or practices 
" Targeted support for low carbon technologies - such as the UK's Renewables 
Obligation 
" R&D programmes directed to lower carbon or more efficient technology 
" Public information programmes 
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" Mandatory or voluntary product energy efficiency labelling schemes 
" Voluntary agreements with industry to reduce emissions 
In Britain, high level goals have been set for emissions reduction (Defra 2007; DTI 2007b), 
and specific energy and climate policies include participation in the EU emissions trading 
scheme, the Renewables Obligation, Energy Efficiency Commitments, support for energy 
related RD&D, advertising and information campaigns and proposals to support carbon 
capture and storage (Ibid). 
This thesis returns to the policy implications of path dependence and divergent scenarios 
for the development of low carbon energy systems in Ch. 8. 
3.6 Divergent futures and path dependency 
The purpose of this section is to begin to understand why the energy system might exhibit 
might path dependence. It first illustrates `path dependence' in a non-technical sense; 
reflections on the scale, longevity and inter-relatedness of energy system investments 
without reference to economic theory. Ch. 4 provides a more technical review of `path 
dependence' as used in a more precise sense by economists and other theorists, together 
with a review of the debate that surrounds this concept. 
3.6.1 Timescales and trajectories in the energy system: a non-technical view of path 
dependency and lock-in 
There are a wide variety of lower carbon options, and their characteristics vary. Whilst 
some options are directly complementary and others may be developed and utilised 
independently of each other, some are in effect alternatives. In addition, because energy 
services are always delivered by means of a complex system of interlinked and compatible 
technologies, no technology type can be considered in complete isolation - if the nature of 
primary energy sources is changed this may require the development of different energy 
transport and delivery infrastructures and end use devices, and vice versa. 
The components of the energy system change over time: individual appliances and vehicles 
are replaced quite frequently; buildings, power stations and refineries have longer 
lifetimes; major generation, fuel processing and infrastructural investments may last for 
tens of decades (see Table 3.2). As components are replaced a gradual process of evolution 
takes place; efficiencies increase and end uses diversify for example. In addition, there are 
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periodic decision points where major investments are initiated. Examples of this might be 
the decision to develop the UK natural gas distribution system, or a major programme of 
road building. These decision points affect the direction of investment (and energy use) 
over a long period of time. Whilst not every major infrastructure development entailed 
deliberate strategic, regulatory choice in many cases the regulatory and/or fiscal 
environment played a very important role. 
Table 3-2: Lifetimes for key energy system components 
(PIU 2002hl 
Item Lifetime (years) 
Gas network 60 
Electricity transmission system 50 
Oil refinery 50 
Large gas fired power station 30 
Large nuclear power station 40 
Wind turbine 20 
Motor car 12 
Domestic appliance 5- 10 
Boiler 15 
Commercial building 30 
An important related issue in energy system evolution is the size of the investments 
required in many of these long lived assets. For example a new coal or nuclear power 
station is likely to be around 1 GW in capacity (a gas fired station 300 - 700 MW), and 
power stations cost anything between around £O. 5m and £1.5m per MW, depending on the 
nature of the technology (DTI 2006b; DTI 2007b; Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). The 
UK currently has the capacity equivalent of more than seventy 1 GW power stations in 
operation, so replacing electricity generating capacity will require investment in the range 
£35 - £105 billion, depending on the mix of generation types. Similar orders of magnitude 
apply to many major energy assets, such as oil refineries and power and gas grids. 
Irrespective of any arguments over path dependence, energy systems are clearly subject to 
very large sunk costs that investors expect to recoup over extended time periods. One 
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important implication of this is that there will be strong economic interests acting against 
any sudden or rapid changes to the status quo in the energy system. These may well be 
underwritten by regulatory regimes and political commitments (Walker 2000). More 
widely, societal and institutional factors interact with invention, technological development 
and corporate strategy in a numerous and complex ways. It is important to note that 
societal changes drive technological development as well as vice versa (Hughes 1987). 
Resistance to change may occur for a range of reasons; some technical, some economic, 
some organisational, psychological or institutional. The relationship between such factors 
and path dependence is explored in Ch. 4. 
The examples above concentrate on the `energy system' or some subcomponent thereof - 
electricity generation, fuel refineries and so on. Much of this thesis focuses upon the 
system associated directly with the provision of energy services, particularly in the 
stationary sectors (non-transport sectors) of the economy (see Ch. 5 and Ch. 6). The thesis 
therefore discusses path dependence specifically in the context of electricity supply or fuel 
infrastructures. However it is important to note that technological development proceeds in 
tandem with societal change and that development in a wide range of spheres inter-relates 
(Hughes 1987). For example developments in manufacturing may be associated with 
developments in electricity supply. Indeed some analysts have been concerned with macro- 
economy level clusters of technologies that define the very nature of the world economy, 
and also change over time (see e. g. (Grubler 1998)). Whilst the thesis confines itself to 
study of path dependence in energy services provision it is likely that the concept may be 
fruitfully applied to different, or wider, systems. 
3.6.2 The importance of positive feedbacks 
Aside from the scale of investment required to replace energy infrastructure, important 
positive feedbacks or self-reinforcing effects take place, economists call these increasing 
returns and have identified different categories of them (see Ch. 4). An important result is 
that policy or consumer choices, regulations or market successes that occur early in the 
development of a new system may have such significant long term impacts. In what 
follows I take a much simplified example of one such feedback, where complementary 
technologies and infrastructures emerge to support a particular technology and this leads to 
the exclusion of alternatives: 
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During the second half of the twentieth century in most OECD countries governments 
invested heavily in an improved network of major roads, in response to growth in vehicle 
numbers. The new roads helped encourage car ownership, whilst competition and 
expanding vehicle sales encouraged and funded car manufacturer RD&D leading to vast 
improvements in the comfort and performance of vehicles, feeding back into ownership, 
and encouraging more road construction. Similar positive feedbacks can be observed in 
what might be described as sub-systems of the road transport system; for example as the 
performance of internal combustion (IC) engine was improved and vehicle use expanded 
demand for road-fuels increased, which encouraged fuel suppliers to expand their network 
of refuelling stations. The ready availability of fuel was of benefit to motorists, which 
made the development of alternative means of propulsion by the car-makers serving such 
consumers less attractive, encouraging instead further refinement and development of the 
IC engine - and so on. Several commentators have observed that a series of `historical 
accidents' may have been responsible for the success of the IC engine relative to its 
competitors (electric and steam cars) in the very early days of the motor car. However a 
process of increasing returns in both engine technology and fuels rapidly rendered 
alternative propulsion systems obsolete (Arthur 1989). 
As noted above, the boundary of a particular `system' subject to increasing returns may be 
difficult to draw. Many social and economic factors other than the economic feedbacks 
between engine and fuel also affected the phenomenon of expanding road transport and car 
ownership; land use planning, personal income growth, social norms that favoured 
personal mobility, increased leisure time; the list is long and stretches well outside the 
normal boundaries of energy or transport policy. This inter-relatedness of systems, 
technology types and societal and economic change is reflected in the interest in, and 
importance of, the macro level clusters described above. 
Increasing returns can therefore be observed at a macro-level (cars and roads), micro-level 
(engines) and through networks (engine type and fuels). There are in fact several categories 
of increasing return, explored below (Ch. 4). Numerous refinements take place in all 
aspects of a system of fuels, vehicles, roads, financial arrangements, regulation and so on. 
These reinforce each other, become more deeply established over time such that alternative 
paradigms, be they fuel choices or transport modes, become `locked out' to a very 
significant degree. 
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Similar issues may surround increasing use of decentralised generation; taken to its 
extreme this could greatly reduce the need for, and economic viability of, long distance 
electricity transmission (WADE 2006). This in turn could lead to a progressive reduction 
in long distance high voltage electricity network capacity, which would `lock out' remote 
energy sources. Some commentators have even observed that following this logic we 
might `remove the pylons' (Monbiot 2006). Why invest in infrastructure that is not needed 
by the new dominant technologies? 
Economists and other analysts of technological and social change have developed more 
precise models of such positive feedback effects, or `increasing returns to adoption', 
developed mathematical models of such effects and have codified different forms of 
increasing return (Arrow 1962; Arthur 1989; Arthur 1994; David 2000). Whilst the simple 
explanation of increasing returns, path dependence and lock-in into (petroleum fuelled) 
road transport provided above has great intuitive appeal, the economic significance of 
`historical economics' (David 2000) is more complex, and has been subject of considerable 
controversy. The next chapter therefore provides a more technical review and assessment 
of the literature on path dependence. 
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4 Path dependency and lock-in in economic theory 
`Path dependence' and `lock-in' are terms used in a relatively recent branch of what is 
broadly termed `evolutionary economics'; explicit use of the terms, and analysis of their 
causes and consequences originates in the mid 1980s (Arthur 1989). However, several of 
the key concepts utilised in the path dependence/lock-in literature have a rather longer 
history, in particular the importance of increasing returns (e. g. (Arrow 1962)). As 
discussed below, path dependence can be linked to other areas of `evolutionary' 
economics, and innovation theory, work on behavioural economics (in particular the notion 
of economic agents as having `bounded' rationality) the theory of the firm and various 
theories of growth (Dosi 1997; Marechal 2007). In this section the definition and 
explanations of path dependence and lock-in are explored, their significance in economic 
debates explained and controversies examined with a view of the usefulness of the concept 
to understanding carbon abatement scenarios. The section closes with a discussion of the 
relevance of path dependence to this thesis and a proposed set of `path dependence criteria' 
utilised for analysis in later chapters. 
There are other areas of interest within evolutionary economics (Nelson 1995). In 
particular, work that links evolutionary principles and the behaviour of economic agents in 
order to understand how both give rise to particular outcomes such as competitive 
advantage, induced technical change and economic growth (Nelson 1993). Dosi (1997) 
explores the linkages and complementarities between research concerned with behaviours 
and technical progress, and that which focuses on path dependence and increasing returns; 
he contends that these are broadly complementary paradigms. However, it is not necessary 
to explore the full range of evolutionary economic thinking in this thesis (for an excellent 
review see (Nelson 1995). Moreover the importance of increasing returns has been noted in 
several contexts, including `endogenous growth' models (see below and (Dosi 1997)). 
Finally, interest in increasing returns, evolutionary economics and path dependence is 
often linked to a wider class of investigation into innovation and technical change that goes 
beyond economics and includes sociology, history and engineering. This important strand 
of analysis is sometimes referred to as `transitions' thinking and has been associated with 
particular policy approaches to overcoming so called `lock-in' (Geels 2002; Kemp 1997). 
Whilst this chapter is focused on arguments specific to path dependence and economics, 
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the transitions management approach and policy responses associated with this school are 
returned to in Ch. 8. Marechal (2007) provides an excellent review of the linkages between 
various strands of analysis of evolutionary economics and other disciplinary perspectives 
on technical change and `lock-in' to high carbon energy economies. 
The linkage between the literature on path dependence and the branch of economics that 
deals with so called `bounded rationality' (Dosi 1997) is important, since a range of 
behavioural factors are associated with lock-in. Economists since the 1950s have sought to 
find a better representation of the complexities of human behaviour than that of the 
`perfectly rational' economic agents found in simple neo-classical economic models 
(Rubenstein 1998; Simon 1955). Some authors have drawn out the linkages between 
evolutionary economics and models of human behaviour (Arrow 1986). However, 
`bounded rationality' can be modelled and discussed independently from evolutionary 
economics (Rubenstein 1998) and the potential for lock in has been modelled using agents 
that are homogenous and `economically rational' in all respects except that they do not 
have perfect foresight (Arthur 1989). Analysis of the effects of competing technologies 
under increasing returns does not depend upon agents being `irrational' (Cowan 1991). It 
certainly does not require that economic agents make conscious choices that are in some 
way economically suboptimal. However, in most cases the case for path dependence at 
least depends upon a degree of bounded rationality, broadly defined in terms of 
heterogeneous agents with imperfect knowledge - at least of the future (Dosi 1997). 
4.1 Definitions of path dependence and lock-in 
Precise definition of path dependence and lock-in presents the analyst with an interesting 
paradox; it is easier to use the terms than to provide a rigorous and readily intelligible 
definition. It is relatively straightforward to define both terms in a non-technical sense: 
path dependence means `that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events' and lock-in that `once a country or region has 
started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high' ((Levi 1997; Sewell 1996) cited 
(Pierson 2000)). Lock-in is generally defined as the consequence of path dependence 
`central to the idea of lock-in is that technologies and technological systems follow specific 
paths that are difficult or costly to escape' (Perkins 2003). 
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However, clear definitions of both terms are relatively scarce and many analysts proceed 
direct to the causes of lock-in or path dependence, or criticisms thereof, rather than 
spending time on definitions. It is notable, for example, that several key texts dealing with 
lock-in do so with little or no specific reference to path dependence and move straight to 
how lock-in arises as a result of various forms of increasing returns (Arthur 1989; Cowan 
1990; Unruh 2000). This lack of clarity is important because debate over the economic 
significance of path dependence has focussed upon `types' of path dependence (Liebowitz 
& Margolis 1995a), and which `types' are included in economic debate will be affected by 
definitions. Moreover some commentators have highlighted confused or conflated use of 
terminology and argue that this gives rise to conceptual and normative disagreement 
(David 2000; Pierson 2000). Technical definitions have been proffered, though some are 
rather less than accessible to non-specialists: 
`Path dependence refers to a property of contingent, non-reversible dynamical processes... 
that can properly be described as evolutionary' (David 2000) 
`Processes that are non-ergodic, and thus unable to shake free of their history, are said to 
yield path dependent outcomes' (Ibid) 
`A path dependent stochastic process is one whose asymptotic distribution evolves as a 
consequence (function) of the processes' own history. ' (Ibid) 
`Lock in has been used... to describe... the entry of a [path dependent] system into a 
`trapping region' - the basis of attraction that surrounds a locally (or globally) stable 
equilibrium. ' (Ibid) 
Conceptual confusion and misunderstandings related to the use of words have been closely 
linked in philosophical discussion of the nature of human understanding. For example 
Wittgenstein argues that where theorists attempt to prescribe meanings to words that depart 
from the usual linguistic usage, or `landscape', conceptual confusion can arise, since use of 
language and understanding are inextricably interlinked. Meaning is not independent of 
usage (Wittgenstein 1968). However, such conceptual confusion is in some respects 
inevitable where language is being stretched and changed as a result of new avenues of 
research. Indeed Wittgenstein suggests that as new developments in the language 
47 
landscape are constructed (because of new endeavours in human knowledge) the usage that 
provides terms with their meaning become established and confusion diminishes. 
Since the literature and research into path dependency is new and emerging this helps 
explain why it is more straightforward to explain how path dependency and lock-in arise 
than it is to provide a precise, intelligible and uncontroversial definition. Again following 
Wittgenstein it may be that meaning can only be inferred from usage. Most analysts of 
path dependence have been concerned with the importance of increasing returns; indeed all 
of the technical definitions presented above assume increasing returns. Hence, following 
several key analysts (Dosi 1997; Pierson 2000; Unruh 2000) path dependence is defined for 
this thesis explicitly in terms of its origins in theories of increasing returns. 
A definition of path dependence: Path dependence' refers to a category of economic 
phenomenon where technologies or systems are subject to increasing returns. Increasing 
adoption accelerates cost or performance advantages relative to competing alternatives, 
further encourages consumption and/or stimulates the co-evolution of infrastructures and 
networks. In time this effect renders competing alternatives uncompetitive (in price or 
performance), incompatible with physical networks or related technologies, or with 
consumer expectations, regulations, institutional arrangements or the skills and expertise 
needed for exploitation. Effects are `non-linear' and `non-ergodic' such that early effects 
are amplified over time and it is more difficult to change them at a later point in time than 
it was to affect them in the first instance. Hence development moves along a particular path 
(or branch, see below (Pierson 2000)). The consequence of such path dependence is 
therefore `lock-in' to a particular set of technologies, systems, practices and rules. 
This definition is the author's own. It is important to note that this definition is relatively 
narrow. It excludes technologies subject to constant or diminishing returns despite the fact 
that `history matters' to such technologies and their markets too. Moreover it is important 
to note that the concept appears to be graduated rather than binary. All technologies appear 
likely to be subject to some (though not all) forms of increasing return, hence a degree of 
path dependence, but the significance of increasing returns will be much greater for some 
technologies/markets than others. 
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4.2 Increasing returns: the origins ofpath dependence 
If path dependence is defined in terms of the role of increasing returns it is important to 
understand how increasing returns give rise to path dependent effects. Increasing returns 
have been modelled mathematically (Arthur 1989). One important aspect of this is that 
early events/choices affect all later events/choices but not (in the absence of a time 
machine) vice versa. Events separated in time are `one way', so early events matter more; 
path dependent outcomes will differ according to the path that is followed, which is in part 
determined by early events/choices. This also means that increasing returns phenomena 
can have multiple equilibria - depending on which early choice gets the benefits of 
increasing returns. Notably these equilibrium points are uncertain at the outset and 
(controversially) may turn out to be inefficient or suboptimal (Arthur 1989; Pierson 
2000; Unruh 2000). 
A simple analogy of how increasing returns may be understood and modelled 
mathematically is provided by Polya 's Urn defined thus (based on (Pierson 2000)): 
Imagine a very large urn containing two balls, one black one red. Remove one ball at 
random and return it together with another the same colour. Repeat this process until the 
urn is full (say 1000 times). Each choice is random and the probability of drawing either 
colour is initially 50%. But each choice is `remembered' and affects subsequent choices - 
early red draws increase the probability of future red draws. Three key effects can be 
noted: 
-A range of possible mixes of red and black balls is possible from 1 red and remainder 
black to the opposite, and we cannot know at the outset what the outcome of any 
particular run of the `urn game' will be. Outcomes are uncertain and unpredictable. 
- In any particular run the colour balance will be determined in an asymptotic pattern as 
draws proceed, trending towards an equilibrium colour mix. Later draws contribute 
much less to the overall mix than earlier ones. Each run has equilibrium, but as each 
run may have a different outcome the urn game has multiple equilibriums. 
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- Sequence is crucial. The colour mix filling of the urn will tend to follow a path heavily 
influenced by the earliest outcomes. Draws late in the sequence do not simply cancel 
out the earlier draws: The game is `non-ergodic' (indeed even if conscious choices 
were permitted in the later stages of the urn game it would not be possible in many 
cases to materially change the equilibrium that had emerged). 
Arthur represents increasing returns to random choices in more detailed mathematical form 
(Arthur 1989). He also contrasts the dynamics of such increasing return effects with 
constant and diminishing returns. In addition to the unpredictability, multiple equilibriums 
and non-ergodicity noted above he also notes the following more normative points ((Arthur 
1994) cited in (Pierson 2000)). 
- Developments are inflexible. The further into a path we are the more difficult it is to 
shift. The effect of technology subsidies is cited - subsidy is more likely to shift the 
outcome if comes early rather than later. 
- There is the potential for path inefficiency. The outcome that is generated in any 
particular run may be less desirable than an alternative. 
One of Arthur's central contentions is that small, chance or apparently insignificant events 
early in a path dependent sequence can have dramatic long term consequences, a point 
reinforced by other authors citing both theoretical principle and empirical examples 
(Arthur 1989; Arthur 1994; Cowan 1990; David 2000). Path dependence can lead to 
suboptimal outcomes, even where economic agents optimise and markets are efficient. The 
likelihood of a sub-optimal outcome occurring in the real world is the subject of debate as 
discussed below (David 2000; Liebowitz & Margolis 1995a). Increasing returns do not 
imply that inefficiency will happen of necessity - increasing returns can generate both 
vicious and virtuous cycles (Pierson 2000). Indeed, the literature on increasing returns has 
its origins in analyses that sought to explain high levels of economic growth (Abramovitz 
1956; Arrow 1962) and recent interest in endogenous growth theory is based upon 
increasing returns concepts (Dosi 1997). But it is very important to note that positive 
feedback economics have very different outcomes from conventional neo-classical 
economics, where diminishing returns and negative feedbacks push economies or markets 
back towards stable, predictable and economically optimal equilibrium points (Pierson 
2000). It is also important to note that under increasing returns sub-optimal outcomes can 
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result from the actions of economically rational and well informed agents. As noted above, 
the only caveat on this is that agents do not have perfect foresight since the future of the 
technologies is uncertain (Cowan 1991; Dosi 1997). 
4.3 Sources of increasing return 
Why and how do such positive feedbacks or increasing return arise? Interest in increasing 
returns originated in macro-economics; economists noted that post war economic growth 
appeared to be more rapid than neoclassical theories of capital accumulation would imply 
and ascribed the difference to technological learning effects (Abramovitz 1956; Solow 
1957) in (Arrow 1962)). A famous paper by Kenneth Arrow introduces and models a form 
of positive feedback, `learning by doing' (Arrow 1962). Arrow himself notes that 
awareness of various forms of positive feedback had a much longer history in the 
engineering literature (Wright 1936). Indeed the existence of increasing returns of a sort 
can be traced back to Adam Smith (Dosi 1997). Explicit analysis of increasing returns 
(both mathematical and empirical) has been extended beyond learning effects. Three broad 
categories of increasing return have been identified, though there is overlap (Arthur 1994) 
(Pierson 2000, Unruh 2000, Perkins 2003): 
Increasing returns to adoption: increasing production leads to a fall in the unit price or 
improvement in quality either through scale economies or a variety of learning effects 
(learning by doing, using etc). 
- Adaptive expectations: As a leading design emerges consumer uncertainty is reduced 
and more consumers are encouraged to adopt the leading design, further encouraging 
its adoption and hence feeding back into yet more widespread use. Adaptive 
expectations also apply to investors, and in commercial enterprises. 
- Network externalities: also described as co-ordination effects (Pierson 2000), these 
occur where technologies are linked and need to be compatible, or a system is required. 
Examples include computer hardware and software, video tape or DVD formats, road 
vehicles and refuelling systems. 
Some authors also point to `technological regimes', `rules of thumb' or `mental frames' 
(Perkins 2003; Unruh 2000). These relate specifically to the skills, principles and accepted 
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ideas within the technological community involved with product 
design and development. 
Such effects may be a source of increasing returns, 
for example a form of adaptive 
expectation. They are also part of a complementary strand of analysis concerned with 
providing a behaviourally richer insight into how 
learning by doing and other feedbacks 
proceed and are prevalent in economic analysis concerned with agents acting with 
bounded 
rationality (Dosi 1997). Effort, training and expertise are 
focused on the dominant design 
(e. g. the IC engine not the electric motor) (Unruh 2000). These effects also contribute to 
path dependence and lock-in since alternatives are no longer seriously explored. 
Some analysts of path dependence discuss it in terms of a branching process; technological 
choices or institutional arrangements take us along a particular branch, new developments 
branch off and so on. Extending the analogy to a tree, it is suggested that history results in 
human systems exploring a set of branches over time but perhaps leaving whole parts of a 
potential tree unexplored (Foray 1997). This analogy may also be linked to the literature on 
behaviour, since the unexplored areas will lie outside the `mental frame' of the 
technological community. Analogies may also be drawn with evolutionary biology, insofar 
as recent thinking about evolution emphasises that `fitness' of a species is context specific 
and the product of a path dependent process (Nelson 1995). Hence only some potential 
branches of the `family tree' of a species are explored. 
4.4 Why path dependence matters 
As noted above, the primary focus of interest in path dependence has been related to 
economic efficiency and the evolution of markets rather than to energy policy or climate 
change. However, path dependence is important to analysts of technical change in general 
and of the low carbon energy in particular for the following reasons. 
Inefficient or suboptimal systems may become `locked in': Economists have been 
interested in path dependence because it appears to lead to the possibility that efficient and 
competitive markets can deliver, over time, economically suboptimal outcomes (Arthur 
1989). This is also one reason that path dependence is controversial, for reasons that we 
explore below. 
Lock-in has normative consequences and implications for policy: Moreover, the potential 
for suboptimal outcomes has normative consequences since this may justify state 
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intervention. This fuels further controversy (see below). Interestingly, it can also be 
demonstrated analytically that under conditions of increasing returns and uncertainty about 
future technological advance a central planner can also `lock-in' to a suboptimal 
technology; even where the danger of doing so is recognised (Cowan 1991). 
Institutions matter: Much of the literature on increasing returns focuses on products. 
However, it is important to note that institutions, regulations, financial arrangements and 
so on may be subject to network externalities and/or may benefit from increasing returns. 
Indeed some analysts pay specific attention to the interplay between technologies and 
institutions and argue that these are particularly significant in energy systems (Unruh 
2000). The importance of institutions opens up the possibility of institutional `capture' by 
vested interests or simply by enthusiasts for a particular technology or approach (Cowan 
1990; Unruh 2000; Walker 2000). 
Opportunities missed: Finally, to return to the `branching' analogy outlined above; path 
dependence suggests that potential technologies and systems remain unexplored and 
unexploited, both commercially and in terms of the `mental frames' of relevant agents. 
4.5 Why is path dependence controversial? 
Perhaps surprisingly, path dependence has been the subject of intense debate, with claim 
and counter claim proliferating (David 2000; Foray 1997; Liebowitz & Margolis 
1995a; Pierson 2000). Before considering the merits of these arguments it is worth 
considering why some economists appear to dislike path dependence. The principal issue 
that critics of path dependence take issue with is the supposed implication that economic 
optimisation by rational agents and optimal equilibrium points delivered by effective 
markets can be over-ridden by `chance events': 
`Welcome to the world of path dependence, a world not governed by our stars, not by 
ourselves, but by insignificant accidents of history.... In the world of path dependence ... 
our expectations for market consequences are turned upside down. The invisible hand does 
not work in the world of path dependence' (Liebowitz & Margolis 1995b) in (David 2000). 
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Hence path dependence may have a normative dimension; that markets may not deliver a 
socially optimal outcome, not only due to (static) market failure but because of `historical 
accidents'. Again this runs counter to the expectations of conventional economics; that the 
`best' technologies win through competition. A related point draws a technological analogy 
from evolutionary biology in order to contrast natural selection (survival of the fittest) with 
path dependent selection (a sequence of (partly random or trivial) events produced the 
fittest) (Foray 1997). In fact, biology does not contend that `fittest' applies in some 
absolute sense, and explicitly allows that it is a path dependent and temporary phenomena 
(Nelson 1995). However, there is much to disentangle here: theoretical point from 
empirical claim, normative consequence from analytical possibility or empirical 
observation. In what follows the principal objectives of this thesis - to assess the 
possibility of and policy relevance of path dependence in future energy systems - is kept in 
mind when discussing the arguments for and against the economic significance of path 
dependence. 
Critics of path dependence and lock-in make two central claims, that have been the main 
focus of debate (David 2000; Foray 1997; Liebowitz & Margolis 1995a; Pierson 2000): The 
first is that only what is termed remediable path dependence has any policy relevance or 
meaningful theoretical significance. The second is that there is no empirical evidence that 
significant suboptimal outcomes ever emerge under conditions of remediable path 
dependence. It is argued that remediable suboptimal outcomes could only emerge if there 
were a complete absence of institutions (such as patents or futures markets) that allow 
entrepreneurs to profit from knowledge of future benefits (and hence counteract sub- 
optimal increasing returns). `Remediable' in this context refers to a state of affairs where 
market participants or public policy makers could know ex-ante that path `a' was better in 
the long run than path `b', yet `b' was adopted. This critique does not deny the existence of 
increasing returns but it does challenge the notion that chance events or relatively 
fleeting/minor benefits lead to sub-optimal lock-in. 
It is important to note that the policy relevance and theoretical significance of path 
dependence can be sustained if either of the above criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny 
(Pierson 2000). Both points are now considered in turn. 
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4.5.1 Only remediable path dependent inefficiency matters (? ) 
Liebowitz and Margolis identify three types (degrees) of path dependence (Liebowitz & 
Margolis 1995a). The first is where a path dependent outcome occurs but there is no reason 
to believe it is sub-optimal. They do not dispute the existence of path dependent lock-in of 
this nature, but suggest it is simply `history'. `Second degree' path dependence is where an 
outcome is indeed sub-optimal in some way (regrettable ex-post), but this could not have 
been foreseen by economic agents, and at all prior points optimal decisions were taken. 
The possibility of this is also agreed, though they claim it is rarer than type one. `Third 
degree' path dependence would occur when a sub-optimal outcome could have been 
foreseen but was not, or was foreseen but that foresight was not acted upon, or where a 
current remedy exists that costs less to make than the penalty of the extant inefficiency, 
and again is not taken. The justification for dismissing the first two forms of path 
dependence is because the availability of effective remediation is a well established 
principle of public policy intervention. Liebowitz and Margolis argue that the third form 
either does not occur at all, or only in a very trivial sense (much discussion on this appears 
to relate to video tape formats! ). 
Several points may be made in response to this criticism. First, the step from theoretical 
inefficiency to public policy objectives may be questioned. Pierson (2000) points out that 
we may be interested in outcomes ex-post for purposes other than remedial policy. If that is 
the case then second degree path dependency is of theoretical significance. In the context 
of this thesis, interest in how path dependence might cause us regret is clearly of relevance, 
not least to guide the formation of future (but not directly remedial) policy. A more 
fundamental contention is made by Foray (1997). Foray argues that the notion that optimal 
action is knowable ex-ante is logically flawed, since the very process of technological 
development is inherently uncertain. It is not surprising that third degree inefficiency is 
hard to find empirically since the very processes that path dependence theorists focus on 
(technological innovation and adoption) are inherently uncertain ex-ante (Foray 1997). 
Moreover, the notion that economic decisions are in all respects optimum would appear to 
require the existence of an omniscient economic agent, with perfect foresight (Dosi 1997). 
When considering path dependence and technological lock in over time it appears that 
limits to both actual knowledge and the possibility of knowledge are both present. This in 
turn suggests that the link to policy that Liebowitz and Margolis make is itself conceptually 
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flawed - the policy relevance is not defined in terms of in how to correct a foreseeable 
market failure but rather how best to intervene (or even should a case for intervention 
exist) in the face of both uncertainty ex ante and potential path dependency. It also 
suggests that there is no meaningful distinction between 2°d and 3id degree path 
dependence. 
Supporters of path dependence also point out that the epistemology of neo-classical 
economics is teleological - an ahistorical science that seeks to understand phenomena in 
terms of extant functions and relationships, not their origins or antecedents. They argue 
that adding an historical dimension is not a challenge to conventional economics, merely 
an extension to it (David 2000). However they also point out that attempting to apply the 
principles of policy analysis that only apply in the ahistorical/static context, namely that 
there must be an identifiable (translated in the ex ante historical context into `foreseeable') 
market failure, represents a mixing of teleological and chronological concepts that is likely 
to lead to confusion. 
Despite these criticisms the arguments against path dependence, and the counter 
arguments, do have interesting implications for policy. If Liebovitz and Margolis are right 
(policies can only deal with what is knowable and remediable), and Foray is right (it is 
impossible to determine path dependent inefficiencies ex-ante) then one response might be 
to focus only on current market failures. Arguably any existing carbon `lock-in' arose not 
because of path dependence per se but simply due to ignorance of the `carbon problem'; in 
short, an externality was overlooked until it was too late. Had the long term consequences 
of CO2 emission been recognised sooner policymakers could have applied the standard 
instruments of environmental policy (regulation and taxation) earlier. As a result, `lock-in' 
to low carbon could have been avoided or reduced irrespective of any scenarios or path 
dependent analysis. This argument has considerable internal logic, and certainly supports 
the contention that `getting the prices right' now should be a central plank of climate 
policy, since doing so will help to avoid lock in to future high carbon systems even though 
we do not know how such systems will develop. Perhaps controversially it also suggests 
that pricing carbon in developing countries that have not yet `locked in' to a high carbon 
energy system might be more economically beneficial in the long term than pricing carbon 
in rich nations that are already `locked in'. Exploring the implications of this idea further is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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However, whilst few would dissent with the idea that correcting market failures is part of 
the policy response, this does not imply that pricing carbon (for example) is the only 
response. A key question is whether there are other actions that could be considered in the 
light of current understanding of the potential for path dependence and recognition of 
uncertainty. Even if Liebovitz and Margolis are right that policy is only about remedies for 
known problems, it is possible that policy can respond to anticipated problems. Indeed 
recent UK policy accepts the proposition that future uncertainties require policymakers to 
engage with the management of risk (Stern 2006). We know that the future is uncertain and 
can anticipate path dependence; hence it appears sensible to consider policies that go 
beyond correcting externalities and attempt to actively manage (or at least proactively 
engage with) path dependent processes. We return to these intriguing possibilities and 
implications for policy in Ch. 7 and 8. 
Another difficulty with the `laissez faire' response to path dependent lock-in to high 
carbon (or any other undesirable lock-in) is that if we accept the historical/evolutionary 
reasoning that leads to the identification of lock-in, then it follows that extricating 
ourselves from a locked-in condition is going to be difficult, indeed only possible if the 
conditions that create lock-in are removed or overcome (Marechal 2007). One implication 
of this is that if carbon price is the only tool used to overcome lock in then carbon pricing 
will only work if price rises to `disruptive' levels. It is interesting to note here also that the 
prescription does not follow from the analysis that reveals the problem. The problem is one 
of a dynamic and non-linear process, difficult to reverse, leading to a new state where 
carbon (for example) is `locked-in' (see Unruh 2000 and Ch. 7). Not surprisingly, a 
response based solely on a `static' view of the `carbon externality' (note again the 
confusion of teleological and chronological concepts, above), can only work in-extremis, 
by providing a costly `economic shock'. It would appear more consistent to consider 
responses to path dependence that have been conceived by analysts of path dependence 
(and the economic dynamics, technological and institutional processes that lie behind it) 
than relying solely on a conceptual framework that cannot accommodate lock-in. Again, I 
return to this in Ch. 7 and 8. 
57 
4.5.2 Lack of empirical evidence 
We have already established that there are good reasons to expect it to be difficult to 
establish an empirical case for remediable path dependency. A second issue is given rather 
less explicit attention in the literature, and in fact it applies to all types of path dependence 
because proving (sub)-optimality depends upon the establishment of a credible 
counterfactual (Foray 1997). Yet the supposed superiority of a counterfactual which by 
definition never came to pass is impossible to disprove. This creates an epistemological 
problem, since any claim made about suboptimal path dependence is inherently un- 
falsifiable. The nature of scientific `facts' has been subject to philosophical debate since 
Socrates, but a strand of scientific philosophy (usually associated with Karl Popper) argues 
that claims that cannot be tested by seeking to prove them wrong are not suitable objects 
for scientific analysis. We cannot scientifically establish sub-optimal path dependence; we 
can merely moot its possibility. 
Whilst debate within the philosophy of science has moderated the Popperian position 
somewhat, the limitations of argument based upon the relative superiority of an imaginary 
out-turn can be illustrated in simple common sense terms: The better option that appeared 
to be available ex-ante was never exploited, so how can we be sure it would not have been 
dogged by unforeseen problems? The better option that appears to be available now is 
hypothetical too and so similarly may turn out to have practical problems. Problems of this 
nature are well known in evolutionary theory; modem biology does not require that current 
extant species are optimal (even to their current niche), merely that they best suited a 
particular path dependent evolution. Evolutionary biology also highlights the value of 
exploration of (un-falsifiable but nonetheless useful) `what ifs' (Nelson 1995). 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of counterfactuals that cannot be disproved 
Liebowitz and Margolis do not place their absence at the centre of their criticism. Rather 
they devote their attention to countering empirical claims made for the inferiority of VHS 
video, the QWERTY keyboard, etc (technologies cited by path dependence theorists as 
examples of path dependence). Given that Liebowitz and Margolis accept the possibility of 
inefficient lock-in but argue it is likely to be rare, this attention to empirical evidence is 
sensible. However, it is notable that we can never prove nor disprove the inferiority or 
otherwise of these examples, only argue about `what if' different technology came to 
benefit from increasing returns. `Proof that path dependent inefficiency is rare can never 
58 
be provided through empirical reviews since by definition the competitor (Beta video, 
DSK keyboard, etc) never achieved market dominance. ((Foray 1997) citing Arrow 1995). 
However if we set aside the attempt to find 'proof, then empirical evidence and examples 
that draw upon the engineering literature and history can provide interesting insights into 
the desirability of the current status quo, how it arose and whether it could be improved. 
For this thesis empirical proof that suboptimal lock-in has occurred is not necessary, since 
it is concerned with future scenarios rather than interpreting the past. Following the 
evolutionary biology model (Nelson 1995), all that is necessary for our purposes is to be 
able to demonstrate with reference to sufficient engineering and other evidence that: a) 
credible alternatives to current systems might have come to pass; b) options that were not 
selected early in a process of development (hence not subject to increasing returns) fell by 
the wayside in the past. It is not necessary to prove that such counterfactuals would or 
would not have turned out to be superior to extant technologies. The principal issue for our 
purposes is simply that we cannot be certain ex ante if path `a' or path `b' will be optimal, 
but we can envisage either. It is therefore important to try to understand the extent to 
which progress toward `a' or `b' is path dependent, will result in lock-in and hence might 
create what Foray terms `regret' - an appreciation ex post (impossible to know ex ante) 
that we have arrived at a sub-optimal state of affairs (Foray 1997). 
In sum, whilst the controversy surrounding path dependence is fascinating in the context of 
the epistemology of economics and has important implications for policy, it does not 
appear that any of the arguments `against' path dependence undermine its potential 
importance to future energy scenarios. The next two chapters this thesis set aside questions 
that surround the epistemology, usefulness and existence of path dependence. Ch 7 returns 
to path dependence on the basis that exploring the potential for it is possible. This requires 
a means by which to test for it. 
4.6 Testing for path dependence? 
Ch. 5 and Ch. 6 address technological and practical matters related to the technologies 
available to reduce CO2 emissions and how they might be combined in the energy system 
of the future. Since a key goal is to explore these scenarios for path dependence the 
question arises as to whether it is possible to `test' for path dependence? Moreover can we 
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frame this criterion or test such that it helps to elucidate whether divergent low carbon 
energy systems might be in some way in competition for dominance? The degree of path 
dependence exhibited by an energy system may be explored through the following 
questions: 
- Are there increasing returns to the adoption of particular component technologies or 
energy systems? These may arise as a result of. 
o learning effects reducing costs relative to alternatives 
o high initial costs/economies of scale 
- Are there increasing returns due to network externalities? These include: 
o infrastructure requirements 
o fuel source/energy carrier and end user device compatibility 
o institutional and regulatory needs 
- Are there increasing returns due to `adaptive expectations', for example: 
o consumer confidence in fuels or technologies 
o managerial experience with key technologies and/or systems 
o investor confidence 
o Is there the need to develop particular `knowledge sets' that apply to 
particular technologies but not others? 
4.7 Conclusions on path dependency, energy scenarios and policy 
This brief review of path dependence reveals a literature that is controversial and still 
defining its terms. The controversy is to do with the nature and epistemology of economics 
(mechanical vs biological, evolutionary or teleological) and the principles that underpin its 
models (optimal or bounded rationality, stable or multiple equilibriums, etc) as well as 
with path dependency per se. Analysis of the debates highlights the importance of 
understanding that insight may be gained through comparing largely hypothetical and 
possibly incomplete `what ifs' rather than proving the existence of an unequivocal optimal 
counterfactual outcome. The normative consequences of these debates are significant, 
since policy must be able to deal with both technological uncertainty and limits to 
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knowledge and at least the possibility that path dependence will lead to a suboptimal (in 
the sense of regrettable) outcomes. Should policy attempt to embrace path dependence or 
merely correct market failures that we know to exist now on the basis of more 
conventional (ahistorical) economic analysis? 
Nevertheless the key points about path dependency and lock-in that were highlighted in 
section 4.4.4 (inefficient or suboptimal systems may become `locked in'; lock-in has 
normative/policy consequences; institutions may be locked in and opportunities may be 
missed) do not appear to be fundamentally undermined, provided the limitations and 
controversies highlighted here are borne in mind. Hence path dependence is relevant to 
energy policy, and worth particularly exploring in energy scenarios, using the criteria 
above. This is what this thesis attempts to do in Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
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5 Emerging low carbon energy technology options - prospects, 
challenges and implications for energy system change 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the characteristics and current 
status of low carbon technology options. The main objectives are to: 
- outline the challenges faced by each technology option/type 
- explore how large a role each option could in principle play in reducing emissions 
- consider possible timeframes for development 
- discuss implications or requirements for energy system/infrastructural change 
This provides the basis for the development of energy system scenarios (Chapter 6). The 
chapter provides an overview for each option of characteristics such as decentralised or 
central station operation, and whether new vectors or facilitating technologies are needed. 
The chapter draws upon work undertaken by the author for the PIU and work published by 
the author elsewhere (Anderson & Gross 2003; Gross et al. 2006; Gross, Leach, & Bauen 
2003; PIU 2001d). 
5.2 The Diversity of options: a review 
CO2 emission reduction can be achieved in three principal ways: by reducing demand for 
energy services (light, heat, motive power), by extracting primary energy and converting it 
into commercially useful forms in a way that results in zero (or very low) net emissions of 
CO2 to the atmosphere; and by improving the efficiency with which energy is converted, 
transported or used (hence the efficiency with which energy services are delivered). In 
what follows the latter two routes are considered. The section therefore considers four 
categories of technology: 
- Low carbon primary sources: renewable energy; nuclear power 
- High efficiency fossil fuel conversion technologies; and engineered capture and storage 
of CO2 from fossil fuel plants 
- High efficiency end use devices; including appliances, buildings and vehicles 
- Energy transmission and storage media such as electricity networks or hydrogen. 
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The section considers options applicable to the UK, with a review of global developments. 
It is based upon analytical work by the author for the PIU Energy Review (PIU 2002b), 
and Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (Anderson & Gross 2003) and other publications 
(Gross, Leach, & Bauen 2003)5. Methodologically it draws upon two main techniques 
which allow for estimation of cost reduction potential; technology learning curves and 
engineering assessment. 
5.2.1 Renewable energy and nuclear power 
Both renewable energy and nuclear power produce zero net C02 emissions in use. Life 
cycle emissions that include emissions associated with plant construction are also low 
relative to fossil fuels (Holland et al. 1998; Schleisler 2000). Most renewable technologies 
are relatively immature and deployed in small markets relative to fossil fuels; less than 5% 
of UK electricity is provided by renewable sources (DTI 2007a). They tend to be more 
expensive than more established options, though the extent to which this is true varies 
widely between technologies and applications. Some renewables are intermittent; their 
output fluctuates with environmental conditions and time of day. This can lead to 
additional costs when integrating them into electricity networks (Gross, Heptonstall, 
Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 2006). Some face constraints due to land use planning 
and other issues. 
Nuclear power by comparison is a mature and well-proven option that currently provides 
around 20% of UK and 17% of world electricity. On most estimates nuclear is also more 
costly than the cheapest fossil fired alternative (currently gas combined cycle generation 
(CCGT) in the UK), though cost estimates vary -a point returned to below (Gross, 
Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). Nuclear faces a variety of obstacles related to its public 
acceptability, waste management and its attractiveness to private investors. For all these 
reasons this section provides a detailed review of the prospects for leading renewables 
technologies and for varied designs of nuclear power station. For each option it considers 
the resource base and potential scale of contribution to energy needs, current and 
prospective future costs, and key challenges related to expanded utilisation. 
5 Full technology details are provided in annexes 1&2, which reproduce sections of working papers and 
reports produced by the author for the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and the UK Energy Review 
respectively (Anderson & Gross 2003; PIU 2001d). 
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5.2.2 Renewable energy options 
Resource base 
Detailed work on the potential resource of each type of renewable resource was undertaken 
by the UK DTI (DTI 1998) and the author provided an updated review for the Cabinet 
Office, which also noted other sources (PIU 2001d). A revised version developed by the 
author is summarised in Table 5.1 (First published in (PIU 2001d)). 
Table 5-1: UK Resource in 2025 
((DTI 1998), (Bauen 2000)) 
Technology Technical potential TWh/yr Practicable potential TWh/yr 
Building integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) 250+ 37** 
Offshore wind 3000 100 
Onshore wind 317 8*** 
Biomass (energy crops)## 140 -30 
Wave 700 50 
Tidal stream# 36 1.8 
Small Hydro 40 3 
Waste technologies: MSW 13.5 6.5 
(municipal solid waste) 
Landfill gas 
7 7 
This table is based largely upon DTI figures (DTI 1998), with more recent figures used for offshore wind, and estimates based upon 
(Bauen 2000)for biomass. 
'Technical potential' here is termed 'accessible resource' in the DTI study and practicable potential is termed 'practicable resource'. The 
language change is to convey that all figures arc for potentials - potential energy output, not available resource input. 
Figures for practicable potential include a variety of technical and non-technical constraints, and technical potential provides an 
assessment of the useful energy that could be extracted from available resources. 
* DTI derive 'resource cost' curves for all technologies, that increase with cost, in most cases up to a maximum level at which external 
(practicable potential) constraints cut in. The exception is BIPV, where only the potential at less than 7p/kWh is included in the figure 
for practicable potential. 
'" BIPV practicable potential is limited by assumptions about penetration rate into new buildings. 
* Assumes constrained build rate and no network reinforcement 
# Tidal stream devices exclude large barrages. 
## Biomass energy (for both heat and electricity) using forestry residues already makes a significant contribution to other Northern 
European countries and in the US. However, the UK's very low forest cover limits UK available resource, and realisation of significant 
practicable potential would require development of dedicated energy crop plantations. DTI analysis suggests that energy crops could 
provide 33 TWh of electricity and this is based upon quite conservative assumptions about land availability. If these constraints are 
relaxed, technical potential becomes much larger - for example if 10% of UK arable land were to be utilised for energy crops, technical 
potential would be around 140 TWh/ycar (Bauen 2000). 
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Whilst it is reasonable to expect that the availability of suitable locations and competing 
land uses will always constrain onshore wind, energy crops and photovoltaics (PV) on 
buildings (BIPV) in the UK, the picture for offshore resources is less clear-cut. To take 
offshore wind as an example, the UK government recently identified three prospective 
strategic regions for the development of offshore wind, based upon information submitted 
to the DTI by prospective wind energy developers (DTI 2002). Excluding the closest 5 km 
to the shore, the total theoretical resource amounts to around 1,000 TWh /yr at less than 30 
metres depth, with another 2000 TWh in waters less than 50 metres deep6. If 3.5% of the 
area is actually used for offshore wind this could deliver 100 TWh/yr, and wind farms 
occupying 15% of the area would be equivalent, in terms of total energy delivered per 
annum, to all UK electricity demand (though demand and supply would need to be 
balanced through extensive use of energy storage). It should also be noted that there are 
many other areas off the coast of the UK that could be developed. In addition, individual 
wind turbines are positioned hundreds of metres apart, other uses of the sea such as inshore 
fishing and leisure vessels are able to continue even within the areas where developments 
take place, indeed the Scroby Sands offshore wind-farm has become a tourist attraction. 
Overall it is clear that for biomass, PV, wind and wave/tidal stream technologies7, 
technical potential is large, and unlikely to be a constraint on development for many years. 
Development status: an overview of the leading options 
Most renewable options are technologically immature and occupy very small market 
shares relative to nuclear and fossil fuels. However, renewable energy options differ 
considerably in terms of the maturity of each technology, prospective market and 
technological development, and the obstacles to progress. These differences have been 
explored in detail in a wide variety of different contexts (see eg (Gross, Leach, & Bauen 
2003), (UNDP/WEC 2000)). The current global status of each is summarised in Table 2, 
which indicates current costs, size of the existing market and market growth rates. 
6 Based upon the use of 3MW turbines at 500 m spacing (DTI 2002) 
We consider the issues that surround wave and tidal stream collectively, as there are many similarities 
between the two in terms of technological maturity and the stage of development of the industry. 
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Table 5-2: Current global status of leading renewable energy options 
Technology Current costs Installed capacity Market Growth 
($cents/kWh) (MW) 
PV 30 - 80 -6000 25 % pa 
Onshore wind 3-5 -75,000 30 % pa 
Offshore wind 5-8 -400 Installed capacity tripled 2002 - 
2004, longer term growth rate 
not yet clear 
Biomass 5-8 (conventional -35,000 (power Unclear 
combustion for power generation and CHP) 
generation) 
Wave and Tidal Estimated at <2 Demonstration stage 
stream - 10 (largely on basis of 
prospective costs 
Costs 
Detailed analysis of the current and future costs of renewable energy was undertaken by 
the author for the UK Energy Review. This work used the techniques of engineering 
assessment and technology learning curves to assess cost reduction potential to 2020. The 
main findings are summarised in Table 5.3 
Table 5-3 Current and future UK renewable generating costs (PIU 2001d) 
Technology Current cost 2020 Basis and confidence level Prospects for 
£/MWh projection continued 
reductions 
beyond 2020 
Onshore wind 30 - 50 15 - 25 Learning curve, market Poor 
growth and engineering 
assessment. High 
Offshore wind 40 - 80 20 - 30 Engineering assessment and Moderate 
proxy learning curve. 
Moderate 
Biomass NA 30 - 45 Engineering assessment. Moderate 
Moderate 
Wave/tidal NA 60 - 80 Engineering assessment. Low Good 
PV - 700 100 - 150 Learning curve, market Good 
growth and engineering 
assessment. High 
8 The lower end of the range represents the authors calculations of the costs of delivered energy from the 
Danish stations at Horns Rev and Nysted (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). The upper end is an estimate 
from the DTI Energy Review 2006. The authors own estimates also suggest that the UK farms at North 
Hoyle and Scroby Sands are delivering energy at around £55 - 60/MWh (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). 
9 Neglects any potential for offset costs (building materials displaced by PV facade and tile materials). 
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Key challenges facing renewables 
The challenges faced by each option are diverse. An overview for each option is provided 
in this section. 
Solar PV 
PV faces two main challenges. The first is that costs are currently very high, and look set 
to remain high relative to other options in the UK, particularly if the potential to offset 
other building materials is neglected. The second relates to the implications for electricity 
grids; PV is likely to be most cost effective if deployed in small scale applications on 
buildings, it is also very intermittent. As a result widespread utilisation will require 
changes to local distribution networks and widespread utilisation might require the 
development of storage technologies (see Ch. 6). 
Wind 
Wind energy in the UK has suffered from difficulty in securing planning consents ((PIU 
2002b)), due to adverse visual impacts on landscape and concerns about noise. It remains 
to be seen whether developments offshore will be subject to planning constraints, but there 
has been opposition to offshore developments (NATTA 2007). Wind energy is also 
intermittent. The cost implications of intermittency are very modest at low penetrations, 
studies indicate that they will rise to around £5 - 8/MWh if the proportion of wind plant on 
the system rises to around 20% of electricity supplied (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, 
Green, Leach, & Skea 2006). This represents around 10% of the cost of generation at 
present. Another problem currently limiting progress with wind power in Britain is access 
to grid connection, and a `queue' of up to ten years in some parts of the National Grid 
network where upgrading is needed under current regulatory arrangements (DTI 2006e). 
Wave and tidal 
As yet wave and tidal technologies are largely unproven since only a small number of 
devices have been tested in the marine environment. Moreover, there are a wide variety of 
designs and approaches and it is not yet clear which of these, if any, will be able to deliver 
electricity at a cost that is competitive with other renewables, particularly wind. The best 
sites are also remote from existing grid infrastructure, which suggests that investment in 
electricity transmission or alternative energy transport (such as hydrogen) will be needed if 
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the technology is to be exploited on a significant scale (Gross, Leach, & Bauen 2003; PIU 
2001 d). 
Biomass 
Biomass based technologies include a wide range of feedstocks and conversion 
technologies. Conventional combustion based technologies using forestry residues, 
agricultural bi-products and municipal wastes (including landfill gas) are already cost 
effective in some applications. More advanced techniques such as gasification of woody 
materials for use in a combined cycle gas turbine are more costly and have rather limited 
market exposure. In the UK context, low cost feedstock availability appears to have 
impinged negatively on development - with little forestry residues are scarce compared to 
countries like the US and Denmark, whilst a complex range of factors has tended to 
discourage plantation of energy crops ((E4tech 2006; Gross, Leach, & Bauen 2003)). 
`Intermittency' and renewable energy 
With the exception of biomass, renewable generation is both intermittent and, to a greater 
or lesser extent, unpredictable. This presents a number of challenges for electricity system 
operators, particularly if the amount of intermittent power on the system becomes 
substantial in relation to peak supply. The impacts of intermittency cannot be considered in 
isolation from the main principles of electricity system operation, since they change (rather 
then create) engineering and commercial requirements for operating electricity systems 
reliably and efficiently. The author and colleagues examined this area in detail for UKERC 
(Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 2006), this section provides a 
brief overview. 
Renewable electricity generation helps to reduce the need to operate power stations 
burning fossil fuels such as coal and gas. This means that carbon dioxide emissions are 
reduced. It is sometimes said that wind energy, for example, does not reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions because the intermittent nature of its output means it needs to be 
backed up by fossil fuel plant. Wind turbines do not displace fossil generating capacity 
on a one-for-one basis. But it is unambiguously the case that wind energy can displace 
fossil fuel-based generation, reducing both fuel use and carbon dioxide emissions. 
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- Renewable generation does mean that the output of fossil fuel-plant needs to be 
adjusted more frequently, to cope with fluctuations in output. Some power stations will 
be operated below their maximum output to facilitate this, and extra system balancing 
reserves will be needed. Efficiency may be reduced as a result. At high penetrations 
(above 20%) energy may need to be `spilled' because the electricity system cannot 
always make use of it. But overall these effects are much smaller than the savings in 
fuel and emissions that renewables can deliver (Dale et al. 2003; Grubb 1991b). 
- The introduction of significant amounts of intermittent generation will affect the way 
the electricity system operates. There are two main categories of impact and associated 
cost. The first, so called system balancing impacts, relates to the relatively rapid short 
term adjustments needed to manage fluctuations over the time period from minutes to 
hours. The second, which is termed here `reliability impacts', relates to the extent to 
which we can be confident that sufficient generation will be available to meet peak 
demands. 
- System balancing entails costs which are passed on to electricity consumers. 
Intermittent generation adds to these costs. For penetrations of intermittent renewables 
up to 20% of electricity supply, additional system balancing reserves due to short term 
(hourly) fluctuations in wind generation amount to about 5-10% of installed wind 
capacity. Globally, most studies estimate that the associated costs are less than 
£5/MWh of intermittent output, in some cases substantially less. The range in UK 
relevant studies is £2 - £3/MWh. 
- Intermittent generation increases the size of the system margin required to maintain a 
given level of reliability. This is because the variability in output of intermittent 
generators means they are less likely to be generating at full power at times of peak 
demand. The system margin needed to achieve a desired level of reliability depends on 
many complex factors but may be explored by statistical calculations or simplified 
models. Intermittent generation introduces new factors into the calculations and 
changes some of the numbers, but it does not change the fundamental principles on 
which such calculations are based. 
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- Capacity credit is a measure of the contribution that intermittent generation can make 
to reliability. It is usually expressed as a percentage of the installed capacity of the 
intermittent generators. There is a range of estimates for capacity credits in the 
literature and the reasons for there being a range are well understood. The range of 
findings relevant to British conditions is approximately 20 - 30% of installed capacity 
when up to 20% of electricity is sourced from intermittent supplies (usually assumed to 
be wind power). Capacity credit as a percentage of installed intermittent capacity 
declines as the share of electricity supplied by intermittent sources increases. The cost 
to maintain reliability lies within the range £3-5/MWh of intermittent output under 
British conditions. Impacts can also be expressed in MW terms; additional thermal 
capacity to maintain reliability at peak amounts to around 15% - 22% of installed 
intermittent capacity. 
Key issues in renewables and implications for possible path dependence 
Renewable energy is highly context and location specific; resource availability, and 
suitability for different markets, differs considerably around the world. In the UK context: 
- Wind and biomass appear to have the highest level of technological maturity and 
lowest costs relative to the other options with large potential. 
- The main obstacles to the development of energy crops and onshore wind appear to be 
institutional - planning and land use constraints affect both, but the total impact (in 
terms of the limits on total energy that might be secured) appears largest for wind. 
- The resource available from forest and agricultural residues is small relative to energy 
needs. Market related factors are currently hindering the establishment of a domestic 
energy crop industry. Energy crops could play a substantive role in the long run. 
- Offshore wind will face a number of technological challenges, and future costs remain 
rather uncertain, but prospects for technological improvement and cost reduction 
appear promising. A very large resource is available. 
- The costs of PV are widely expected to continue to fall, and PV offers the potential to 
deliver cost effective electricity in some UK applications - notably if PV materials can 
replace alternative building cladding. It appears unlikely to play a substantial role 
within the next twenty years because of high costs, but longer term, BIPV could 
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become a significant contributor to UK electricity demand. Substantial changes to 
electricity distribution networks would be needed if PV were to be widely utilised. 
- Wave and tidal devices remain at an early stage of development, with a large number 
of alternative technological approaches, most of which are only beginning to be tested 
outside of laboratory conditions. At this stage the role of both therefore remains highly 
uncertain. Should the technologies under development succeed wave power could 
provide a significant share of UK electricity. 
- All technologies except biomass are intermittent, and all have implications for the scale 
and location of generation relative to conventional plant. This means that the electricity 
network will have to be extended and operated differently if both remote sources and 
small scale decentralised options are to be exploited. 
The primary sources of path dependence appear to be those associated with networks. 
There are likely to be economies of scale and other forms of increasing return associated 
with exploiting remote resources since a `virtuous cycle' of economies of scale related to 
electricity gird utilisation and learning by doing in the renewables technologies (offshore 
wind and wave/tidal) could drive an overall reduction in the cost of electricity from these 
`large scale remote resource' options. Similarly, expanding use of decentralised generation 
options such as PV and biomass (and gas CHP, see below) would be expected to decrease 
their costs. Investment in technologies and systems to manage their variable outputs in 
`thinking' distribution networks are currently being researched (see e. g. 
http: //www. supergen-networks. org. uk/FlexNet. htm). These would also be expected to be 
more cost effective if utilisation was expanded and another `virtuous cycle' would be set 
up - small scale technologies are used in large numbers, costs fall, distribution networks 
are developed to allow greater usage, and so on. Interestingly, the remote options would 
not require action to develop `smart' distribution networks and the smaller scale options 
could reduce the need for a high voltage electricity transmission grid. These system 
implications are examined in Ch. 6. 
5.2.3 Nuclear Power 
Resource 
The basic nuclear power resource is uranium or thorium. Most reactors use uranium, which 
is cheap and abundant in terms of the volumes currently required for commercial power 
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production (around 4.7mT proven reserves, annual consumption 66kT) (UNDPIWEC 
2000; World Nuclear Association 2006b). Considerable expansion of global output will not 
be constrained by uranium resources. 
However, there are practical constraints on the contribution of nuclear power. The relative 
inflexibility of all current designs of nuclear power station places an upper limit on the 
proportion of electricity that can be supplied by nuclear since highly flexible plant is also 
required to respond to changing demands, known as `load following'. Nuclear can load 
follow to an extent that varies by reactor type (Pouret & Nuttall 2007), and depending on 
circumstance countries may be able use export to other regions, demand management and 
other measures to balance supply and demand. Hence the extent to which inflexibility 
limits the role for nuclear power varies considerably by country. The French nuclear fleet 
operates with an average load factor of 76% as a result of load following (World Nuclear 
Association 2006b). France has time of day electricity metering is also heavily 
interconnected with neighbouring countries and can export power at periods of low 
demand. The other constraint on nuclear is availability of suitable sites: Issues include 
public acceptance, geological suitability, electricity grid capacity and access to cooling 
water. Recent policy is based upon the expectation of new reactors locating at the site of 
(some) existing reactors (DTI 2006e; DTI 2007c). 
We consider the overall limitations that inflexibility and site availability place on the 
contribution of nuclear in the UK in more detail in Ch 6. 
Development status 
Nuclear power provides 17% of world electricity, from an installed capacity of around 370 
GW (World Nuclear Association 2006b). Proportions in different countries varying widely 
- from 80% in Lithuania to zero in several OECD countries (World Nuclear Association 
2006b). It is a mature technology that has been under development for more than 50 years. 
A variety of competing approaches during the 1950s, 60s and 70s have given way to one 
dominant reactor designs - (light) pressurised water reactor (PWR) - though there is still 
one company (Candu) developing a heavy water reactor (World Nuclear Association 
2006a). 
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Current designs of nuclear power station are rather large relative to gas-fired generators 
and have capital costs around three times larger per MW than gas stations, and much 
longer build times (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). Inflexible output means that nuclear 
stations are not well placed to benefit from market conditions that reward flexibility. 
Whilst manufacturers levelised cost estimates (per MWh) are close to those typical of gas 
stations, predicated upon series build of several identical stations (see below), high capital 
costs and exposure to price risks in liberalised markets make private investment in new 
nuclear complicated relative to gas plants (nuclear is a `price taker' (Ibid)). Since the late 
1980s commercial activity has focused on countries with high energy prices, security of 
supply concerns and a relative lack of private investor involvement in electricity sector 
investment decisions. However the reactor under construction in Finland has been financed 
through an equity sharing arrangement with large electricity consumers (Ibid). 
Costs 
Manufacturers of current `market ready' nuclear reactor designs quote costs as low as 
£23/MWh (British Energy 2001). Rather higher estimates have been developed by bodies 
such as the PIU, UNDP/WEC and MIT (UNDP/WEC 2000) (MIT 2003; PIU 2001c). 
Current estimates from the British government are of the order of £35/MWh (DTI 
2006a; DTI 2006e). The PIU, with close involvement of the author, engaged in an extensive 
dialogue with nuclear developers. They also undertook a sensitivity analysis of a range of 
possible cost increases and build time over runs relative to the industry assumptions (PIU 
2001c). This work led to estimates of costs of designs likely to become available in the 
period to 2020 range from 25 - 40 £/MWh ((PIU 2002b)). More recent analyses have also 
highlighted the uncertainties that originate from cost and build time over-runs (MacKerron 
et al. 2006). 
While such results must be interpreted with care, there are several reason why learning 
may be expected to be slower for nuclear than other, small-scale low carbon technologies. 
Learning rates for nuclear power as low as 5.8% have been reported historically, against 
10% to 20% for most other energy technologies, largely as a result of increasing safety 
standards and a relative absence (historically) of global competition between nuclear 
power developers (McDonald & Schrattenholzer 2001) (lEA 2000). 
73 
Key issues for nuclear power and possible implications for path dependence 
The issues faced by nuclear power relate to the attractiveness of nuclear stations in 
liberalised markets, public acceptability and the scale and location of reactors: 
- Future costs of new nuclear power stations are currently subject to some uncertainty. 
- The emergence of liberalisation as a major force in electricity industries in the 1990s 
disadvantaged nuclear - the new markets were characterised by greater risk and a 
higher cost of capital. This is difficult for a capital-intensive, `price taking' technology 
like nuclear power. 
- Nuclear power faces political controversies and public mistrust related to safety, waste, 
and proliferation. 
- Until and unless much smaller designs are commercialised nuclear power is likely to 
remain a large-scale technology. 
- For a range of reasons it is likely that the existing practice of locating nuclear reactors 
in relatively remote locations is likely to continue. 
As with renewables, the primary path dependence possibilities relate to networks, size and 
location of generators and constraints due to public acceptance. Because of the large scale 
and remote characteristics of nuclear power, existing grid may require upgrading if the 
contribution from nuclear were to expand. As with the current British National Grid power 
flows would tend to be from large power stations in relatively remote locations to centres 
of demand, and decentralised generation would not be likely to increase. This is a key 
driver of the energy system scenario `Big is Beautiful' developed in Ch 6. In that chapter 
we also discuss the implications for energy system development of the relatively inflexible 
nature of nuclear plants and for expanding the contribution of low carbon electricity to heat 
markets. 
5.2.4 High efficiency fossil fuel plants and carbon capture and storage 
There are three ways by which the fossil fuel industry might respond to climate change. 
The first is through efficiency improvements to energy conversion technologies for 
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electricity supply; the second is through improvements in distribution and transmission and 
in utilising `waste' heat through combined heat and power (CHP). Finally, it is possible to 
capture the carbon emitted from hydrocarbon fuel combustion at source and store the 
resulting CO2 in geological formations or in the oceans. This section considers efficiency 
and CHP and carbon capture, changes to transmission and distribution systems are also 
discussed in Ch 6. 
High efficiency energy conversion 
Technology characteristics, maturity and costs 
There are two principal means by which emissions from energy conversion may be 
improved: by improving combustion-based systems; and by moving to energy conversion 
based on electro-chemical reaction - the fuel cell. Both may be utilised in combined heat 
and power (CHP) mode, which offers further improvement in overall energy efficiency. 
Existing large-scale combustion based electricity generating plants offer considerable 
scope for efficiency improvement. A more detailed discussion of improvements to CCGT 
and coal fired electricity generation, assembled by the author is provided in Anderson and 
Gross (2003). Evolutionary developments of CCGT are expected to raise efficiencies to 
around 70% in non-CHP mode by 2020 (Anderson & Gross 2003). Advanced coal stations 
could approach 50% efficiency over this timeframe. 
Fuel cells 
Fuel cells convert hydrogen and oxygen directly into electricity. They are highly efficient, 
clean and quiet, with no moving parts. They are promising technologies for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the decades beyond 2010, and have the potential to become a 
`disruptive' or `transforming' technology, for both electricity generation and transport. 
They have three major advantages: 
" Energy efficiency. In power generation, for example, an advanced solid oxide fuel cell 
(SOFC)/gas turbine system is expected to operate at more than 70 percent net 
efficiency. Fuel cells also have the potential for a two to threefold efficiency gain when 
used for transport - again when compared to existing vehicles. 
" Low or Zero CO2 Emissions. Fuel cells are a key technology in an evolving strategy to 
a low carbon economy. They are a complementary technology to hydrogen as an 
energy carrier (see below). 
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9 Very low emissions of local air pollutants - whatever the fuel, fuel cells largely 
eliminate oxides of sulphur and nitrogen and particulates - all of which continue to be 
associated with conventional engines. 
However, current costs are well above conventional technologies in most areas, though this 
varies with the type of fuel cell: estimates range between $2000 and $10,000/kW (a mature 
electricity generating technology such as a gas turbine costs about $400-600/kW, a car 
engine $50/kW). 
Engineering analysis and the modularity of the technology both suggest they have the 
required characteristics for rapidly declining cost as the volume of applications expands 
and as research, investment and operating experience accumulates. But market experience 
is very limited and it is not possible to give a more detailed review of the prospects for cost 
reduction in fuel cell technologies. With further development and once in mass production 
it is estimated that they could cost as little as $30/kW for transport and $300/kW for 
stationary power (Anderson & Gross 2003). 
CHP 
Medium and large scale (typically 30kWc1O to 30MWe) combined heat and power (CHP) is 
a well established technology. Large and medium scale CHP plants are used on industrial 
sites, in service sector complexes (e. g. large hotels, hospitals) and in community heating 
schemes. Industrial CHP is generally cost competitive with purchasing electricity from the 
grid and burning gas in a heating boiler, where there are large and continuous heat loads. 
Effective generation costs will be site specific. There is considerable scope for expansion 
in these sectors. Current installed capacity is around 5.8 GWe and electrical output is 
approximately 30 TWh/year (DTI 2007a), the Government has a target that amounts to 
more than 10 GWe or around 40 TWh/yr of electrical output by 2010, or around 10% of 
electricity (DTI 2007a). 
As the economic size of the technology has decreased, smaller scale CHP, often known as 
mini-CHP, has become available for smaller commercial buildings. However, the smallest 
scale products, micro-CHP (MCHP), suitable for individual homes, is an emerging 
1° The subscript `e' refers to installed electrical capacity. 
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technology with the first units on commercial trial (PIU 2002a). The electrical efficiency of 
CHP tends to reduce with the size of plant, the best achieving 45% and the current micro- 
CHP units 10% to 15%. However, in all cases, because of the association with a heat load, 
the effective power generation efficiency is typically 80%-90%. The ratio of heat to power 
varies between systems and applications (Hawkes et al. 2007). This has implications for 
the share of high efficiency CHP in the electricity mix, since high overall CHP efficiencies 
depend upon heat loads being present. We return to this issue in Ch 6. 
In the longer term, industrial heat loads are expected to continue to decline. The scope for 
further large CHP increase in industry will therefore be limited. Longer term growth is 
therefore likely to be more for heating in buildings. The greatest potential for growth by 
2050 is in micro-CHP which provides a direct replacement for a conventional gas. In 
future it is expected that units based on fuel cells will become available and that these will 
have a significantly higher electrical efficiency (Hawkes, Aguiar, Croxford, Leach, 
Adjiman, & Brandon 2007). 
The economics of CHP are complex. Compared to the current alternative of CCGT from 
centralised power plants, there are additional costs associated with the distribution of heat, 
but savings from increased efficiency. However, there are also different costs associated 
with the locations and scale at which gas is used and electricity is produced. CHP costs 
therefore span a wider range than centralized supply using gas. However, smaller turbine 
costs are expected to continue to fall. Power costs have been estimated to lie in the range 
£ 16 - 24/MWh by 2020 (PIU 2001 d). 
Key issues for advanced energy supply technologies and implications for path dependence 
Evolutionary development of CCGT and advanced coal technologies does not face any 
over-riding obstacle, and is not subject to any particular market failures. System 
implications relate primarily to scale of utilisation. An expansion of small scale CHP 
would precipitate an increase in decentralised generation. Fuel cells also offer the prospect 
of greater efficiency at smaller scale uses (both with and without CHP) and CCGT may 
become economic at ever decreasing scale. For these reasons, the gas fired technologies 
either require (in the case of CHP) or could facilitate (fuel cells, CCGT) an expansion in 
the use of decentralised generation. 
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The principal issues explored in Ch. 6 through energy system scenarios and modelling 
include the contribution from CHP to total energy supply and to emissions reduction and 
the system implications of a much wider utilisation of decentralised generation. 
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) 
CO2 can be stored in geological repositories such as deep aquifers, depleted oil and gas 
reservoirs, salt caverns and coal seams. It is also possible to store CO2 in the deep ocean, 
but this option is not considered further here. 
Resource 
Global and UK resource estimates are presented in Table 4.4 below. These are preliminary, 
and span a wide range because the suitability of different types of formation (particularly 
`uncapped' aquifers) (DTI 2003c) are not yet fully understood, and detailed mapping of 
potential repositories has not yet been carried out in most regions. There is therefore a high 
level of uncertainty about total resources. Nevertheless with current global energy sector 
emissions at around 25Gt CO2 (7 CtC) per year (IPCC 2001) (DTI 2003c), it appears that a 
substantial resource exists. 
UK specific estimates suggest that depleted gas fields have a capacity of up to 9 GtC and 
saline aquifers 65 GtC (DTI 2003c). Current annual UK CO2 emissions are around 130 
MtC (500 Mt C02), which implies that resource is unlikely to be a constraint on 
sequestration rates for many years, and probably many decades, unless the above range is a 
very dramatic overestimate. More work is needed to characterise the in more detail UK 
resource in terms of both prospective repositories and the infrastructure options to connect 
them to appropriate point sources (DTI 2003c). 
Table 5-4: Global and UK CO2 storage potential (IEA 2002a) (DTI 2003c) (IPCC 
2005) 
Sequestration option Worldwide capacity GtC UK Capacity GtC 
" UK figures from (DTI 2003c), converted to Ct from t CO2 . rounded. 
Figures for coal seams not provided in 
(DTI 2003c) 
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Deep saline formations loos- 1000s 2-65 
Depleted oil and gas reservoirs 100s 2 
Coal seams los-loos NA 
Technology characteristics, maturity and costs 
The technologies required to capture, compress and transport, and store C02 are well 
established, though innovative options offer the prospect of future cost reductions and 
efficiency gains (lEA 2002a). The main uncertainties surround the viability of different 
storage media. Cost estimates for current and future technologies are provided in table 4.5. 
Whilst a single future cost figure is presented in the source utilised for this data, real costs 
both now and in the future, would fall into a range depending on factors such as fuel costs 
and accessibility of the repositories and the nature of the technologies used. As yet there 
are very few CO2 storage projects in existence and so considerable uncertainty also 
surrounds the economics of the technologies should they be utilised on a large scale. 
Table 5-5 Costs of carbon capture (IEA 2002a) (DTI 2003c; IPCC 2005) 
Technology Cost `now' $/MWh Future cost 
Gas CCGT (post combustion capture) 40 - 80 43 
Coal ICGT (pre-combustion capture) 50 - 90 51 
Coal pulverised fuel (post combustion capture) 60 - 100 63 




40 - 50 
40 - 60 
30 - 50 
- 
- 
It has been suggested that CCS could be used as a load following plant, helping to 
overcome the `intermittency' of renewables and possibly to complement the inflexible 
output of nuclear power (Marsh, Pye, & Ten Brink 2005). 
Key issues for CCS and possible implications for path dependence 
12 (lEA 2002a) suggest that the upper limit of aquifer storage could be of the order of 104 Gt C02 13 (lEA 2002a), reporting on future costs in `ten years' (2012 from date of publication) 
79 
CCS is largely unproven, with the exception of a relatively small number of demonstration 
projects (IPCC 2005). Much wider demonstration is needed to both prove commercial 
viability and to address concerns about leakage and environmental impacts. Research into 
the viability of a range of geological repositories is needed to assess the scale of the 
potential and to identify individual sites. In the UK context work is needed to assess the 
viability of various CO2 repository/source combinations and compare this with other 
carbon mitigation options. As yet, the issues only appear to have been explored at a 
relatively high level of generality (Gough, Shackley, & Cannell 2002). Case 
studies/scenarios have been developed to explore the economics of CCS (Marsh 
2003). These combine a range of power station types and locations with approximate 
pipeline configurations and repositories in order to estimate costs, but do not seek to define 
in detail an infrastructural configuration. With regard to path dependence, in the author's 
view the following questions are as yet not fully answered: 
- How many generation and other plants are needed to maximise economies of scale in 
pipelines and utilisation of a given repository/ies? 
- Where are the point sources in relation to the most promising repositories and how 
might a `CO2 grid' be configured? 
- Does expansion of CCS militate against expansion of decentralised generation? 
- Could coal or gas fired plant with CCS be used economically as load following plant to 
complement renewable or nuclear generators? 
We consider these issues in more detail through the energy system scenarios and modelling 
in Ch. 6. 
5.2.5 End use energy efficiency 
Resource 
The range of technologies available to improve end use efficiency is very large and reflects 
the wide diversity of energy end uses. Rather than provide an estimate of the potential 
reduction for each and every device and energy service most estimates focus on the 
aggregate potential across the economy. These estimates are typically derived from 
sectoral level studies, often using a microeconomic model of investment decisions in each 
sector to assess the scope for cost effective improvements in efficiency (UNDP/WEC 
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2000). Analysis undertaken for the PIU Energy Review and UK Energy White Paper 
indicates that a reduction in energy use of around 30% across all sectors in the UK could 
be achieved by 2020 if cost effective technologies were adopted on a wide scale (PIU 
2002a). Similar potential exists in most other OECD countries/regions (UNDP/WEC 
2000). In the UK, realising this potential would result in a net cost saving of around £12 
billion per annum (PIU 2002b). On a global scale it is estimated that useful energy 
delivered to end use devices is around 37% of primary energy extraction - meaning that 
almost 2/3rds of energy is wasted - and further savings are possible at the step from end 
use technologies to the provision of energy services (UNDP/WEC 2000). 
The limits placed on absolute energy efficiency by the second law of thermodynamics may 
be described in terms of the capacity to do useful work (exergy) required by energy end 
uses relative to the total exergy available from primary sources. On this basis, current 
usage patterns make use of less than 15% of the theoretical potential available from current 
primary resource consumption (UNDP/WEC 2000). Improving `exergy efficiency' is 
based upon tailoring useful energy extraction/conversion to end use such that `high quality' 
energy (such as high temperature heat and electricity) is dedicated to uses for which this 
grade of potential energy is essential, with lower quality energy (such as waste heat) 
`cascaded' down to subsequent utilisation (UNDP/WEC 2000). There are numerous 
practical limits placed upon all such optimisation. Nevertheless exergy analysis provides a 
valuable yardstick against which energy efficiency of the whole energy system may be 
judged, and illustrates how far away the energy system currently is in principle from 
`running out' of energy efficiency improvement potential. 
Over the longer term it is reasonable to expect that the scale of potential savings will 
continue to increase as innovation delivers new cost effective energy efficient options. 
Eventually thermodynamic limits will begin to diminish the scope for improvement, but 
this is not likely (in aggregate) within the timeframe of this study and it is therefore not 
considered likely that the scope to improve energy efficiency will be `used up' once the 
current cost effective potential is realised (UNDP/WEC, 2000). 
The PIU scenarios for energy system development suggest that energy efficiency could 
improve 100% over the period to 2050 in the `best case' scenario. (PIU 2002b). This 
scenario requires that aggregate energy efficiency increases slightly more rapidly than has 
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been the case historically; the historical average in the UK is for energy efficiency to 
improve at just under I% per annum (I% in housing but rather lower in other sectors, (PIU 
2002b)) and the scenario implies an improvement of just over 1% per annum. However, 
most scenarios also suggest that the demand for energy services will increase as a result of 
economic growth (the nature and direction of this growth determine the extent to which 
energy service demand will increase). As a result the total impact on energy demand in 
future will be determined by the interaction between savings due to efficiency and 
increases due to energy service demand growth. All PIU scenarios envisage a degree of 
energy service increase, and energy use by scenario ranges from a 40% decline to a 40% 
increase. 
Overall, energy efficiency improvements have the potential to deliver a substantial fraction 
of prospective C02 emission reduction to 2050. In a widely cited paper that seeks to 
disaggregate emission reduction into a discrete set of `wedges' (a wedge is 1 GtC/y of 
emissions savings in 2054), two energy efficiency options are cited - efficient buildings 
and efficient vehicles. Each could contribute one wedge, equivalent to installing 700GW of 
nuclear power (double the current global capacity) or building two million wind turbines. 
(Pacala & Socolow 2004). The contribution will depend on both the rate at which energy 
efficiency improves and the nature of future economic growth and development; since this 
will determine the rate of growth of energy service demand. However a reduction in 
emissions of at least 30% over the period to 2050 is undoubtedly feasible. 
Development status 
Many energy efficient devices are technologically mature and cost effective now. 
Examples include improved domestic housing insulation, energy efficient lighting using 
compact fluorescent bulbs, numerous appliances such as boilers, fridges and freezers, 
computers and monitors, commercial drives and motors and washing and dishwashing 
machines, ground and air source heat pumps. Emerging options that are not yet 
technologically mature and able to offer a net cost saving include light emitting diodes for 
space lighting, micro-CHP units for use in domestic buildings and hybrid vehicles. The full 
list of options in both categories is too long and detailed for this report. The main issues 
that confront energy efficient end use options relate to market, behavioural and 
institutional barriers to the adoption of proven and cost effective technologies - these are 
discussed in detail elsewhere and are not the main focus of this report (see (PIU 2002a)). 
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Costs 
For reasons discussed above many energy efficiency options are available at negative net 
costs, which means that the full lifecycle costs of purchasing and using energy efficient 
devices is below the full costs of continuing to use less efficient options. 
Key issues for end use efficiency and possible implications for path dependence 
-Investment in improved energy efficiency is subject to a range of barriers. These have been 
explored at length in numerous publications (PIU 2002a). In the case of most stationary 
energy efficiency devices there are few, if any, wider energy system implications from 
wider adoption of energy efficient devices. Changes to the nature of electricity networks or 
fuelling infrastructures are not required, although energy efficiency clearly has the 
potential to reduce the need to expand energy provision and hence to build new or 
upgraded systems to produce, transport and distribute energy. This is less true in the road 
transport sector where the adoption of more efficient fuel cell vehicles could require the 
development of hydrogen delivery systems (unless high efficiency on-board reformation of 
existing fuels can be developed). The primary objective of this report is to consider the 
stationary energy using sectors so this aspect is not considered further, but sensitivity to 
transport emissions reduction is explored quantitatively in Ch. 6. Assumptions are made 
about fuel switching and overall demand for energy services by mode are held common for 
both scenarios. However use of CHP is differentiated by scenario. 
5.3 Summary of key issues relevant to path dependence in future energy 
system scenarios 
5.3.1 Overview 
This section assesses the main implications of the technology review in terms of what kind 
of changes to the energy system overall would be needed for each option to make an 
expanded contribution to energy supply. It is clear that the needs of each different 
technology are profoundly different. We consider scale and location of plant, need for new 
infrastructure to transport energy and the need for facilitating technologies to aid electricity 
network management (such as electricity storage or remote load management). The key 
issues are summarised in table 5.6. 
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Table 5-6: System implications of low carbon options 
Large scale sources: 
Technologies Characteristics System requirements Options for managing 
key problems 
Nuclear power, Economies of Long distance Electricity grid 
CCS on power scale in transmission of upgrading, innovation in 
stations, wave installation, energy from remote electricity transmission, 
and tidal, resource is often areas new energy vectors such 




Wind and wave Intermittent Wherewithal to Extra firm capacity and 
plant resource manage reserve for system 
intermittency balancing, and/or energy 
storage plant and 
advanced load 
management techniques 
Nuclear power Inflexible output Wherewithal to Load management, 
manage inflexible flexible plant on system 
output for meeting, peak 
Waste and public Resolution of demand, energy storage 
acceptance outstanding issues of Long term waste 
long term waste repository 
disposal, securing 
public trust 
Carbon capture CO2 waste Need to transport Development of 
and storage for stream and store CO2 pipelines and geologic 
power generation repositories 
Small scale and decentralised sources 
Technologies Characteristics System requirements Options for managing 
key problems 
PV, onshore Economies of Connection of large Upgrading of 
wind, biomass, scale in amounts of distribution networks 
small CHP manufacture of decentralised including active and 
components, local generation to passive control of loads 





PV, onshore Intermittent output Wherewithal to Active management of 
wind, CHP manage distribution networks, 
(heat load intermittency advanced load 
following) management, electricity 
storage 
5.3.2 Energy demand and path dependence 
Improvements in end use efficiency will of course have very important implications for the 
size of the energy system - for example the in the PIU scenarios primary energy demand 
differed by a factor of two. Changes to demands for energy services and improvements in 
energy efficiency will also affect the relative shares of total energy demand of accounted 
for by different end use sectors. This will shape the energy system overall. However, 
changes to the efficiency of end use devices is unlikely to have profound path dependent 
implications for the system overall, unless it also requires fuel switching. Hence, the 
remainder of this thesis is based upon the view that end use efficiency improvements do 
not have path dependent implications for the nature of the energy system. Instead Ch 6 
explores how different configurations of the energy system may meet a broadly similar 
(not identical, see Ch. 6) level of energy demand. Overall the systemic implications of 
improved energy efficiency in end use devices are dealt with through the demand 
modelling that underpins both energy system scenarios developed in Ch. 6. The exception 
to this general presumption is small scale and micro-CHP. Whilst this may be viewed as a 
demand side technology because it replaces a domestic boiler, this thesis considers CHP as 
a supply side option, and its role in reducing emissions is central to the `decentralised gas' 
scenario developed in Ch. 6. 
5.3.3 Changing the electricity system 
Decentralised generation 
The electricity infrastructure of most countries was predicated on the need for large power 
stations, often remote from demand centres, in order to exploit economies of scale and to 
exploit coal resources. The desire to keep stations away from populations, and similar scale 
economies, perpetuated this central station model when nuclear power came onto the 
electricity scene. Increasingly, however, natural gas is the preferred option for electricity 
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generation. This has freed generation from many of the above location constraints, though 
some constraints are imposed by the availability of gas infrastructure. As a result, smaller 
scale generation closer to demand has been developed (National Grid Company 2006). 
Whilst most gas fired stations are still large - up to around 1000 MW, some of the 
economies of scale are broken, since combined cycle turbines are more modular and 
dedicated fuel delivery/processing less costly than in the case of coal/nuclear. CCGT 
stations are more commonly of the range 300 - 700 MW than the 1-4 GW typical of 
large coal and nuclear installations (DTI 2007a). 
Some new technologies offer the prospect of ever smaller generation, which can benefit 
from avoided transmission costs if embedded in local distribution networks, and may be 
more amenable to use in CHP installations. Both these factors can raise overall efficiency - 
markedly so in the case of CHP. It is possible to envisage `medium' scale generation - 
typically a few tens of MW - from gas turbine CHP, biomass and onshore wind playing an 
increasing role. 
This trend towards decentralisation may become even more pronounced; micro-CHP based 
on gas turbines or fuel cells, and PV all offer the possibility of very small scale generation, 
perhaps incorporated into the buildings where energy is used. 
Should the trend to smaller scale generation continue the requirements of the electricity 
network would change; large scale transmission from remote sources would become less 
necessary, whilst distribution networks would need to be managed more actively than is 
currently the case. As a result, the investment incentives on infrastructure operators, and 
relative economics of transmission and distribution infrastructure would be likely to 
change. If long distance transmission of large volumes of electricity is reduced the grid 
may increasingly play a `back up' role - shifting power between distribution networks as 
required. It is therefore possible that investment is devoted largely to `upkeep' and 
upgrading of transmission lines might be delayed or even abandoned. Maintaining the high 
voltage transmission network is expensive and it might be possible to reduce its capacity 
and extent (see Ch 6 for further discussion). On the other hand investment in local 
networks - in particular in substations and active and passive control technologies for 
distribution networks - would be expected to increase. 
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Developing renewable resources 
In addition to decentralisation, renewable sources of energy give rise to a number of 
differences in the way in which power is fed into electricity networks and in which 
networks are operated, compared to the current approach, which is dominated by large and 
despatchable `central station' power generation feeding into the high voltage grid. The 
most important of these is intermittency (variable and largely unpredictable outputs). 
Overall, and given the current small contribution of intermittent renewables to generation 
in almost every country, intermittency is in general unlikely to present a problem in the 
immediate future. However, as the penetration of intermittent renewables expands it 
appears likely that the potential for renewables will come to depend increasingly upon the 
costs and viability of a range of options for coping with intermittency - increased 
interconnection, demand management techniques, peaking plant and storage technologies. 
Remote options 
Renewables do not just have implications for a decentralisation of generation. The offshore 
options in particular are both large scale and potentially remote from both existing grid 
infrastructure and demands. This is likely to result in an increasing requirement for the 
development of new transmission capacity or new energy carriers. Nuclear power also 
continues to exhibit strong economies of scale and recent designs of reactor are 1 GW units 
or larger. Planning constraints may discourage location of large reactors close to urban 
areas. The economies of scale may be broken in the long term if more radical new designs 
such as the PBMR can be brought to commercial fruition. Application of carbon separation 
and storage to electricity generation is also most easily amenable to the large central station 
model, since this would be consistent with capturing CO2 from a relatively small number 
of large point sources. The need to extract, compress and transport CO2 would appear to 
militate strongly against installing capture and storage on decentralised units. Indeed, it 
may prove more economic to locate plant close to potential CO2 repositories, and move 
electricity via the grid, than to develop long distance CO2 pipeline or tankering activities. 
This would also tend to reinforce the remote, long distance transmission model of the 
electricity network. 
There are therefore three categories of low carbon option that appear more likely to 
reinforce than to break down the current model of electricity supply from large remote 
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stations: Nuclear power, some of the UK's largest renewable resources; and carbon 
sequestration plants. 
5.4 Conclusions 
A number of over-riding and interrelated issues for energy system development emerge 
from this techno-economic analysis of low carbon options: 
- Some options are decentralised, they will require changes to the way distribution and 
transmission systems are operated. A large expansion of decentralised generation may 
decrease the volume of electricity moved through long distance transmission lines. It 
may also require facilitating technology developments to manage intermittency such as 
energy storage and remote load management. 
- Other low carbon options (notably offshore renewables, nuclear power and CCS) are 
likely to reinforce the existing central station model of electricity generation. They may 
require that long distance transmission is extended and expanded. They may also 
require developments to manage intermittency or inflexibility of output but not in 
distribution networks. CCS will require the development of a new infrastructure to 
transport CO2. This may not be compatible with widespread expansion of decentralised 
generation. 
The `large scale remote' to `small and decentralised' axis has the potential to give rise to 
path dependent development in the energy system, particularly when considered in 
combination with the other characteristics of the larger scale and decentralised options. 
These include the need to associate CHP with heat loads but to use electric heating to 
complement nuclear power, actively manage distribution networks with the decentralised 
options but not with the centralised, develop a CCS pipeline network that would be 
redundant (or at least not needed for power station emissions) if decentralised generation 
were to become dominant and so on. 
The large-small scale axis therefore provides the primary focus of the scenarios developed 
in Ch 6. Before we can assess any aspect of path dependence it is first necessary to assess 
whether, and in what configuration, decentralised generators or large scale sources could 
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be assembled in order to deliver a 60% cut in emissions. This requires a quantitative model 
of the energy and carbon outputs of the energy system; hence the scenarios developed in 
Ch 6 are first described then modelled numerically. 
6 Examining future developments - Scenarios of energy system change 
6.1 Exploring path dependency: the value of a scenario based approach 
A common technique for informing decisions with implications for the far future is the 
development of scenarios (Shell 2003). Scenarios are used by governments, businesses and 
research groups in order to take into account the inevitable uncertainties entailed in any 
attempt to make judgements about the long term future (Borjeson, Hojer, Dreborg, Ekvall, 
& Finnveden 2006; Shell 2003). Scenarios are self consistent pictures of the future and can 
take a variety of forms, and a basic taxonomy is provided below. As discussed in Ch. 2 
there is a considerable literature devoted to scenarios, and what is described as `futures 
studies' (Aligica 2005; Borjeson, Hojer, Dreborg, Ekvall, & Finnveden 2006), with the 
development of modern energy scenarios commonly attributed to seminal work by Kahn 
and Weiner in the late 1960s (Kahn & Weiner 1967). Scenarios are useful to the subject 
matter of this study because they allow us to consider different visions of what the nature 
of the energy system of the future might be. Hence it is possible to consider how divergent 
development might give rise to path dependence that precludes some options and favours 
others. 
The self reinforcing effects described in Ch. 4 suggest that it is possible that divergent 
development paths could emerge; both for the stationary sectors (electricity, gas and heat 
markets) and in transport (road transport fuels and vehicles in particular). In order to 
understand the extent of the path dependence that might therefore arise it is helpful to 
consider different `out turns', that is, to use scenarios for the development of the energy 
system that cover a range of possible configurations of energy technologies and 
infrastructures. The approach taken here is to explore two widely divergent visions for the 
energy system. Both are consistent with deep cuts in carbon emissions, but consist of quite 
fundamentally different systems in terms of the nature of the technologies deployed, the 
mix of primary energy sources used and infrastructures. The focus of differentiation 
between each scenario is the stationary sectors, since consideration of all the possibilities 
in all energy using sectors would be too extensive a task for a study of this length. The 
scenarios are described in detail below. 
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6.2 Understanding the role of scenarios 
Two basic varieties of scenarios can be identified (lEA & OECD 2003): Normative 
scenarios postulate some desirable outcome, for example the development of a low carbon 
energy economy, and then consider how such a system might develop. The alternative 
approach is to postulate a set of drivers, such as socioeconomic trends or technology 
developments and derive from these a vision of future worlds, a technique that is referred 
to as exploratory scenarios. 
Many energy system and climate policy scenarios take the exploratory approach. Examples 
include the IPCC `SRES' scenarios and the UK government's Energy Review and 
Foresight Panel (IPCC 2000; PIU 2001b; PIU 2002b). Usually exploratory scenarios 
postulate different sets of social and political drivers, that give rise to different types of 
world - for example whether institutions and trade become more or less globalised, or 
whether political processes reflect individualistic or communal social values. Many energy 
scenarios have also used as a driver the extent to which public policies or social choices 
address environmental concerns. They may also include technical change as a key driver, 
perhaps linked to economic drivers (for example the more globalised scenarios are also 
more innovative in the PIU Scenarios (PIU 2002b). It is possible to start with such 
scenarios and move on to consider how the development of different sectors, including 
energy, might proceed in each. Indeed recent scenarios have explored technology and 
system configurations in detail, based on economic drivers (Elders, Ault, Galloway, 
McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & Lampaditou 2006). 
More normative scenarios have been developed by Shell and the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RECP 2000). Shell's 1995 and 2002 scenarios are both designed 
with the presumption that efforts to cut emissions affect technology and social choices 
(Shell 1996; Shell 2003). The Shell scenarios also consider the contribution to energy 
supplies of different technologies. The RCEP scenarios are both normative and 
technologically specific - they describe a mix of demand reductions and supply side 
technologies that would be consistent with a 60% cut in emissions (Shell 1996; Shell 2003). 
Recent scenarios assess in detail different technological options and different system 
configurations (Elders, Ault, Galloway, McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & Lampaditou 2006) 
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but without an explicit emissions constraint or treatment of path dependence. However few 
explore in detail what would be needed for energy systems to develop over time, how 
options might emerge and fit into new energy systems, and the viability of options. None 
could be found that relate this to path dependence 
The scenarios developed for this study are partially normative, in so far as they are 
designed to be consistent with deep cuts in carbon emissions. Moreover, each scenario is 
chosen to represent a particular configuration of energy technologies and infrastructure. 
The intention is not to derive each world from any particular socio-economic scenario. 
Rather they represent diverse possibilities that might be envisaged technologically - based 
upon technologies that are already in use, under development, or emerging from basic 
R&D. Some comment on the drivers that would be needed for each to emerge is provided 
(for example continued liberalisation), but these drivers are of secondary importance to this 
study, and are not the starting point for the work. The scenarios are exploratory insofar as 
there is a technological starting point, and a conscious effort to refine each scenario in 
order to ensure that it is consistent with a 60% emissions reduction. The report also makes 
use of energy demand scenarios developed by the PIU Energy Review and 
Interdepartmental Analysts Group. However, these are used here in order to derive a level 
of energy services demand for 2050, which is common to both the scenarios described and 
explored below. Hence, whilst the PIU's scenarios were exploratory, they are used here to 
define a demand level that can then be utilised for supply side scenarios. 
6.3 The two scenarios 
Two scenarios are developed and explored in detail below. The first, `decentralised 
generation expands' is based on extensive use of more decentralised forms of electricity 
generation, using renewable energy and gas. Large and remote electricity generation is 
much reduced, as is long distance electricity transmission. The scenario is an extrapolation 
of trends towards decentralised generation identified by several commentators (Patterson 
1999). The second, `big is beautiful' is based upon a much expanded role for large scale, 
low carbon sources such as carbon capture and storage, offshore renewables or nuclear 
power. The remote nature of many such sources means that there is an expanding role for 
high voltage electricity transmission. In this scenario electricity remains the predominant 
medium for transporting energy for stationary applications over long distances. 
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The rationale for these scenarios is twofold. First, both are technologically conceivable, 
and both could be consistent with deep cuts in C02, for reasons discussed in more detail 
below. Second there is good reason, prima facie, to presume that the energy infrastructures 
needed for each would be different, and this allows us to explore path dependence in more 
depth. At the heart of this analysis is consideration of the extent to which developments 
that take the energy system closer to one of these scenarios might close off options 
available in the other. 
The intention is to test a diverse range of technological possibilities and as such each world 
is to an extent a caricature; reality is likely to include elements of all. However, it is 
possible to identify distinct `clusters' of technologies that are likely to complement each 
other - for example gas infrastructure and decentralised electricity generation based upon 
micro-turbines, or nuclear power and large scale transmission of electricity. Infrastructural 
investment decisions favour certain conversion and end use technologies, and vice versa. 
The energy worlds are therefore designed to maximise internal consistency. They are not 
entirely mutually exclusive, but there is good reason to expect that the energy system that 
does develop over the coming decades will exhibit a clear `centre of gravity' - it is 
unlikely that the worlds described below would co-exist in equal measure. An important 
area that the research will explore is which aspects of each world might be transferable - 
feasible in more than one world. To do this we need first to consider the key facets of each 
world individually, and in isolation. The scenarios, and how they might diverge from 
business as usual (BAU) developments, are illustrated in Figure 6.1, below. 
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Figure 6-1: Energy worlds in 2050 
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Both scenarios focus on stationary energy use - that is the provision of space, water and 
process heat (and cooling), and direct use of fuel in industrial processes, as well as 
electricity. They are not electricity only scenarios. The reasons for this are as follows: 
- Taken together, electricity and other stationary14 uses account for around 78% of 
energy related CO-2 emissions (DTI 2007a). 
- There is a wide range of options emerging to reduce emissions in these sectors. 
- Different combinations of technologies could give rise to radically different 
infrastructure requirements even if the transport sector is not considered in detail (see 
below). 
- Expanded use of CHP can only make a major impact on emissions if provision of both 
electricity and heat/cool are considered together. 
- Zero emission electricity generation is not sufficient, alone, to deliver the level of CO2 
emission reduction stipulated for the scenarios, unless the contribution of electricity to 
heating and other sectors currently directly supplied by fossil fuels also expands. 
Focusing on stationary energy use and supply neglects the role of the transport sector. This 
sector currently accounts for just under 30% of emissions (DTI 2007a). Reducing transport 
14 Including electricity used in transport, almost entirely rail transport 
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emissions could be achieved through a combination of behaviour, modal shifts (e. g. road to 
rail), changes to vehicles and changes to energy vectors. However, the prospective changes 
are manifold and complex (entailing an assessment of the roles of hydrogen or electric 
vehicles, biofuels, efficiency gains and modal shift). Changes to the transport sector also 
give rise to complex issues similar to those discussed above - path dependence and lock in 
can occur in all sectors. Indeed some path dependent system developments may cross 
sectors, for example if CCS were to be applied to both the production of transport fuels and 
electricity generation using a common infrastructure. This study therefore makes some 
simplifying assumptions about transport, common to all scenarios, and focuses the main 
scenario variations on stationary energy supply options. Changes to the transport sector are 
also almost certain to be necessary in order to deliver deep cuts in carbon emissions (DTI 
2003b; Monbiot 2006; PIU 2002b). So some changes relative to today's transport fuelling 
system are built into both scenarios in the form of assumptions about both efficiency gains 
and transport growth - incorporated into the PIU derived demand baseline - and through 
an assumption about the proportion of transport fuelled by hydrogen. The contribution of 
this assumption to emissions reduction is explained and quantified below. 
Whilst more detailed treatment of transport would be a valuable addition to the work, it is 
not possible to devote sufficient attention to all aspects of the energy system in a study of 
this length. Nevertheless there are important linkages between stationary and transport 
fuels, technologies and infrastructure, and these are considered and discussed below. 
It is also important to note that the scenarios described below are not exhaustive. Other 
energy systems are possible, and there are further dimensions to path dependence and 
policy that could be explored. For example it would be possible to consider a scenario that 
focused on the prospects for maximising the contribution of renewables, or even moving to 
a 100% renewable energy system. In addition, it would also be possible to consider the 
demand-side issues as scenario dependent variables, rather than taken as common to both 
scenanos. 
The study attempts to provide an overall that might be applied to other scenarios for the 
stationary sector and to consider transport energy in more detail. Doing so would be a 
valuable extension of this work. 
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6.3.1 `Decentralised generation expands; ' Gas and decentralised heat and power 
world 
In this vision of the future current trends toward more widespread and more extensive use 
of natural gas in power generation continue. Trends towards smaller scale, more efficient 
and highly reliable forms of energy conversion also continue. Technological progress 
occurs in micro-turbines and fuel cell CHP and technologies for managing local electricity 
networks. It is assumed that there is sufficient availability of gas to meet demands. 
Investment expands in highly efficient, small-scale electricity/heat generation, close to 
point of use. Where conditions are favourable, small-scale renewable generation is also 
adopted, for example the use of biomass CHP, building integrated PV and solar thermal 
hot water. Exploring the extent to which zero carbon options are essential components of a 
decentralised generation energy system that delivers a 60% reduction in emissions is an 
important aspect of the scenario, and is returned to below. 
The need for long distance electricity transmission is reduced in this world. Neither nuclear 
power nor other large scale, remote point sources of electricity - such as wave power and 
electricity production from fossil fuels with the carbon sequestered - play a role. CO2 
emissions are reduced through a combination of: efficiency gains - higher thermal 
efficiency of gas fired plant, much greater use of combined heat and power (CHP), reduced 
losses in electricity transmission; fuel switching - abandonment of coal and oil in all 
stationary sectors, adoption of small scale renewables. 
This scenario is very much in line with a view of the world where a combination of new 
technologies, environmental pressures and liberalised markets (which favour incremental 
investment, flexible plant and less capital intensive forms of generation) combine to 
reshape the energy system. However the scenario demonstrates that a substantial role for 
zero carbon technologies is needed to secure a 60% cut in carbon emissions. High 
efficiency gas based generation is not able to deliver deep emission cuts alone. The role for 
zero carbon options is explored in more detail below, and the implications for policy 
considered in Ch 7. 
6.3.2 `Big is beautiful; ' a large scale sources and electricity transmission world 
In contrast to the decentralised world described above, it is possible to envisage a future 
energy system where long distance transmission of electricity increases its role, based upon 
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large generation plants. There are three important low carbon primary sources of electricity 
that tend to favour large scale energy conversion: 
- Large scale renewables; offshore wind and large onshore 
farms, wave and tidal power, 
central station solar thermal generation 
- Nuclear power 
- Production of electricity from fossil fuel sources with the 
CO2 sequestered in 
geological formations (carbon capture and storage CCS) 
Each of these options exhibit strong economies of scale that favour large plants and either 
exploit remote resources or need to be kept away from centres of population, or both. As a 
result it is necessary to transport large amounts of energy to multiple consumers, in many 
cases over long distances. In this scenario we assume that the principal means for doing so 
in the stationary sector is electricity transmission. 
As we note above, some commentators have suggested that current trends in electricity 
generation currently favour a decentralisation and downscaling. However, these trends 
may not continue and/or may become inconsistent with economic drivers and policy 
objectives. Indeed recent policies appear rather ambivalent, favouring both large scale 
developments such as nuclear power and decentralised developments (DTI 2007b). If 
exploitation of the large-scale low carbon sources proves essential to efforts to reduce CO2 
this may give rise to policy intervention that favours those options, particularly if 
combined with geopolitical concerns about security of gas supply. The economic case for 
some of the key decentralised options could be undermined by sustained high gas prices. 
Alternatively, innovations in large scale generation technologies (for example much 
improved nuclear) and transmission (perhaps superconductors) could make both become 
more attractive to private investors than they are at present. The central issue for this thesis 
is whether, and to what extent, path dependency will play a role and `lock in' to one or 
other of the rather distinct sets of technologies required for decentralised generation as 
opposed to the large scale options. But how different are they? The analysis below 
attempts to find out, and in the light of this analysis Ch. 7 returns to path dependence and 
policy. 
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6.4 Approach to scenario development and quantification 
In order to understand the contribution to emissions reduction and energy service provision 
of the different energy supply and transmission scenarios described below it is necessary to 
develop a model of energy demand, broken down into different sectors and end uses. It is 
also necessary to model the supply mix, and how different options contribute to different 
types of demand - for example, which fuels or systems provide space heating, and which 
power domestic appliances. In addition, supply and demand of energy must balance. 
A relatively simple spreadsheet model of energy supply and demand was developed for the 
2002 Energy Review (PIU 2001b). The original authors of the model made it available to 
the author, and it has been extended and developed in order to quantify the components of 
the scenarios developed here. The model provides a mechanism for deriving and energy 
demand baseline, in this study this is kept largely common to both scenarios, and allows 
differing supply and infrastructure mixes to be explored. The model developed by PIU 
analysts was extended by the author in order to vary the energy supply mix and to assess 
capacity margin issues (relating energy supply to firm capacity). The author has developed 
two main scenario variants, described below, but in total there are seven 
scenarios/sensitivities modelled reflecting the way that the model was adjusted to reflect 
emerging modelling results (see the DGE scenario below) or to test sensitivities to key 
assumptions (such as the role of the transport sector). In Annex 1 some samples of the 
model's sheets are reproduced. These cannot capture cell formulae, so a CD is also 
annexed to this report which contains the model in its entirety, including all of the scenario 
runs and sensitivities assessed. 
The model is used to quantify CO2 emissions, and ensure that the technology mixes 
defined in the scenarios are consistent with a 60% reduction. It is also used to ensure that 
the right form of energy supply is available to meet different demands. The model deals 
with aggregate energy provision (TWh/yr), and from this derives carbon emissions. It does 
not provide cost estimates, nor does it represent flows of power at different times of the 
day, or electricity system balancing. In the discussion that follows, the model is therefore 
utilised for the following aspects of the scenarios: 
- To derive a baseline common to both scenarios for energy demand in 2050, broken 
down into end uses 
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- To ensure that aggregate supply and 
demand of energy are in balance in terms of total 
energy supplied (including losses) and used each year 
- To describe in quantitative terms the supply mix required to meet 
different types of 
demand 
- To take into consideration changes in the transport sector 
(in the form of a common 
assumption used in both scenarios, and sensitivities) 
- To quantify the carbon emissions associated with each scenario 
The model does not deal with the following aspects, which are therefore discussed 
qualitatively, and/or built into the scenario using assumptions: 
- Electricity system balancing and the need for electricity storage and peaking/stand by 
plant 
- Infrastructure requirements 
- The relative costs of each scenario (quantification of this aspect is not an explicit 
requirement or feature of these scenarios) 
- Policy requirements 
6.4.1 Baseline for both scenarios - energy service demand and energy efficiency 
The first factor that needs to be considered, in defining both scenarios, is levels of demand 
in 2050 for electricity, heat, and direct use of fuels. Over such a long time frame demand 
changes are uncertain. Most studies take a scenario-based approach. One such set of 
scenarios were developed by Dr Nick Eyre and Prof Jake Chapman for the PIU Energy 
Review (PIU 2002b), in collaboration with the UK government Interdepartmental Analysts 
Group 15. The PIU demand scenarios comprise a quantification of the relationship between 
energy service demand changes, which is driven by social and economic change, and 
energy efficiency improvement, which is driven by technical efficiency gains (PIU 2001b). 
This is combined with analysis and description of energy supply technologies and sources 
in order to quantify total emissions in each scenario consistent with energy demands being 
met. The scenarios feature different assumptions about the key drivers of energy demand 
including economic growth and structure, and rates of technological, social and 
15 The lAG was set up to provide analysis across UK govt departments on long term policy issues. Its 
scenario assumptions are reported in (DTI 2003b) 
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demographic change. Full details of the techniques used by the PIU to derive demand 
projections are available in the relevant PIU Working Paper (PIU 2001b). 
Each scenario is associated with a level and structure of energy services demand. This acts 
as the basic driver of the energy system, as it determines the output required from the 
energy system (including imports). Although, in practice, aspects of the energy systems 
(notably costs) will affect demand, for simplicity the PIU treat the demand for energy 
services as determined by the scenario. The scenarios used by the PIU are described in Box 
6.1. 
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Box 6.1 PIU energy scenarios for 2050 (PIU 2001b) 
Scenario: World Markets (WM): a world defined by an emphasis on private consumption with a highly 
developed and integrated world trading system. 
- GDP growth averages 3% 
- Sustainable development is marginalized 
- Light regulation with a declining role for government in economic management 
- Policies increasingly developed at the EU level or in global 
institutions 
- Strong growth in international trade 
- Energy markets dominated by fossil fuels 
- Energy prices remain low in the short term with low priority 
for energy efficiency 
Scenario: Provincial Enterprise (PE): a world of private consumption values coupled with policy making 
reflecting local, regional and national concerns and priorities. 
- GDP growth averages 1.5% 
- Sustainability disappears as a political objective 
- UK independence in economic and foreign policy prioritised 
- Use of existing sources of energy including indigenous coal and nuclear power 
- Renewables not developed 
- Energy prices for consumers higher than in the world markets scenario 
- Energy efficiency limited by available capital and low priority of environmental investment. 
Scenario: Global Sustainability (GS): social and ecological values are more pronounced and there is 
greater effectiveness of global institutions, including stronger collective action in dealing with 
environmental problems. 
- GDP growth averages 2% 
- Adoption of more sustainable technologies and behaviour 
- Greater co-operation and management within the international system 
- Strong technological innovation 
- Education underpins sustainable development and consumers eco-aware. 
- New dwellings built to high environmental standards 
- Energy prices high due to environmental policy 
- Large global markets for renewable energy developed. 
- Energy suppliers move towards the provision of integrated services 
Scenario: Local Stewardship (LS): stronger local and regional governance allow social and ecological 
values to be demonstrated to a greater degree 
- GDP growth averages 1% 
- Social values encourage co-operative self-reliance and resource conservation. 
- Decision-making power, including regulation, are devolved 
- Widespread take up of energy efficiency measures 
- Trend towards smaller households reversed 
- High eco-awareness 
- High energy prices for all sectors particularly transport 
- Willingness to invest in local renewable energy technologies 
6.4.2 Using the PIU demand scenarios 
For the purposes of this report a single PIU scenario is chosen to derive total demand for 
energy in various forms and for varied purposes. The PIU's `global sustainability' (GS) 
scenario is used, which combines globalisation, economic growth similar to historic trends 
and rapid technical progress (particularly in cleaner technologies) with strong societal 
concern for the environment. It is therefore consistent with this study's objective of 
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exploring energy systems that deliver a 60% cut in CO2 emissions. The PIU's main GS 
scenario featured renewable energy and gas as the primary sources of energy. Within the 
PIU process there was some debate about the extent to which the GS scenario is internally 
consistent with different energy supply options, in particular with nuclear power and 
carbon sequestration (author's own recollections). This question probably remains open, 
but it is clear that unlike the PIU's other low carbon scenario (`local stewardship', LS), it is 
arguable that GS is consistent with non-renewable forms of generation. For this reason the 
GS scenario allows for the comparison of the different energy supply mixes in question 
here. Both scenarios developed below require a lot of innovation and are predicated on 
global learning in the area of low carbon technology. Both are consistent with the drivers 
outlined by the PIU for the GS scenario. However, for one or the other to emerge and 
become dominant the learning would need to be focused in a particular direction. Indeed it 
could be that an `early lead', however that lead emerges (technical advance, policy, market 
preferences), directs subsequent learning. Since this is exactly what we would expect in a 
path dependent process, the scenarios allow for the examination of path dependency. 
Energy demand can be met from a variety of supply options, and using various vectors - 
direct use of fossil fuels, electricity, and hydrogen. Hence, use of the GS scenario allows us 
to define a picture of energy use in 2050, and adjust energy supply and infrastructure to 
reflect the scenario variations in question in this study. 
6.4.3 Using the PIU energy demand-supply spreadsheet 
This thesis uses and adjusts the PIU demand-supply model in order to quantify the 
contribution of different technologies within the two scenarios described above. It 
therefore: 
- Uses the energy demand figures for each end use sector developed in the PIU GS 
scenano. 
- Uses the PIU's supply-demand balancing model to test a range of assumptions about 
energy supply mix. 
- Changes the supply mix, relative to the PIU GS mix, in order to meet the criteria of the 
current scenarios. 
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- Adjusts the PIU figures in order to reflect changed assumptions about transport 
fuel 
and the share of electricity in provision of heat. 
These key facets of the work are described in more detail below (6.5.1). In order to 
understand the present work it is necessary to provide additional information about the 
PIU's model. 
Energy demand in the PIU work 
The PIU approach to energy demand scenarios was developed through an extensive 
programme of expert workshops. This work was scrutinised by external experts and 
government analysts (Interdepartmental Analysts Group, IAG). It combined an expert view 
on trends and drivers of energy service demand growth with technical efficiency 
improvements, differentiated by scenario, for the following categories of end use: 
- Domestic space heating 
- Domestic water heating 
- Domestic lights 
- Domestic appliances 
- Service sector heat and power 
- Cars (inc m/c) 
- Light vans 
- Heavy lorries (HGVs) 
- Coaches and buses (PSVs) 
- Air transport 
- Other transport (primarily rail) 
- Industry heat 
- Industry power 
Energy service demand changes were driven by demographic changes; for example 
number of households and household occupancy rate, economic changes (e. g. share of 
industry and service sectors), demand for transport services, etc. These assessments gave 
rise to energy service multipliers, which were applied to year 2000 energy use data, over a 
50 year period in order to derive demand for energy services in 2050. A similar process 
was used to assess prospective technical efficiency improvements within each category and 
this gave rise to energy technology multipliers. The product of both multipliers gives 
energy demand in 2050. It is not the purpose of this report to assess or change any of this 
work. Instead the global sustainability demand projection is utilised for both scenarios 
under consideration here to provide a basis in terms of energy service demand for 2050. 
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Energy Supply in the PIU work 
In the PIU's analysis the demand growth projections in each scenario were incorporated 
into a supply-demand balance spreadsheet. Based on a variety of technology focussed 
working papers a supply mix for each scenario was defined, with each scenario dependent 
technology mix designed for consistency with the scenario drivers described above. The 
PIU did not attempt to impose a 60% emissions cut on any scenario, but it is notable that 
energy demand reductions and the supply-side mix defined for both the GS and LS 
scenarios did secure a 60% emission reduction (PIU 2001b). 
The main features of the PIU's approach to supply side energy scenario modelling are as 
follows: 
- The energy demand spreadsheet provided data on the energy requirements for each end 
use described above. 
- Electricity demand, and heat supplied by direct use of fuels, was adjusted to take into 
account electrical heating, which is not considered separately in the demand side 
spreadsheet. The PIU used scenario specific assumptions about this factor (both 
proportion of electrically supplied heat, and efficiency of gas-boilers displaced). In the 
analysis below, this factor is varied by scenario, to represent assumptions about greater 
use of electrical heat in `big is beautiful' and of CHP in `decentralised generation 
expands'. 
- To ensure that demand and supply are balanced, the PIU introduced balancing options 
into each scenario, to ensure that the scenario derived demands are always met by the 
supply mix. These were gas fired boilers for heat, CCGT for power and petroleum for 
transport. The appropriateness of this assumption is discussed below and modified as 
appropriate. 
- The PIU did not assume hydrogen production for transport except where the scenarios 
provided an excess of low carbon electricity. The assumption was made that excess 
electricity would be used to make hydrogen for transport fuel. Hence CCGT balances 
any shortfall and hydrogen generation absorbs any surplus electricity (in terms of 
average energy per year, not in terms of system balancing on an hour by hour basis). In 
what follows a rather more complex approach is taken, and this is described below. 
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More detail on the variables changed and assumptions tested in this study's scenarios is 
provided in the section below. 
6.5 Quantifying the scenarios 
6.5.1 Approach 
For each scenario the main characteristics and factors to be analysed are described and 
discussed. The prospective contribution of different technologies is explored qualitatively 
and this gives rise to some quantitative assumptions which are then tested using the PIU 
model. In each case, the maximum prospective contribution of different options is 
explored, and the model is used to assess whether this is consistent with the target for 
carbon emissions and contribution to energy needs. The outcome in terms of energy supply 
mix and emissions reduction under different assumptions is reported and the extent to 
which different assumptions are able to meet the requirements of the scenario are 
discussed. The interactions of different options are considered, and the contribution of 
each is adjusted to ensure consistency with all the objectives set for each scenario. Finally, 
a definitive scenario is presented, and the energy mix and associated emissions are 
quantified using the model. The implications for infrastructure and the development of 
other technologies (for example electricity storage) are discussed and this allows us to 
develop some key conclusions that relate to path dependency - which are considered 
further in Chapter 7. 
The end use demands that feature in the GS scenario are as follows 
Scenario demands by end use (TWh/yr) (PIU 2001b) 
- Domestic space heating 253 
- Domestic water heating 94 
- Domestic lights 14 
- Domestic appliances 65 
- Service sector heat and power 213 
- Cars (inc m/c) 138 
- LGVs 50 
- HGVs 152 
- PSVs 29 
- Air transport 241 
- Other transport 35 
- Industry heat 114 
- Industry power 127 
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Each of the scenarios uses these basic demand data, but adjusts the contribution of 
electricity to heat load, losses and various other factors in order to maintain consistency 
with scenario assumptions. 
6.5.2 Transport sector assumptions 
The PIU scenarios dealt with transport demand in 2050 through changes to vehicle and 
other transport technologies, and in terms of changes to demand for mobility. In the GS 
scenario considerable efficiency improvements are built into the demand projections, but 
energy service demand also increases. The scenario assumes that car use increases 
modestly, but vehicle efficiency improves by around 60% - based on the use of very high 
efficiency hybrid vehicles. Other transport modes achieve more modest efficiency gains, 
and some (bus use and air travel) have greatly increased utilisation. Overall, efficiency 
gains are largely offset by increased demands for mobility and for the transport sector 
overall energy demand remains almost the same as in 2000. 
The PIU assumed that renewable electricity would be utilised for hydrogen production, 
which makes a significant contribution to transport fuelling under their GS scenario. This 
assumption is not sustained in either of the current scenarios. Instead it is assumed that 
20% of transport fuel is decarbonised by 80%. This would be consistent with a scenario 
where hydrogen is produced from reformed natural gas with 80% of the C02 effectively 
sequestered. Restricting decarbonisation to 20% of total energy consumed in transport 
would reflect a 60% penetration of hydrogen into all larger vehicles (vans, buses, HGVs - 
note that total bus use expands three-fold in the GS scenario). It is assumed that hydrogen 
does not feature strongly, or not at all, in passenger cars. This perhaps conservative 
assumption is made in order to reflect the fact that the scenarios already envisage 
substantial efficiency gains in cars, and in order to set rigorous requirements for the 
stationary sector. Moreover, limiting the role of CCS in transport allows the scenario 
exercise to more effectively `test' for potential path dependent differences related to CCS 
between DGE and BiB. Since BiB has CCS in the power sector and DGE does not it is 
important that this distinction is not substantively undermined by a common, and very 
large, CCS transport infrastructure. This assumption is maintained in the scenario 
quantifications undertaken in both the scenarios described below, but sensitivity to a more 
radical decarbonisation in the transport sector is indicated where appropriate. 
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6.5.3 Assumptions related to electric heating 
The PIU assumed that electric heating would be provided using resistive heaters of some 
form. This assumption is maintained in the current scenario exercise. It is assumed that 
electric heating is 100% efficient - that is to say that electric space heaters and water 
heaters can substitute for heating fuels on the basis that no energy is lost in converting 
electricity into heat. One important possibility that this approach neglects is the potential to 
use electricity to power heat pumps that extract thermal energy from the ground or from 
the air, effectively raising the `efficiency of conversion' from electric power to heat to over 
100%. Indeed heat pumps can provide around 70% more heat output than an equivalently 
rated conventional electric heater. Ground source heat pumps require a substantial run of 
underground piping and this may restrict their potential application, particularly in existing 
urban areas. Despite many attractive features and considerable potential, air source heat 
pumps are not widely utilised. Nevertheless it is important to note that the potential for 
heat pumps to significantly reduce electricity consumption for an equivalent amount of 
heat provision would have the effect of substantially reducing total electricity demand, 
particularly in the BiB scenario, which envisages a large role for electric heat. 
Alternatively, heat pumps could allow a greater penetration of electricity into heat service 
provision, reducing the role of gas boilers. Heat pumps (like many energy efficiency 
technologies) would therefore make the achievement of either scenario's emission 
reduction objective easier. Neglecting their use is therefore a conservative assumption that 
makes emission reduction more challenging. 
6.6 Big is Beautiful (BiB) 
In this vision of the future, the UK government's recent plans to encourage development of 
nuclear power, CCS and marine renewables (DTI 2007b) are extrapolated and extended 
such that these technologies come to dominate stationary energy supply. Any 
decentralising trends (such as described by (Patterson 1999)) are not continued in the long 
term. Instead, electricity supply is based upon large scale low carbon technologies - 
nuclear power, fossil fired generation with CO2 capture and storage (CCS), and large scale 
renewable installations such as wave and offshore wind. There are two principal drivers 
towards such a world. The first is carbon emission reduction. The second is concerns about 
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increasing UK dependence on imported gas. These drivers are assumed to direct the 
orientation of investment decisions in favour of large plants. The role of gas is greatly 
reduced relative to 2000 levels, reflecting a desire to reduce gas imports. The scenario also 
includes a single large tidal barrage. 
If a large scale, zero carbon energy system were to develop several important issues can be 
assessed: 
- First, it is possible to estimate the effect on CO2 emissions under different assumptions, 
relative to supplying an equivalent quantity of energy service from the current energy 
mix. 
- Second, it is possible to consider whether the development of large scale options will 
introduce problems related to electricity system management that might necessitate the 
development of electricity storage, sophisticated power demand management or 
peaking/stand by plant. 
- Third, it possible to consider implications for investment in electricity networks - to 
what extent might we expect requirements for bulk transfers of electricity over long 
distances to increase? 
- Fourth, the changing nature of emissions - the share and quantity of CO2 from large 
scale point sources predominating and being put into CO2 capture and storage. It may 
be possible to define the pipeline infrastructure that might be required for doing this. 
6.6.1 Defining the big is beautiful scenario 
This section explores and describes in detail the energy mix of the decentralised generation 
expands scenario. In order to do this four key factors are discussed: 
- The level of stationary energy demand, broken down into heat and power required in 
different sectors - in particular the use of electricity for heating. 
- The potential contribution of each main large scale, low carbon option, and 
implications for emission 
- Implications for energy system change in terms of 
o electricity storage requirements, remote demand management 
o infrastructure/network change 
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o Changes to the location and size of CO2 sources, and implications for new 
infrastructure for CO2 disposal. 
6.6.2 Energy demand projections 
The end use energy service demands that feature in the PIU GS scenario are described in 
section 6.5.1. Electricity supply is adjusted to reflect electrical heating, electricity used in 
transport and losses. In the big is beautiful case, it is assumed that 175 TWh of electricity 
is used to provide heat (compared to 46 TWh in 2000, and 30 TWh in the Decentralised 
Generation Expands or DGE scenario below). This assumption is used in order to represent 
a situation where there is substantial availability of low carbon electricity, where building 
efficiency improvements reduce overall demands for heating and where policymakers are 
seeking to reduce dependence on imported gas and CO2 emissions. The role for gas-fired 
boilers is reduced commensurately. Losses remain at 8% (2000 levels) as unlike the 
decentralised generation scenario, there is no decrease in the proportion of electricity 
transported through long distance transmission networks (transmission losses are assumed 
to decline to 5% of total electricity supplied in DGE scenario below). 
Big is beautiful total supply of energy (TWh) 
Fuels used directly (stationary sector) 401 
Electricity generated 
Transport fuels used 
506 
621 
It is possible to consider the implications of these energy demand changes for emissions 
based upon a scaled year 2000 mix of electricity generation plant and means of providing 
stationary heat. The model was run under these assumptions, and delivered a 5.9% 
reduction in emissions. This is almost entirely due to the fact that demand for stationary 
heat is reduced in absolute terms relative to year 2000. This is partly offset by an 
expansion of the use of electricity for heating and demand for transport fuels. 
6.6.3 Mix of electricity plant and implications for emissions in the BiB scenario 
This section assesses how much of each type of large scale low carbon option (nuclear, 
renewables and CCS) might be envisaged. The constraints on each are discussed (derived 
108 
from Ch. 5) - these are: the potential for large scale renewables; any constraints on how 
much nuclear power might be installed, taking into consideration prospective sites for 
nuclear stations; and the compatibility of coal or gas (both with CCS) with the scenario. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the contribution of renewables and nuclear power is 
maximised, and gas/coal fired C&S makes up the remainder. 
Two further considerations will affect the contribution of each option: Wind, wave and 
tidal stream are all intermittent sources, and this has implications for system balancing and 
firm capacity, as discussed below and in Ch. 5. It is therefore important to assess the extent 
to which the contribution from renewables might be constrained in the absence of effective 
storage or demand management techniques. The second consideration relates to the fact 
that CO2 CCS does not eliminate emissions, but reduces them by 85%, which might place 
limits on the penetration of capture and storage that is consistent with securing a 60% 
reduction in CO2 emissions, particularly if it is coal fired. We discuss these issues below. 
Renewables 
Renewable sources able to contribute electricity on a large scale include offshore wind, 
large onshore wind farms, wave and tidal stream power, tidal barrages and large hydro. 
The technical potential of wind, wave and tidal stream is described in Table 5.1 (Ch. 5). 
Offshore wind 
It is clear that offshore wind offers very significant potential, as discussed in Ch. 5 at least 
1000 TWh/yr is theoretically available from sites at water depths of less than 30 metres, 
rising to 3000 TWh/yr if water depths of 50 m are included (DTI 2002). Assessments of 
practical potential vary, but might be around 100 TWh /yr taking into consideration 
competing uses for sea space (DTI 1998). This is therefore assumed to be the contribution 
from offshore wind in the scenario. This is a conservative and very approximate 
assessment, given the scale of the technical potential. However, offshore wind might 
expand to replace wave power should developments in the latter prove difficult (see 
below). 
Onshore wind 
Ch. 5 indicates that onshore wind could provide, in principle, in excess of 300 TWh/yr. 
Large onshore farms are most compatible with the BiB scenario, and it is assumed that this 
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means farms of at least 200 MW. There is little data on the prospective number or 
contribution of such developments, and it is likely that they would be constrained by 
competing land uses and planning considerations but ten such farms would contribute 
around 5 TWh/yr (assumes 30% load factor). It is assumed that some smaller wind 
developments continue to operate, and that the total contribution from all onshore wind 
facilities is 10 TWh - equivalent to around 4GW installed capacity, or just over one quarter 
of that operating in Germany today. 
Wave and tidal 
The potential for wave power is large and somewhat uncertain. DTI data indicate 
theoretical potential of 700 TWh/yr, but assumes that the technical is constrained by 
practicable and sea space considerations to around 60TWh/yr (DTI 1998). Tidal stream 
potential is also uncertain, and technical potential has been estimated at 36 TWh/yr (Ibid). 
In the light of these uncertainties it is assumed that a total of 60TWh/yr of combined wave 
and tidal generation is installed by 2050 - with a 50/50 split between each. Given the very 
large technical potentials available for offshore wind it would be possible in principle for 
wave power to be replaced by offshore wind, should wave power developments fail. 
Large hydro and tidal barrage 
Around 1.4 GW of large hydro is currently installed (DTI 2003b). Output is around 3.5 
TWh/yr. It is assumed that no new sites are available, but that plants are repowered as 
necessary such that a similar capacity is operating in 2050. The Severn Barrage would be 
built under the BiB scenario. An industry consortium proposal for the Barrage is for a9 
GW installation delivering 17 TWh/yr (Tayler 2002). Hence combined output from large 
hydro and Severn Barrage would amount to 20 TWh/yr. 
Nuclear power 
Nuclear power currently accounts for around 22% of UK electricity supply, around 85 
TWh/yr (DTI 2003b). There are 15 operational nuclear stations on the system out of a total 
of 19 built in the UK, and current installed capacity is just over 12 GW (DTI 2003b). 
Existing generating unit sizes vary from 450 MW for the Magnox stations, around 1.2 GW 
for Sizewell B (DTI 2007a). 
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At the time of writing the Government is consulting on changes to the planning system to 
ensure that gaining planning consent for new nuclear power stations is more 
straightforward (DTI 2007b; DTI 2007c). However, it is reasonable to assume that even 
with revised planning laws wholly new sites for nuclear stations could be difficult to 
secure. For the purposes of this scenario it is therefore assumed that new nuclear stations 
are only built on the sites of existing reactors. This assumption might prove to be either 
conservative, or hopelessly ambitious, since new nuclear station construction is highly 
sensitive to public opinion - as the protracted planning process that surrounded Sizewell B 
indicates. Should attitudes to nuclear power alter dramatically, perhaps through increased 
concern about climate change and/or disillusionment with renewables, it might prove 
possible to expand the number of new nuclear sites. On the other hand increased concerns 
about either proliferation or accidents could make any new stations difficult to secure. 
Given these unknowns and the BiB scenario drivers, the assumption that existing stations 
are replaced seems plausible. 
The industry have suggested a build programme of 10 stations on 5 sites for the period to 
2020, each with twin 1 GW stations (British Energy 2001). Extending this to 15 sites 
would result in 30 GW of new plant, 2GW each on 15 existing operational or recently 
decommissioned sites. It is not clear that each existing site would be suitable for new 
development. However some sites, such as Sizewell and Hinckley have already had 
additional reactors proposed, so it is reasonable to assume that these and some others could 
have multiple (perhaps 3 or 4) reactors, whilst other sites are closed. 30 GW of nuclear 
power in 2050 is also consistent with estimates such as the Markal modelling for the 2003 
Energy White Paper (DTI 2003b). 
30 GW operating at a 75% load factor would deliver 200 TWh per year. Around 40% of 
electricity supply under the BiB scenario. Industry sources suggest that load factors for 
new reactors could be 85% or more (British Energy 2001) and industry sources note that 
the best reactors are now achieving up to 90% (World Nuclear Association 2006b). 
However, historically UK reactors have achieved load factors of 75%, or lower (DTI 
2007a), and around 1/3"d of current reactors are achieving load factors below 75% (World 
Nuclear Association 2006b). Moreover, for reasons considered in more detail below (Sect. 
6.7.4) the high penetration of renewables and nuclear in the BiB scenario indicate that 
nuclear may need to take part in a modest degree of load following, which would also 
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decrease load factor, as is the case in France (Pouret & Nuttall 2007). The French nuclear 
fleet operates with an average load factor of 76% as a result of load following (World 
Nuclear Association 2006b). Therefore whilst nuclear load factors are clearly a matter of 
debate 75% appears a reasonable assumption given the high penetration of nuclear in the 
BiB scenario's overall electricity mix. 
CO2 CCS 
I assume that coal and gas fired electricity generation fitted with carbon capture and 
storage contribute the remaining 114 TWh of electricity supply. This range is consistent 
with recent scenarios assessing the potential role of CCS in low carbon energy systems 
(Marsh, Pye, & Ten Brink 2005). Coal provides 60 TWh and gas fired CCGT provides 54 
TWh. It is further assumed that capture is 80% efficient and that plants fitted with capture 
equipment are 45% and 55% efficient for coal and gas respectively. These values have 
been chosen because whilst advanced designs of both type of generator are widely 
expected to improve efficiencies (see Ch. 5), CCS reduces overall efficiency ((DTI 2003b). 
The split between coal and gas represents a pragmatic attempt to reconcile energy security 
and CO2 emission constraints. If we assume that coal contributes all of the 114 TWh 
`residual' then emissions reductions move away from the 60% target (though not by a large 
amount). However, were gas fired generation to provide all of the 114 TWh `residual', it 
would provide around 1/5`x' of electricity supply and concerns over import dependence 
might not be adequately addressed. The assumption set out above reduces gas dependence 
to less than 10% of electricity supply. 
In the BiB scenario it is also assumed that coal and gas stations fitted with CCS are load 
following, and able to act to provide system balancing. Again this is consistent with recent 
analysis of the role of CCS in a low carbon energy system ((Marsh, Pye, & Ten Brink 
2005)). The implications of the scenario for system margin and intermittency are discussed 
below. 
The overall mix of energy by source is summarised in Figure 6.9. This shows that the 
scenario almost completely decarbonises electricity (a small residual arises from the need 
to vent around 15% - 20% of CO2 from CCS (IPCC 2005). The share of electricity in heat 
rises to around 1/3`d, reflecting the availability of zero carbon electricity and absence of 
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CHP or biomass in the scenario. Figure 6.10 shows emissions reductions relative to 2000, a 
59% reduction in emissions. 
Figure 6-2: Energy supplied by source and sector in the BiB scenario16 
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16 Electrical heating (175 TWh/yr, shown dotted, column 2) is in some respects `counted twice' in this 
graphic since total electricity demand includes electricity for heating. Note that gross demand (and 
emissions) can be calculated by summation of the column totals if electrical heating is netted off the total. 
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6.6.4 Potential implications for infrastructure in the BiB scenario 
System balancing and intermittency 
Intermittency is introduced in Ch. 5. A range of studies indicate that whilst modest 
penetrations of intermittent generation (up to around 30% of output) can be accommodated 
with little difficulty, larger penetrations will require more fundamental changes to the way 
the electricity network is operated (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 
2006). CHP and renewables both present problems for system operators. 
This is because CHP has predictable output but cannot necessarily be operated to suit 
electricity demands: If CHP is to maintain maximum overall efficiency it must follow heat 
loads, so little or none of the plant would normally be despatchable in order to respond to 
short term electricity demand fluctuations. Indeed doing so would require a cooling system 
to remove waste heat from CHP installations. Renewable generation is both intermittent 
and difficult to predict in advance (wind and PV), or intermittent and predictable but 
following heat-loads (biomass CHP). This suggests that in order for demand and supply of 
17 Emissions from electrical heating are accounted for in the 'power' column. 
114 
electricity to be balanced instantaneously and reliability maintained additional measures 
will be required. 
This thesis cannot do justice to the range of electrical engineering issues associated with 
managing a large share of intermittent generators on the system. Studies of the topic have 
divided the main impacts into three categories (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, 
Leach, & Skea 2006; Ilex & Strbac 2002) (also see Gross et al 2006 for full definitions of 
terms): 
- System balancing; the additional costs associated with providing additional response 
and reserve plants to manage intermittent fluctuations on an instantaneous basis, at all 
times of the year. 
- System reliability; the additional costs associated with maintaining the system margin 
during peak times of the year required to ensure that a measure of reliability such as a 
specified loss of load probability (LOLP) is met. 
- Distribution network impacts; upgrading and operational changes needed to manage 
the output of intermittent generation connected to local distribution networks. 
Electrical engineering analysis including simulations of the transmission grid and 
distribution networks would allow these issues to be thoroughly explored, but is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. In what follows we discuss system balancing with respect to 
existing studies and provide an approximate quantification of one measure - the 
contribution of intermittent generators to system reliability. 
In the BiB scenario intermittent renewables provide around 1/5`h of total electricity supply. 
In the absence of a representation of output and demand by time of day and time of year it 
is not possible to provide a detailed quantification of the scale of the impacts of 
intermittency and other factors on system operation. However, with reference to other 
studies and working from first principles it is possible to sketch some of the principal 
issues, which is the object of the discussion below. 
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6.6.4.1 System balancing 
The first category of impact that results from a large penetration of intermittent output is 
that the transmission system operator may need to secure additional response and reserve 
services (see Gross et al 2006 and Ilex and Strbac 2002 for full definitions). In addition, 
efficiency may be reduced in any fossil fuel plants that are obliged to vary their output 
more regularly, extensively or rapidly, irrespective of whether such plant are contracted 
reserves or responding to market signals (for an explanation of this distinction see Gross et 
al 2006). Quantification of such impacts is relatively straightforward and unlike some 
aspects of the intermittency debate does not appear to be controversial (Gross, Heptonstall, 
Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 2006). 
The amount of reserve needed to handle unpredicted short term variations - either due to 
demand prediction errors or generation failures - is worked out through analytical 
techniques using statistical principles or simulation models. The objective is to ensure that 
system balancing reserves are available that can deal with almost all the unpredicted 
fluctuations that can be envisaged. The analytic techniques presented here provide 
approximate results but simulations are needed to deal with more complex situations, for 
example where correlations between variables exist. The analytical approach can provide 
an explanation of principles that come into play and indicate orders of magnitude. 
Historically, reserves have been sized to cover approx. ±3 standard deviations of the 
potential uncertain fluctuations that arise from this combined demand prediction error and 
generation plant failure, plus provision for the sudden loss of the largest single unit (n-1 
criteria, or disturbance reserve). The ±3 criteria ensure 99% of unpredicted demand or 
supply fluctuations are covered by reserves: Reserves = ±3 1 J2 +a) (plus disturbance 
reserve) where 0d0 represent the standard deviations of fluctuations demand and supply. 
When intermittent generation is added the variance of the supply side term increases. This 
is usually estimated by adding the effect of intermittence to existing reserve requirements - 
that is to say, adding the squared standard deviation of unpredicted fluctuations in 
intermittent supply to the sum of squared standard deviations of demand and conventional 
supply. 
Two factors are notable: First that even for a relatively unpredictable intermittent source 
like wind power the standard deviation of fluctuations in the period from minutes to a few 
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hours is relatively modest. This is because there is considerable smoothing of outputs in 
the sub-hourly timeframe, and considerable prediction accuracy over a few hours. 
Secondly, variance of intermittent fluctuations must be combined statistically with the 
variance of demand and conventional supply. These factors suggest that reserve impacts 
from intermittence will be relatively modest. 
The SCAR report (Ilex & Strbac 2002) provides a simple example of this in practice. The 
standard deviations of wind fluctuations at half hourly and four hourly time horizons were 
chosen by SCAR to represent different categories of reserve (roughly according to fast 
response and standing reserve in the discussion above). They were found to be 1.4% and 
9.3% of installed wind capacity respectively. SCAR assumed 10GW of wind was installed, 
hence these SDs are 140 MW and 930 MW. This means that the range of possible changes 
(99% or 3 SDs) would be ±420 MW and ±2730 MW. The report notes that the SD of 
conventional generation and demand (ade+a, 2) is around 340 MW at the half hour period. 
Therefore the SD with wind would be /(3402 + 1402) or 368 MW -a minor addition. 
Response and fast reserve requirements would be ±3*368 or 1104 MW - compared to 
1040 MW without wind. In both cases total GB reserves would also require 1.1 GW of 
disturbance reserve (the largest single in-feed loss) - hence in this example 10 GW wind 
accounts for around 130 MW reserve needs out of approx 2.2 GW total reserves needs. 
The BiB scenario is comprised of 55 GW of intermittent plant. If the shapes of the 
distribution of outputs are broadly similar with this level of capacity to a system with 10 
GW as in the SCAR example then the standard deviation at the half hourly period would 
represent 1.4% of 55, or very roughly 800 MW. If the total half hourly reserve needs 
simply scale in line with the increase in peak demand in the BiB scenario (reflecting 
increasing magnitudes in demand errors) then the SD of conventional generation and 
demand (ade +a, ) would increase to 445 MW at the half hour period. Therefore the SD 
with wind would be ((4452 + 8002) or 915 MW. Response and fast reserve requirements 
would be ±3*915 or 2745 MW - compared to 1040 MW without wind in the year 2000 
system and 1335 in the BiB scenario were it comprised entirely of conventional plant. 
Total reserves in the BiB scenario would also need to include the disturbance reserve and if 
we assume that nuclear power stations of up to 2 GW are installed (the EPR being built in 
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Finland is 1.7 GW) this would be 2 GW, bringing total fast response plant up to around 4.7 
GW, compared to 2.2 GW in the current British system. 
Effectively doubling the amount of fast response plant is a relatively minor change to the 
system in comparison to the increase in overall capacity relative to 2000 levels and the 
extent of the changes to the electricity mix envisaged in the scenario. It would add to costs, 
but in comparison with the additional plant that would be needed to maintain reliability 
(see below) this addition is modest. 
It is important to note that additional fast response plant does not contribute additional 
energy to the system, nor does it displace output from renewables plant. Impact on 
emissions is therefore a product of any efficiency losses that result from having such 
services available and from greater variation in outputs from a range of other generators 
(for example by running generators on part load or in additional start up and shut down of 
fossil fired generators see (Ilex & Strbac 2002)). These effects are generally believed to 
have a very modest impact on the overall efficiency of generation, for example Dale et al 
estimate the impacts to be around 1% of emissions savings should wind supply 20% of 
British electricity (Dale, Milborrow, Strbac, & Slark 2003). In the BiB scenario any 
additional system balancing could be largely accommodated by the fossil fired CCS plants 
in the scenario, and whilst this could decrease efficiency and would have some impact on 
emissions, any effect will be moderated by the capture of 80% of such emissions. Overall, 
system balancing impacts are likely to be primarily economic, modest in comparison to the 
scale of the changes envisaged in the scenario overall and highly unlikely to lead to a 
significant reduction in carbon savings. 
Energy spilling: Renewables and demand 
Perhaps more important for the purposes of this study than any costs associated with extra 
system balancing action is the potential for renewable output to exceed demand, hence for 
energy to be wasted or `spilled'. If such energy were to be `lost' from the scenario, in that 
output needed to be spilled, could not be stored and had to be replaced using fossil fuels, 
then emissions reductions could be undermined. In this section the likelihood and 
magnitude of such effects is examined. 
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The BiB scenario installed capacities of wind, wave and tidal power are shown in Figure 
6.8. Peak demand is simply pro-rated from the year 2000 ratio of annual electricity energy 
demand to peak power demand, hence peak demand is 76 GW. A 35% load factor is 
assumed for wind and wave power, and as shown in Figure 6.8 installed capacity is around 
55 GW; within almost 20 GW of peak demand. Installed capacity for intermittent 
renewables is an approximation, since the model is unable to represent the distribution of 
outputs from wind and wave machines, and hence the precise relationship between 
installed peak capacity and average output. 
Time series simulations of the output of wind energy, using meteorological data generally 
indicate that periods of peak output are rare and the distribution of outputs tends to be 
skewed towards a mean level that is close to average load factor for the technology in 
question, and that for wind power this is in the range 20% to 30% of peak capacity (Dale, 
Milborrow, Strbac, & Slark 2003-, Grubb 1991b; Holttinen 2004). This is hardly surprising 
given that wind speeds typically follow a Weibull distribution, where mean wind speeds 
are skewed towards the low to moderate wind speed range 
(http: //www. windpower. org/en/tour/wres/weibull. htm). Indeed wind farm developers and 
wind turbine manufacturers use a Weibull distribution to assess wind farm/turbine output. 
Figure 6-4: Frequency distribution of outputs wind farms in the Nordic region 
(Holttinen 2004) 
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It is possible to represent output over the period of a year, as in Figure 6.5, which again 
indicates that periods of high output are a small proportion of total hours (note that power 
may be expressed in terms of either MW or normalised against total capacity as in the 
figure below). 
Figure 6-5: Duration curves for European wind power (Czisch & Giebel 2000) 
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Distributions that show the frequency of high outputs cannot determine whether the high 
output events, albeit infrequent, coincide regularly with low demand. It is reasonable to 
assume that for the BiB scenario there will be times of the year when renewables supply a 
very large fraction of demand, as already occurs on occasion in Denmark (Holttinen 
2004). Indeed it is possible that there will be times during the year when output exceeds 
demand. How often will this happen and how much energy will be lost" 
Existing analysis has attempted to answer this question using both time series simulations 
that represent demand and intermittent output throughout a year and/or using algorithms 
that represent the key relationships within such data statistically and allow it to be analysed 
more simply (Moretti & Jones 1982). Analysis revealed through a systematic review of the 
engineering literature on intermittent generation (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, 
Leach, & Skea 2006) indicates that such periods are rare, and hence constitute a small 
fraction of the output available from renewables. 
120 
For example, using an analytical approach, Grubb illustrates the point using a cumulative 
probability of load curve that is net of the combined output of 25 GW of wind power and 
several tidal barrages, reproduced below (Grubb 1991b). From a time of day representation 
of demand (of the form in Figure 6.7), it is possible to derive a probability distribution of 
demand, cumulative probability of demand and load duration curves. Similarly given data 
about wind farm output by time of day and time of year it is possible to derive probability 
distribution of output, cumulative probability and `output duration'. Load can then be 
shown net of intermittent generation, which indicates the demand level controllable 
generators need to meet. Using this approach Grubb concludes that energy spilling would 
be around 1% of renewable generation. Other studies of the British network reach broadly 
similar conclusions, estimating spilled energy to be a small fraction of total intermittent 
output even when penetration of such generators is relatively large (Gardner & Thorpe 
1982; llex & Strbac 2002). 
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The extent to which energy spilling happens in the BiB scenario could only be properly 
quantified using a time series representation of the time of day output of renewables as 
well as time of day demand at different times of the year. However a study for the UK 
government assessed a system with a penetration of renewables and peak demand not 
dissimilar to that in the BiB scenario. Ilex and Strbac considered 30% of electricity from 
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renewables, with peak a demand of 76 GW. This work indicates that energy spilling can 
occur, but occurs infrequently and constitutes a small fraction of system balancing costs 
(Ilex & Strbac 2002). 
It is also possible to take a view of the amount of energy lost using some simple 
assumptions to derive a `worse case' scenario. For example by assessing the total hours 
each year where demand falls below some nominal minimum and assuming that these 
coincide with relatively high renewable output. Under present day demand conditions, 
minimum demand in summer falls to below 20 GW, or around 1/3`d peak winter demand 
Figure 6.7 suggests that demand might be below this level for 3 hours each summer night, 
and if this were to happen all summer for 270 or so hours per year. Again, if we simply pro 
rata minimum summer demand from the year 2000 baseline to the BiB scenario on the 
basis of peak demand in each case then minimum demand might be around 23GW, or 
around half the installed capacity of intermittent renewables. In our worse case scenario we 
assume that intermittent output might always be greater than this level, and for illustrative 
purposes we assume that output is in fact 35 GW or around 2/3rds of peak output (unlikely 
given that very low demand summer nights are usually correlated with periods of warm 
weather and high pressure, bringing calm conditions and low winds to at least part of the 
country). 
Under such assumptions around 28 TWh of renewable output would be lost from the 
scenario. The model was run to quantify the impact on emissions. Replacing this with coal 
fired CCS plant would increase overall emissions by around 0.6%. Replacing it with 
CCGT without sequestration would increase emissions by around 2% (see spreadsheets 
BiB1 spill replaced by CCGT and BiB1 spill replaced by coal CCS). 
In summary, whilst there may be periods throughout the year when high levels of 
wind/wave power coincide with relatively low demands, and result in excess renewable 
generation, analyses that explore penetrations of renewables into the British electricity 
network of a similar size to that envisaged for the BiB scenario conclude that the amount 
of energy spilled would be small. A `worse case' scenario also indicates that the impact on 
emissions would be modest, particularly if carbon capture plant were used to make up the 
energy shortfall. 
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Energy spilling: renewables and nuclear power 
Energy spilling as a result of renewable output exceeding minimum demand might be 
relatively rare. However a more significant problem could occur as a result of wind 
generation exceeding a minimum amount of thermal generation on the system required to 
provide key services such as frequency response (Grubb 1988; Grubb 1991a; Grubb 
1991b; llex & Strbac 2002). With 30 GW of nuclear in the BiB scenario it is almost certain 
that there will be periods when the combined output of renewable and nuclear generation 
could exceed demand, unless the output of one or both is curtailed or energy is stored for 
later use. This is most likely to occur during summer. Again, as discussed above, a time 
series simulation and adequate `load duration' data would be needed to assess scale of lost 
energy and the potential impact on emissions savings if the wasted energy were supplanted 
by fossil fired output. In mitigation, it was explained in Section 6.7.3 that the load factor 
assumed for nuclear power is relatively low compared to industry estimates on the basis 
that nuclear stations take some part in load following, which could include part loading or 
shut down when demands are low and renewable generation is high. This should be 
technically feasible for modern reactors (Pouret & Nuttall 2007) and should certainly be 
possible for designs likely to be operating in 2050. It is also likely that nuclear stations will 
be taken out of service for maintenance during periods of low demand. Hence we have 
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already allowed for some degree of curtailment of nuclear power within our emissions 
scenario. Nevertheless there is a clear potential that the emissions savings might be 
undermined, at least to a degree, not by the intermittency of renewables per se but by the 
combination of renewables and nuclear plant. More detailed examination of this is not 
possible in the absence of time series data, such analysis would be a valuable extension to 
the work. 
In sum it seems likely that the BiB scenario will require some combination of additional 
energy storage, active management of demand and nuclear stations with enhanced ability 
to part load in order to accommodate periods of low demand. How much is impossible to 
quantify, but it is likely to be rather different from that described for the DGE scenario. 
BiB requires options to manage large scale but relatively short lived periods when energy 
would need to be spilled if nuclear stations could not part load, renewable output could not 
be stored or demand be moved. Examples include windy summer nights or when demand 
is at the levels typical of summer days and winter nights but renewable output is 
particularly high. 
This thesis did not set out to examine electricity systems operation in depth and the model 
used for scenario quantification is not able to represent time of day/year power flows. 
Nevertheless the author was struck by the relative absence of engineering based electricity 
system simulation scenarios that consider deep cuts in emissions and/or radically different 
energy system configurations (i. e. either scenario described here, or any others). Most 
engineering based studies (See Gross et al 2006 for a review of this literature) consider 
only relatively modest contributions from renewables (up to around 20 or 30%), whereas 
scenarios for much larger renewable penetrations (e. g. (DTI 2003b; PIU 2001a) have not 
looked at power flows in detail. The scenarios developed by the `Supergen' networks 
consortium (a research collaboration between several universities) provide a sketch of 
these issues but do not go into great detail about system balancing (Jamasb, Nuttall, & 
Pollit 2006) (Elders, Ault, Galloway, McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & Lampaditou 2006). 




6.6.4.2 Reliability and system margin 
lt is possible to estimate the reliability with which the BiB scenario might meet peak 
demand. `Equivalent firm capacity' for the scenario can be defined using published data 
for the capacity credits of wind, wave and hydro stations. The capacity credit for wind 
generation in the UK is typically estimated to be around 25% of installed capacity, with 
wind supplying 20% of electricity (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 
2006). For the simplicity the capacity credit of tidal barrage is assumed to be equivalent to 
load factor (22%, based on (Tayler 2002)). The latter assumption is a simplification that is 
used because although output from a tidal barrage is entirely predictable, the timing of 
peak output will vary by around 1 hour per day and output will vary over the course of a 28 
day period, reflecting the lunar cycle. Hence there will be periods of the year when tidal 
cannot contribute to peak demand. Thermal capacities indicated in Figure 6.8, using load 
factors of 75% for nuclear power and 80% for fossil fired generators. 
Figure 6-8: Installed capacity and system margin under the BiB scenario (fossil 
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Figure 6.8 indicates that there is a shortfall of system margin under the BiB scenario, 
which results in part from the modest capacity credits of wind, wave and tidal barrage 
technologies relative to the capacity of conventional technology that would provide the 
same amount of energy. In other words the share of energy provided by these technologies 
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is substantially greater than their contribution to system reliability. However this is not the 
only reason that the system appears to lack capacity relative to the present day system. 
Indeed even if renewables were 100% reliable, but operated at the same load factor as a 
thermal station, the scenario would still need an additional 9 GW of capacity to provide a 
20% system margin. This is because the scenario assumes that all of the generators on the 
system operate at relatively high load factors. System average load factor in Britain in 
2005 was around 58% (DTI 2007a). By contrast the most modern power stations might 
operate with a capacity factor of 85% or above (Ibid), and the BiB scenario assumes that 
CCS stations operate at 80% load factor, and nuclear at 75%. This is because the current 
electricity system operates with a wide range of plants, and different types of plant are used 
at different times of the day or year, in response to market signals (see Figure 6.5). 
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The dispatch of plant is a function of variable costs; low variable cost plant will take up the 
lowest section of the diurnal demand curve shown in the figure above and progressively 
higher plants will be `dispatched' successively. Technical constraints are also relevant and 
18 From NGC Seen Year Statement 2003 (Typical winter demand) Available from Hip www. nanonalgrid. conruk, sys 03 print. asp'chap-7 
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plants that operate `mid-merit' and vary their output need to be physically suited to that 
mode of operation. At present old oil and open cycle gas plants operate during peak hours 
and have very low capacity factors. Strictly speaking `dispatch' only occurs where 
electricity networks operate as vertically integrated centrally controlled monopolies. There 
is no `merit order' in the British electricity market, and no central operations that 
`dispatch' or command generators to operate. Generators are free to operate as they see fit, 
subject to technical and regulatory constraints, but the notion of a `merit order' based on 
variable costs provides a useful shorthand for what happens as a result of complex bilateral 
trading arrangements (See (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007) for more details). 
Figure 6.8 is based on an assumption that CCS plants operate at a capacity factor of 80%. 
If instead enough CCS plant were installed to provide a full range of system balancing 
services and to provide system margin then a much larger capacity of CCS plant would 
need to be installed than would be the case if the plant were operated at maximum output. 
Under the `base case' assumption that CCS plant operates at an 80% load factor, around 17 
GW of CCS plant is installed (8 GW of gas and 9 GW of coal). If the utilisation of CCS 
plant is decreased until a system margin of 20% is provided then installed capacities are 
increased to 21 GW and 22 GW for gas and coal respectively, an overall increase of 26 
GW. Under this assumption the average load factor of all the CCS plant on the system 
would be around 30% (see Figure 6.10 and spreadsheet 'BiB I ccslf adjust to get margin'). 
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This thesis does not provide a detailed review of the relative costs and economics of 
different types of generator. However whilst the potential for CCS plant to load follow has 
been mooted (Marsh, Pye, & Ten Brink 2005), other commentators on low carbon 
electricity technologies have observed that the economics of nuclear power, renewables 
and CCS plants are all such that their owners are likely to seek to operate them for as much 
of the time as possible. The principal reason is that all such plants have high capital costs 
which need to be recouped irrespective of system operational requirements, and this is 
most likely to be realised through operation on `baseload' (Marsh 2003). It is not possible 
to explore the economics of CCS operated to follow loads in detail here. However it is 
notable that building carbon capture facilities in order to operate plants for only 1/3`d of the 
time would only be economic if the rewards available for load following were substantial. 
For reasons explored below it would also prove technically and logistically challenging to 
provide CCS infrastructure on the large capacity of plant that would be required if a large 
capacity of low utilisation CCS were to be installed. This is because pipeline infrastructure 
would have to be extended to a much larger array of power stations. This would require 
either a very heavy concentration of power stations near the east coast or a very extensive 




One potential route by which to meet peak demands reliably without an excessively large 
capacity of low utilisation CCS plant would be to install some fossil fired, non-CCS 
`peaking plant, ' generating capacity with low capital costs that is utilised relatively 
infrequently. For example the `winter peak' in England and Wales lasts around 5 hours and 
is currently up to 8 GW (see Figure 6.8). Assuming that this peak occurs for three months 
of the year, or one quarter of the time, and scales up in the BiB scenario by the same 
proportion that peak demand increases (76/58) it could be met using around 10 GW of gas 
fired CCGT operated for just 5% of the time (5.2% load factor). It is reasonable to expect 
that CCGT plant being build over the next two decades could be kept operable in 2050 to 
perform such a service. If it is also assumed that the output from peaking plant displaces 
coal plant with CCS then the impact on emissions is extremely marginal. CCGT Peaking 
plant would generate around 5 TWh per year, reducing the output of coal fired CCS from 
60 TWh to 55 TWh, which would allow 1 GW of coal-fired CCS to be removed from the 
model if we assume that CCS stations operate with an 80% load factor. If the further 
assumption is made that the amount of CCGT kept on line is set not just to meet winter 
peak loads but also to provide system margin, then CCS plant can be operated at maximum 
output and use of C02 pipelines is optimised (see below). Emissions are unchanged but 
CCGT operates at very low load factor (around 2%) and peaking capacity would be 28 
GW (see spreadsheet `BiB 1 peaking and margin'). 
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Figure 6-11: CCGT capacity provides peaking duty, system balancing and system 
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Emissions reduction compared to 2000 is impacted negligibly; falling from 58.6% to 
58.4%. Alternatively fast responding open cycle plant could be installed for peaking duty, 
whilst such plant is less efficient than CCGT the impact of emissions would be very small 
indeed given the small fraction of demand being met by such plant. Use over winter peaks 
provides a rough proxy for total utilisation. This is because wind output would have a 
strong impact on actual utilisation and time series data is needed to model this. Wind 
output across peaks would tend to decrease the use and emissions from peaking plant 
whilst if gas peaking plant were also be used for some system balancing actions emissions 
would rise. More detailed modelling would be needed to assess the impact on emissions, 
but the `peak load' assumption provides an illustration. However that the BiB scenario 
could be made reliable through the installation or peaking plant (or maintenance of old 
plant), without seriously compromising emissions, appears to be a robust conclusion. 
CO2 infrastructure needs 
The BiB scenario would require a pipeline network that transports CO2 from large power 
stations to geological repositories. The literature on CCS in Britain indicates that such 
repositories would be under the North Sea; depleted oil and gas reservoirs or deep saline 
aquifers (DTI 2003c; Marsh 2003; Marsh, Pye, & Ten Brink 2005). Marsh (2003) has 
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provided scenarios for the location of power stations and pipelines, delivering to North Sea 
repositories the emissions from approximately 1 GW of conventional coal power stations, 
2 GW IGCC or 3 GW of gas stations (variously configured), all operating at an 80% load 
factor. These pipeline and repository combinations are reproduced in Box 6.2, below. The 
author is not aware of more detailed analyses of CCS infrastructure in Britain. 
Box 6.2: CCS plant, pipeline and repository combinations (Marsh 2003) 
Case 1 " Carbon dioxide capture by retrofitting to an existing coal fired power station in 
Central Scotland to supply 500MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" Pipeline transport over land to NE Scotland 200km (Cruden Bay). 
" Sub-sea transport to an oil field cluster centred 170km offshore. 
" 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from the 
central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
" After 10 years a pipeline extension of 390km to a second cluster of oil fields. 
" Again 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from 
the central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
Case 2 " Carbon dioxide capture by retrofitting to an existing coal fired power station in 
NE Yorkshire to supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" Pipeline transport over land to Teeside 150km. 
" Sub-sea transport to oil fields centred 330km offshore 
" 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from the 
central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each) 
" After 10 years a pipeline extension of 170krn to a second cluster of oil fields. 
" Again 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from 
the central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
Case 3 " New build coal fired IGCC plant (4 stations) for carbon dioxide capture to 
supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" Plant located within a 50km radius of where the carbon dioxide pipeline could 
come on shore at Teeside. 
" Four collection pipelines to take CO2 from stations to main transmission 
pipeline on the coast. 
" Sub-sea transport to oil fields centred 330km offshore. 
" Other details as for Case 2. 
Case 4 " New build natural gas fired GTCC plant (4 stations) for carbon dioxide capture 
to supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" Other details as for Case 3 
Case 5 " Carbon dioxide capture by retrofitting to existing gas fired GTCC power 
stations (4 stations) in Northern England to supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" The 4 stations assumed to be an average of 50km from a pipeline node 150km 
from Teeside. 
" Pipeline transport over land to Teeside 150km. 
" Sub-sea transport to oil fields centred 330km offshore 
" 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from the 
central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each) 
" After 10 years a pipeline extension of 170km to a second cluster of oil fields. 
" Again 40% of carbon dioxide distributed to smaller fields in a 50km radius from 
the central field through 4 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
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Case 6 " Carbon dioxide capture by retrofitting to an existing coal fired power station in 
NE Yorkshire to supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" Pipeline transport over land to Humberside 50km. 
" Sub-sea transport to gas fields centred 100km offshore 
" Carbon dioxide distributed to 10 individual disused gas fields in a 50km radius 
from pipeline hub through 10 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
" Gas Injection pressure of 100 bar. 
Case 7 " New build coal fired IGCC plant (4 stations) for carbon dioxide capture to 
supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" The 4 stations located within a 50km radius of where the carbon dioxide 
pipeline could come on shore. 
Sub-sea transport to gas fields centred 100km offshore 
Carbon dioxide distributed to 10 individual disused gas fields in a 50km radius 
from pipeline hub through 10 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
Gas injection pressure of 100 bar. 
Case 8 " New build natural gas fired GTCC plant (4 stations) for carbon dioxide capture 
to supply 500 MMscft/day (317kg/sec). 
" The 4 stations located within a 50km radius of where the carbon dioxide 
pipeline could come on shore. 
" Sub-sea transport to gas fields centred 100km offshore 
. Carbon dioxide distributed to 10 individual disused gas fields in a 50km radius 
from pipeline hub through 10 smaller pipelines (10% each). 
0 Gas injection pressure of 100 bar. 
Marsh's scenarios (or cases) envisage onshore pipelines ranging from 50 km to 200 km in 
length and offshore pipelines that range from 100 km (gas fields) to over 300 km (some oil 
fields). Onshore pipelines vary in number as well as length from 1x 50 km to 4x 50 km. 
Offshore distribution pipelines (from a hub to distinct repositories) vary in number from 
four to ten. The combinations of pipeline configurations and lengths are too detailed to go 
into here, however Marsh estimates the capital costs of pipelines to lie in the range £385m 
- £581m. As each scenario is sized to provide an equivalent amount of C02, equivalent 
TWh/yr varies, reflecting the carbon intensity of gas, IGCC and conventional coal plant. 
The gas scenarios deliver 20 TWh, IGCC 11 TWh and the pulverised coal 7 TWh. 
In what follows Marsh's case studies are used to provide a basis to estimate the order of 
magnitude costs of developing a CO2 pipeline infrastructure consistent with the level of 
generation envisaged for the BiB scenario. Costs are presented in order to illustrate 
prospective path dependence, since high capital costs and strong economies of scale are 
both drivers of path dependency. Interestingly, it appears that pipeline costs are both small 
in comparison to generation plant costs and relatively insensitive to changed assumptions 
about pipeline length and complexity (at least for relatively minor changes). 
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The BiB scenario envisages at least 15 GW of CCS plant, rising to as much as 54 GW if 
additional CCS plant is installed in order to provide system balancing and system margin. 
In either case CCS would deliver around 114 TWh/yr. For illustrative purposes it is 
assumed that CCS plant is operated on baseload and non-CCS plant provides peaking duty. 
In order to assess the scale of the infrastructure needed Marsh's scenarios for storage in gas 
fields are used, together with a graphical representation of the location of plant and 
pipelines, based upon the location and generating capacity of existing power stations. This 
is very much a sketch. There is no reason in principle, for example, why new power 
stations could not be constructed closer to offshore pipeline nodes. The relative economics 
of CO2 pipeline, electricity network upgrades and fuel delivery (and planning constraints) 
would determine the precise location. But Marsh's cases suggest that pipeline costs are 
both a relatively small fraction of total costs for CCS and that total pipeline costs are a 
relatively insensitive to at least modest (10s km to 100s km) increases in distance. 
As noted above, a role for CCS in making transport hydrogen is assumed in both scenarios. 
For simplicity this section neglects the potential to co-locate a gas reformation plant 
making hydrogen from methane with large power stations or as part of a power station 
CCS pipeline cluster. It is not possible to explore in detail the potential for economies of 
scale common to both stationary and transport CCS plant/pipelines. However it is clear that 
the existence of CCS in the power sector in the BiB scenario has the potential to improve 
the economics of CCS for transport sector purposes relative to the DGE scenario, which 
does not feature CCS in the electricity sector (see below). 
CCS coal plant location and pipeline scenario 
Marsh suggests that offshore pipeline could begin at Humberside, and transport CO2 100 
km to appropriate gas fields. The following coal fired power stations (and capacities) are 
located within a 50 km radius of the Humber estuary: 
Cottam (2 GW) 
Drax (4 GW) 
Eggborough (2 GW) 
West Burton (2 GW) 
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Combined capacity is 10 GW, and the BiB scenario envisages an installed capacity of at 
least 9 GW, if CCS plant operates at maximum output (more if CCS plant is used for load 
following). It is therefore assumed that these power stations are retrofitted with IGCC and 
CCS. This is the BiB coal CCS scenario. Marsh's Case 7 (Box 6.2) roughly accords with 
this configuration, except that he assumes each IGCC will be 500 MW, and hence the total 
capacity of the BiB coal CCS scenario will be 5 times larger. Pipeline infrastructure is 
estimated by Marsh to cost £500m. Economies of scale are likely to be significant, since 
construction costs for a pipeline sized to carry 5 times as much CO2 per day would not 
need to be five times as expensive to construct. However the order of magnitude costs for 
pipeline infrastructure alone would be of the order of £1-2 billion. By contrast, capital 
costs for generating stations equipped with capture are of the order of £1.5 billion per GW 
station (DTI 2003c; Marsh 2003). 
CCS gas plant location and pipeline scenario 
A similar scenario can be developed for the 8 GW of gas fired CCS envisaged under the 
BiB scenario. Such a scenario would be broadly consistent with Marsh's Case 8, except 
that each station would need to be 2 GW (Marsh assumes 750 MW). This is an important 
point. Marsh's assumption is much closer to the average size of a modem CCGT. CCGT 
plant is smaller and more widely distributed around the electricity network than coal plant. 
Assembling 8 GW from existing power stations on the assumption that they too would feed 
a single pipeline from the Humber into the North Sea (or indeed any other collection point) 
is only possible if the radius for collection is extended. The following plants are located 
within 50 km of Humberside, total generation capacity 6 GW: 
Killinghome (2 stations) (1.6 GW) 
South Humber Bank (2 stations) (1.3 GW) 
Saltend (1.2 GW) 
Brig (300 MW) 
Immingham (700 MW) 
Keadby (750 MW) 
The additional capacity (2 GW) needed for the BiB gas scenario might be supplied in 
several ways; a 150 km pipeline from Teeside and another to Peterborough, Kings Lynn 
and Sutton Bridge. Alternatively separate offshore pipelines could be laid from Peterhead 
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in Scotland and from Teeside (combined capacity 3.6 GW). Of course by 2050 it would be 
perfectly possible to upgrade the installed capacity of all or any of the stations above, or 
indeed to build an entirely new constellation of CCGTs in the proximity of a convenient 
CCS node. Marsh's Case 8 has pipeline costs of £500m. The emission carrying capacity 
envisaged by Marsh is 3/8ths of the capacity envisaged for the BiB scenario and simple 
scaling of costs on the basis that four large CCGTs were constructed in suitable locations 
would indicate costs around £ 1.4billion. Longer distance pipeline connections or several 
separate offshore pipelines would add several hundred million. Hence order of magnitude 
costs of the order of £1 -2 billion appear appropriate, £2 billion for the case where 
additional offshore pipelines are laid from (for example) Peterhead and Teeside. 
Co-location of plant, large units and location closer to prospective nodes for offshore 
pipeline all decrease the cost of CCS. As already noted pipeline costs are a relatively small 
fraction of total CCS costs, but the examples explored above all envisage that such 
pipelines would be relatively close to offshore nodes and relatively few in number. Costs 
would be much higher for pipelines extending to power stations away from the East coast, 
and securing way-lines for such developments could be problematic. Hence the costs and 
logistics of CO2 transport in the BiB scenario favours the development of transmission 
infrastructure that can provide large point sources of CO2 relatively close to the North East 
coast. Nevertheless the overall cost of constructing CO2 infrastructure (with an upper limit 
of the order of £4 billion for the scenario) is certainly no more significant than the costs 
that would result from other aspects of the scenario (new nuclear and renewable stations, 
transmission upgrades). 
CCSfor a much larger capacity of load following plant 
In the discussion of intermittency provided above, the possibility that a much larger 
capacity of CCS plant might be installed, operating at a relatively low load factor (30% or 
below) to provide system balancing and reliability. The CCS scenarios for 15 GW appear 
relatively straightforward - four pipes, a single offshore node, pipelines of 10s to 100s km 
onshore, etc. A CCS infrastructure connected to 40 GW or more is a very different 
proposition, likely to entail 100s to 1000s of km of pipeline, or wholesale relocation of 
generation plant to the East-coast, with concomitant power grid upgrading. The 
practicalities and economics of such an approach require more detailed analysis than it is 
possible to provide here. 
135 
Conclusions on CCS infrastructure 
Overall it would appear sensible to conclude that the CCS infrastructure required for the 
BiB scenario would require the maintenance or construction of coal and gas fired plant 
within reasonable proximity to the East coast, and that provided this is the case the costs of 
the pipelines are of a similar magnitude to the cost of a single CCS generation plant. 
Whilst the scenario does not explore the potential for CCS in the power sector to be 
developed in tandem with CCS facilities making transport hydrogen it is reasonable to 
assume that the latter would also locate near the East Coast. The implications for path 
dependence do not derive so much from the over-riding cost of infrastructure but from the 
logistical and practical constraints on plant location and from the opportunity to benefit 
from economies of scale if plant co-locate or cluster. Moving to much larger installed 
capacities of CCS plant would be more challenging logistically. 
Implications for electricity transmission 
The BiB scenario has a higher peak flow (76 GW) and additional capacity located in the 
north and west (wave, tidal and wind power), East and North East coast (CCS plant, 
offshore wind) and in a range of relatively remote locations (nuclear). It is likely to require 
upgrading to transmission infrastructure. Graphic 6.1 provides an illustration of the main 
locations for new plant. Based on this it is suggested that 400kV or equivalent will be 
needed in both east and west Scotland (total 300 km), that the England Scotland 
`interconnector' will be upgraded in both North Yorks and Southern Scotland (total 100 
km). It is further assumed that 44kV upgrade will be needed to transfer power from CCS 
plants and offshore wind from the Humber region and the Wash to Southern England (total 
200 km). Upgrades specific to re-powering of nuclear sites or spurs to offshore wind sites 
have not been specifically assessed, however it is assumed that `miscellaneous' upgrades 
and spurs will be needed, totally around 400 km. The very crude approximation generated 
by these assumptions is that around 1000 km of additional 400 kV capacity will be needed 
in the BiB scenario. 
In very simple terms, neglecting locational price signals and a range of other factors, the 
cost per unit of electrical power `moved' along a 400kV transmission line is estimated to 
be approximately equivalent to £ 114/MWkm (National Grid Company 2007). This is based 
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upon the full cost of building electricity lines (which lies in a range of £450k - £700k/km) 
(National Grid Company 2007). NGC also publish an annualised figure, taking into 
account business overheads and maintenance and using an annuity rate based upon NGC's 
regulated rate of return, in this format the cost is around £10/MWkm/yr (National Grid 
Company 2007). The current (2005) England and Wales transmission network extends to 
around 9000 km and peak transmission capacity is around 50 GW (National Grid 
Company 2007). The BiB scenario would be around 10,000 km and 76 GW. Capacity is 
extended and power flow in existing capacity is increased. In very crude terms this 
suggests adding 50 GW x 1000 km and 26 GW x 10,000 km: 310 GWkm, or around £35 
billion worth of new capacity. The capital value of the existing system is £51 billion, 
whilst that of the BiB scenario is £86 billion. This represents a significant sunk cost, and 
may be compared to the scenario developed in the subsequent section where the need for a 
transmission gird declines, possibly avoiding a large fraction of the investment needed 
even to maintain existing capacity. 
Graphic 6.1 Location of generation plant relative to existing transmission 
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6.6.5 Conclusions on BiB: 
A centralised system based on nuclear power, CCS and large scale renewables can help to 
reduce CO, emissions. The scenario modelling outlined above suggests that this would 
deliver an approximate 60% cut in emissions on the basis that electricity is also used to 
meet an increased share of heating (displacing gas fired boilers). New nuclear plants 
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located on existing sites could supply around 200 TWh/yr and renewables 190 TWh/yr. 
Large power station point sources of CO2 with CCS located close to the east coast of 
England could contribute around 114 TWh/yr. A simple sketch of the location and number 
of such plants indicates that pipeline requirements appear feasible. Indeed existing plants 
located close to possible offshore nodes taking CO2 to repositories in the North Sea could 
provide the levels of power the BiB scenario requires. CCS favours large plants and/or 
collocation of power generation plants and possibly also plants reforming natural gas to 
make hydrogen for transport. The role of the long distance transmission network is 
increased and upgrading would be needed. Extensive use of intermittent renewables will 
have implications for system balancing and reliability. A relatively large capacity of gas 
fired peaking plant, operating at a very low load factor could be needed to provide 
reliability. Part loading of nuclear plant would be required to avoid spilling output from 
renewables during low demands. Storage plant or management of loads could assist with 
this aspect. However, the scenario would not appear to have an overarching requirement 
for electricity storage plant (unlike the DGE scenario below). 
6.7 Decentralised generation expands (DGE) 
In this vision of the future the decentralising trends described by Patterson and others 
(Patterson 1999) are extrapolated and extended such that decentralised generation and 
cogeneration of heat and power become the main sources of electricity in the UK. The 
primary aim is to explore the prospects for, and some of the system requirements of, highly 
efficient, small scale utilisation of gas complemented by small scale renewables. For want 
of a more imaginative descriptor the scenario has been named `Decentralised Generation 
Expands' (DGE), and is referred to as such from hereon. 
Given technical progress, small scale renewable generation, for example biomass, building 
integrated PV and wind power, could become more widely adopted. However, it is not the 
purpose of this scenario to consider maximum potential use of these options; instead the 
focus is on a system where renewables are installed alongside decentralised generation of 
heat and power run on gas. Focusing solely on zero carbon and decentralised options - 
primarily electricity generating renewables - would neglect the potential role of high 
efficiency gas based CHP. It would therefore not explore a world in which the drivers 
mentioned above are extrapolated. In addition, it is not clear that the renewable options 
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would be able to meet all requirements for heating and other direct uses of fuels. In the 
sections that follow, the level of emission reduction that might be delivered through highly 
efficient gas based CHP is taken as a starting point. Building on this, the scenario provides 
an indication of the role for, and requirements of, small scale renewables. This reflects 
both the limitations on the role of CHP and the need for renewables to deliver CO2 
emission reductions. 
It is important to note that several renewable sources that may be important in the UK do 
not fit into this decentralising model - offshore wind, large onshore wind farms in remote 
regions, and wave and tidal energy. In order to test some of the most important 
characteristics of a decentralised generation world, we assume that development of these 
options is limited. In general the presumption is that such technologies will only be 
adopted where the prospects for commercially viable exploitation are highest, and where 
there is no inconsistency with decentralised generation. Offshore wind developments close 
to load centres might proceed'9, but remote on and offshore wind, tidal and wave 
developments do not. 
If a decentralised and co-generating energy system were to become the norm, several 
important issues would need to be investigated: 
- First, it is possible to estimate the effect on CO2 emissions under different assumptions, 
relative to supplying an equivalent quantity of energy service from the current energy 
mix. The share of CHP and renewables technologies will affect this. 
- Second, it is important to consider whether increasing the share of renewables and CHP 
will necessitate the development of electricity storage, sophisticated power demand 
management or peaking/stand by plant. 
- Third, it is important to consider implications for investment in electricity networks - 
to what extent might we expect requirements for bulk transfers of electricity over long 
distances to decrease? 
- Fourth, it is important to consider the changing nature of emissions - the share and 
quantity of CO2 from large point sources would be expected to decline. This might 
19 Parts of the strategic regions for offshore wind development recently identified by the DTI could fit such a 
scenario (DTI 2002). These areas are: `greater Wash' off the coast of Norfolk, 'Thames Estuary' and an area 
of the Irish Sea to the North West of the Mersey Basin. 
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have important implications for the scale and feasibility of CO2 capture and storage in 
the stationary sector and potentially the attractiveness of CCS in the transport sector. 
6.7.1 Defining the decentralised generation expands scenario 
This section explores and describes in detail the energy mix of the decentralised generation 
expands scenario. In order to do this five key factors are discussed and quantified using the 
PIU model: 
- The level of energy demand in the stationary sector, broken down into heat and power 
required in different sectors 
- The potential contribution of CHP of varying scale 
- The potential contribution of small scale renewables 
- Implications for energy system change in terms of electricity storage requirements, 
remote demand management, and infrastructure/network change 
- Implications for location of CO2 emission sources 
6.7.2 Energy demand projections 
In the PIU model, electricity supply is adjusted to reflect electrical heating, electricity used 
in transport, and losses. It is assumed that 30 TWh of electricity is used to provide heat in 
the decentralised gas scenario (compared to 46 TWh in 2000), this approximation is used 
to reflect the scenario's increased use of micro CHP - which it is assumed displaces a 
proportion of electrical heating as well as gas fired boilers. Transmission losses are also 
reduced relative to 2000; transmission losses fall, both in absolute terms (reflecting the 
slightly reduced total demand for electricity in this scenario which arises from efficiency 
improvements and reduced electrical heating) and in percentage terms, since it is assumed 
that losses are reduced from 8% to 5%, to reflect the increased share of electricity 
generated from decentralised sources. Adjusted supply is therefore as follows: 
GS, Decentralised Gas total supply of energy in 2050 including losses (TWh) (PIU 
2001b) 
- Fuels used directly (stationary sector) 562 
- Electricity generated 340 
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- Transport fuels used 
621 
In order to test the role of the demand side changes represented in the PIU GS scenario the 
model was run using the yr 2000 supply mix scaled to meet the above levels of energy 
demand. This results in a 14.5% reduction in emissions. This is because the amount of fuel 
used directly and electricity are both reduced slightly in the GS scenario, whilst transport 
fuels increases slightly. 
6.7.3 How much CHP is feasible? 
Key issues and prospects for CHP 
In the base year CHP capacity (predominantly medium and larger scale) was 
approximately 4700 MW (DUKES 2003), producing 24 TWh/year - 6% of electricity 
demand. These schemes produced around 60 TWh of heat in 2002 (DUKES 2003). Around 
80% of this was from schemes of over 10 MW. Current estimates suggest that an average 
CHP plant, where displaced electricity emissions reflect the current fossil fuel basket and 
displaced heat emissions reflect average gas fired boiler efficiency, will provide savings of 
0.78 MtC per I GWe of current installed capacity. The range of savings is wide however, 
from 0.3 to 2.1 MtC - reflecting a range of CHP efficiencies and a range of boiler and 
electricity plant that might be displaced (DTI 2000a). 
It is important to distinguish different types of CHP. CHP can be installed at a range of 
scales, from very small units - as small as 1kWe - which are currently at a relatively early 
stage of technological development and only beginning to enter the market, to large 
industrial plants of 10 MWe or even more. In between there are a range of commercial 
scale units that range from a few 10s kWe to 100s kWe. The electrical conversion 
technologies that may be used also vary - gas turbines and reciprocating engines are 
currently the norm, but emerging designs use Stirling engines and fuel cells. In the sections 
that follows the different scales of utilisation (industrial, commercial and domestic) are 
discussed, and the characteristics of different types of electricity generation plant 
considered as appropriate. 
Industrial scale CHP is typically relatively large plants - over I MWe. Industrial scale plant 
usually has more consistent heat loads than domestic systems and typically operates for 
between 4500 and 5500 hours per year -a load factor of 50 to 60%. The current economic 
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potential for CHP is estimated to be in the range 12 to 20 GWe. This reflects the scope for 
industrial cogeneration, and it is notable that a significant proportion of this potential is 
already exploited. As we look out to 2050 the potential for this to expand appears relatively 
limited, particularly if historic trends away from heavy industry continue. In the GS 
scenario industry heat service demands decline slightly, whilst industry electricity service 
demands almost double. It is therefore assumed that a maximum of 16 GWe of industrial 
scale CHP could be installed - operating for around 4500 hours per year (50% load factor) 
and producing around 70 TWh of electricity per year. Based on the heat/power ratio 
assumptions described below this is the maximum practicable capacity, given the level of 
industrial heat load in the GS scenario (114 TWh/yr). It is assumed that a small amount of 
industrial heat production would be exported, since up to 4 TWh per year would be excess 
to requirements, more if some processes cannot be supplied by CHP devices. For 
simplicity it is assumed that this heat can be utilised in near-by commercial or domestic 
buildings connected to a heat main. 
Domestic CHP. In principle it is possible to imagine that perhaps 60% of housing could be 
supplied by domestic, micro CHP (MCHP) instead of conventional boilers, since 80% of 
households are connected to the gas main, and it is not unreasonable to assume that 
perhaps 75% of these might utilise CHP. This approximates to 15 million MCHP units. 
The MCHP units expected to be on the market soonest are lkWe Stirling engines. These 
are expected to operate heat led for 1500 - 2000 hrs/year, so providing 1.5 MWh/year. 
This load factor is derived from the typical annual output of a domestic boiler, since 
domestic MCHP would operate in heat-led mode - the unit is operated in order to meet 
heat demands, with electricity produced almost as a `by-product' during heat production 
periods. 3kWe Stirling engines could also become available (PIU 2002a), and devices that 
follow heat load and also operate for 1500 hours per year, would generate more than 67 
TWh/year, given one of these in 15 million UK homes. Future designs of MCHP might use 
fuel cells instead of Stirling engines, and whilst the timeframe for this appears uncertain, 
widespread use of fuel cell MCHP in 2050 appears perfectly feasible. 
Would such units need to stay in heat led mode? It would be possible, in principle, to 
operate CHP systems full time, say 8700 hrs/year instead of 1500. This would deliver 24 
MWh/year per home and 15 million homes would supply 360 TWh/yr. Unfortunately this 
would reduce the potential impact on C02 emissions as even the most electrically efficient 
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option for CHP - fuel cells - typically operate at around 50% efficiency in electricity alone 
mode, which is similar to the efficiency of a gas fired CCGT20. Gas turbine and Stirling 
engines are considerably lower in electrical efficiency than fuel cells. If decentralised, and 
predominantly fossil fired, options are to deliver deep carbon savings then the proportion 
of energy supplied in CHP mode needs to be maximised, even if fuel cell MCHP becomes 
the norm. This has important implications for the type of technology that needs to be 
encouraged. It appears unlikely that there will be sufficiently large heat loads available to 
facilitate efficient utilisation of current designs of micro turbines and Stirling engines in 
domestic installations - if these are to provide a large fraction of electricity needs. As a 
result it is important that technologies that offer a high total efficiency combined with 
lower heat-power ratios are developed. The most promising option in this regard is the fuel 
cell. 
Fuel cell CHP units are able to vary their heat-power ratio, within certain limits21, without 
compromising overall efficiency. This is likely to expand the amount of time that CHP 
units are able to operate at high overall efficiencies whilst responding to changing 
electricity demands, rather than simply following heat load. Any capacity for heat storage 
is also important, since this allows for the utilization of heat generated whilst responding to 
electrical loads at a subsequent point in time. These factors would serve to maintain the 
overall efficiency of electricity and heat generation using small CHP over a longer period 
than that of the heat load of a conventional central heating boiler. I therefore assume in 
2050 MCHP is based upon fuel cells and that operating hours can be increased from 1500 
to 2500 per year with no overall efficiency loss. 
Electricity storage could play a role, but it is heat rather than power that would tend to be 
overproduced if CHP were to be used to meet a large fraction of electricity. To the extent 
that heat can be effectively utilised DG can reduce emissions. If heat cannot be utilised, a 
substantial fraction of the potential gain will be, quite literally, wasted. However, storage 
20 As section 4 makes clear, both CCGT and fuel cells offer the prospect of increased efficiency in future, but 
it is by no means clear that fuel cells will offer a clear cut advantage in efficiency since both might be able to 
achieve efficiencies as high as 70% (Anderson & Gross 2003). 
21 Solid oxide (high temp) fuel cells could operate in the range 1.3: 1 to 10: 1 heat: power. Today's small scale CHP units typically operate at around 5: 1 heat: power. It is the potential to decrease this ratio that is of 
greatest significance (Hawkes, Aguiar, Croxford, Leach, Adjiman, & Brandon 2007). 
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could help allow for the utilization of CHP installations that stay close to heat load profiles, 
hence maximum efficiency, but which have higher electrical capacities, operating with a 
much lower heat-power ratio. Storage would also ease the integration of other intermittent 
sources, such as wind and PV. I therefore return to electricity storage in the discussion that 
includes renewables, below. 
Commercial sector CHP: The potential for CHP in commercial installations is rather 
smaller - direct gas consumption in service industry and public sector buildings is around 
30% of that in the domestic sector (DTI 2007a), whilst electricity consumption is only 
slightly lower than domestic consumption (Ibid). It follows that the ratio of heat loads to 
electricity requirements is substantially lower in this sector. CHP only makes sense if there 
is a heat load to be met and all other factors being equal this means that a smaller amount 
of total energy and electricity needs can be met by CHP. However, it is also reasonable to 
expect that heat (or cooling) and electricity loads are more closely correlated in 
commercial buildings. Almost all are occupied during the daytime. Important categories of 
commercial installations - shops, warehouses, offices - require heat/cool and electricity 
over long periods each day, and the electrical and heat loads closely coincide. This would 
tend to increase the potential for cost effective CHP, because although installed capacity 
would be smaller most plant would operate at higher load factors than those typical in the 
domestic sector, provided the technologies selected could generate efficiently at a 
relatively low heat-power ratio (see above). Nevertheless, total potential for CHP in this 
sector reflects total heat requirements, and is therefore smaller than in the domestic sector. 
Underlying assumptions about the contribution of CHP 
Examining these issues in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we make a 
number of simplifying assumptions: 
- Number of domestic installations: By 2050 it is reasonable to assume that at least 20% 
of the building stock will consist of new, highly efficient buildings with very low 
demands for space heating. CHP could prove unattractive in such settings, as heat- 
power ratios could militate against the efficient use of CHP. In addition, it is likely that 
perhaps 20% of dwellings will remain too remote for connection to gas networks. It is 
assumed that CHP is installed in the remaining 60% of dwellings. 
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- Heat-power ratios and load 
following: detailed time of day modelling of electrical 
demands and the outputs of both CHP and other electrical sources is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Factors that would need to be modelled include building electrical and 
heat loads, alongside the ability of fuel cells CHP to vary heat - power ratios, and the 
extent to which it might prove possible to help meet electricity demand peaks that do 
not coincide with heat loads. 
- Instead we assume that MCHP 
is operated at maximum efficiency (90%) for 2500 
hours per year. This is based on the assumption that fuel cell units with more 
favourable heat-power ratios are utilised. If we assume each installation is 3 kWe, then 
on this basis domestic CHP would provide 110 TWh/yr of electricity. 
- Commercial installations: It is assumed that commercial 
building CHP potential is 
closely linked to gas heat load, which is 25 - 30% of that in domestic installations. So 
commercial CHP is assumed to deliver 30 TWh/yr of electricity. 
- Industrial heat and power assumes that installed capacity is restricted to 16GWe, with a 
higher load factor than for domestic systems, and systems that are able to achieve very 
favourable heat: power ratios (see below). Operation for around 4500 hours per year 
would result in 70 TWh/yr electrical output. 
Modelling the contribution of CHP to emissions reductions in 2050 
Based on these considerations and simplifying assumptions CHP could supply a maximum 
of 210 TWh/yr of electrical output. Domestic CHP providing 110 TWh/yr, commercial 30 
TWh/yr and industrial installations 70 TWh/yr. CHP therefore accounts for 62% of 
electricity supply. However, such a large penetration may not be consistent with securing 
deep cuts in emissions, because gas-CHP is highly efficient, but not zero emission. In order 
to test this, the PIU model is set up with the following assumptions: 
- Large scale CHP provides 70 TWh/yr and micro-CHP 140 TWh/yr of electricity 
('micro'-CHP includes commercial sector installations). 
- Fuel cell CHP units become available, such that the heat/power ratio is improved whilst 
retaining overall efficiencies. 
- Large scale CHP operates at 85% efficiency with a heat/power ratio of 1.4/1 - so 
heat: power: losses are 50: 35: 15. 
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- Small scale CHP operates at 90% efficiency and a 2/1 heat/power ratio - 
heat: power: losses are 60: 30: 10. 
- Remaining demand for electricity is met using GGGT operating at 55% efficiency. 
This assumption could be changed to one where fuel cells are used, possibly 
decentralised CHP units also used in power only mode. This would give rise to a 
reduction in transmission losses, but otherwise CO2 emissions would be broadly the 
same22. 
- At this stage electricity system balancing is not explicitly factored into the analysis, for 
simplicity the working assumption is that the firm plant (CCGT or fuel cells) that 
provides 38% of electricity is also sufficient to provide system balancing and enough 
capacity installed to maintain a system margin adequate for reliable operation. 
- Remaining demand for heat (non-CHP dwellings etc) is met using boilers that are 90% 
efficient and run on gas. 
- Demand by sector is as described in table 6.2 and hydrogen derived from gas with 
sequestration meets 115 `h of transport fuel demand, as described above. 
Energy supplied by different options by sector, and emissions reductions by sector are 
provided in Figures 6.12 and 6.13. 
22 Efficiencies as high as 70% have been suggested for both CCGT and FCs, see Ch. 5. A more conservative 
55% is assumed in this work. 
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23 Electrical heating (30 TWh/yr, shown dotted, column 2) is in some respects `counted twice' in this graphic 
since total electricity demand includes electricity for heating. Note that gross demand can be calculated by 
summation of the column totals if electrical heating is netted off the total. 
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Electricity Heat Transport 
Sector 
Based upon these assumptions total CO2 emissions are reduced by 37% relative to 2000 
levels (see spreadsheet `CHP only DG-world') 
Sensitivities to improved efficiency, reduced transmission losses and transport 
decarbonisation 
In order to ensure that cautious assumptions on key electricity technologies are not leading 
to a significant overestimate of emissions, two simple sensitivities were tested (see 
spreadsheets CHP only DG-world sensI and sens2): 
- CCGT at 55% efficiency replaced by fuel cells at 70% efficiency - emission reduction 
increases to 39 %. 
- Zero transmission losses assumed and CCGT replaced by fuel cells at 70% efficiency 
(commensurate with a 100% decentralised system based on CHP fuel cell units, able to 
operate at 70% efficiency in electricity only mode and following electrical load) - 
emissions reduction increases to 40%. 
- These two factors combined would therefore increase overall reduction in emissions 
relative to 2000 by around 3% compared to the CHP `base case'. 
It is possible that the transport sector assumption is also too cautious. In order to 
understand the role of the transport sector in reducing emissions two further sensitivities 
were tested: 
- Hydrogen produced from gas supplies 50% of transport sector energy. This decreases 
total emissions by a further 8% relative to 2000, a 45% overall reduction. 
- Hydrogen produced from gas supplies 100% of transport sector energy24. This 
decreases emissions by a further 20%, a 57% overall reduction relative to 2000. 
In both cases it is assumed that hydrogen production from natural gas with sequestration 
emits 20% of the CO2 content of the gas. 
Conclusions about the role of CHP 
Moving to a predominantly gas-fired CHP based system, even when combined with high 
efficiency and decentralised fuel cells for non-CHP mode operation, is not sufficient to 
24 Excluding electricity powered transport (mostly trains) 
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deliver a 60% cut in emissions. This is despite the fact that considerable energy efficiency 
improvements are also endogenous to the PIU GS energy demand scenario. This finding is 
consistent with other work that seeks to model a 60% cut in UK C02 emissions. Modelling 
for the DTI on low carbon futures, actually foresees first an increase and then a decline in 
the contribution from CHP as emissions constraints increase over the period to 2050 (DTI 
2003b). This is because the Markal model optimises costs and as emissions constraints 
increase, it becomes cheaper and/or more effective to produce electricity from zero carbon 
sources and revert to heat only boilers and electrical heating, particularly as requirements 
for space heating demands decline as building efficiency improves. 
It also follows that with a gas fired-CHP stationary energy system it is not possible to get 
close to a 60% reduction unless the entire transport system, including air transport, is also 
moved to low or zero carbon hydrogen. Yet many studies suggest that decarbonising the 
transport system is likely to be more costly than developing a low carbon electricity 
system. Air transport, which takes a rising share of energy under the GS scenario (almost 
doubling from 2000, and accounting for more than 1 /3 of total transport energy), appears 
likely to be the most difficult and costly of all (DTI 2003b). It is notable that in the recent 
Markal modelling for DTI, the model did not indicate a large contribution from hydrogen 
transport until very deep cuts in emissions were combined with limited progress with 
energy efficiency (Ibid). 
If it is assumed that the transport sector is not completely decarbonised, a 60% reduction in 
emissions would require that gas-fired CHP is complemented by an expansion of zero 
carbon electricity. In the DGE scenario we have assumed this must be in the form of 
decentralised renewable generation options - PV, wind and biomass. The prospective 
contribution from such options and their interaction with the share from CHP is discussed 
in the next sub-section. 
6.7.4 The role of renewable sources 
In principle, renewable sources could provide a large amount of the UK's electricity 
requirements. Biomass energy can also contribute to heat and transport fuelling. Section 4 
provides an overview of the potential of renewables in the UK. Taken together, the 
technical potential of the leading options easily exceeds current electricity demand. The 
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relative role of renewables, gas fired CHP and other forms of electricity provision in any 
future energy mix will depend on the way the system evolves and on the relative costs of 
different options. This study is primarily concerned with what is feasible, rather than what 
is or is not most likely. This section therefore considers the prospective share of different 
renewable options, and whether there is any conflict with the large share for gas fired CHP 
fuel cells described above. 
Preliminary modelling of the role of renewable sources - RE electricity displaces gas fired 
CCGT 
The PIU model is utilised in order to estimate the implications for C02 emissions of a 
varying share of renewables providing electricity and, through biomass, heat. To avoid 
further complication the study does not consider the prospective role of biofuels in the 
transport sector. A preliminary run was undertaken, that retains the contribution of CHP as 
outlined above. To begin with, system balancing implications are neglected, but are 
returned to below. The following assumptions are tested: 
- The contribution from RE is set to be sufficient to ensure that RE and CHP between 
them meet all electricity demand. 
- The contributions of individual renewable options cannot exceed the technical 
potentials described in Ch. 5. 
- Biomass is also assumed to operate in CHP mode, which makes a contribution to heat 
demands. This is assumed to displace gas fired boilers - no specific assumption is 
made about the allocation of this heat (domestic, commercial or industrial) 
- The contribution of CHP unchanged from that above (210 TWhe). 
- The renewables that contribute are PV, onshore wind and biomass CHP since these are 
the most suited to decentralised applications. The respective contributions are 40 TWh, 
40 TWh and 50 TWh of electricity. These contributions are assumed feasible in 
principle given the technical potentials outlined in Ch. 5. The problem of intermittency 
and system balancing is returned to below. 
As before, the resulting CO2 emissions relative to 2000, share of emissions by sector and 
share of energy supplied by source are shown below (in Figures 6.14 and 6.15). Under 
these assumptions CO2 emission reductions increase to 50% relative to 2000, thus reducing 
emissions by an additional 13% of 2000 emissions relative to the CHP-only base case. 
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Figure 6-14: CO2 emissions by sector in CHP-rich + renewables DGE scenario 
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Figure 6-15: Energy supplied by source and sector in CHP-rich + renewables DGE 25 
Electrical heating (30 TWh/yr, shown dotted, column 2) is in some respects `counted twice' in this graphic 
since total electricity demand includes electricity for heating. Note that gross demand can be calculated by 
summation of the column totals if electrical heating is netted off the total. 
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This means that zero carbon options will also need to displace some gas-CHP if a 60% cut 
is to be achieved. However it is important to ensure that the increase in CO2 emissions due 
to an increase in the share of gas boilers in heating (associated with displaced CHP) is 
adequately offset by the increased electricity output of renewables. One means by which 
to ensure this is to expand the use of both electricity only renewables (wind and PV in this 
case) and the use of biomass operating in CHP mode. The effect of this is to displace both 
gas-fired electricity and a proportion of the gas-fired boilers that would otherwise be 
required to meet heat demands in the absence of CHP. In fact, because biomass CHP is 
assumed to be carbon neutral, displacing gas-CHP with biomass CHP gives rise to further 
cuts in emissions in the heat sector. 
The model was therefore set up with the following assumptions: 100 TWh PV; 40 TWh 
onshore-wind; and 100 TWhe biomass CHP. CHP is scaled back accordingly (IOOTWh 
total). The resulting emissions relative to 2000 and share of energy sources in each sector 
are shown below (Figures 6.16 and 6.17). Emissions fall by 58% from 2000 levels, which 
is close to the 60% target for this scenario. Given the extent of uncertainty about the 
precise contribution of each option, and that both demand and supply take the form of 
approximations based on a number of simplifying assumptions, it is not appropriate to 
attempt make the detailed changes necessary to cut emissions to exactly 60%. This energy 
supply mix is therefore assumed to meet the 60% target set for the scenario. 
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Figure 6-16: C02 emissions by sector in CHP-confined and renewables expanded 











Figure 6-17: Energy supplied by source and sector in CHP-confined and renewables 
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Conclusions on the roles of CHP and renewables in cutting C02 emissions 
The scenario quantification carried out above indicates that the high proportion of gas-fired 
CHP initially prescribed for the scenario is not able to deliver a 60% C02 emission 
reduction. Only if the transport sector is also substantially decarbonised is it possible to get 
to the desired 60% reduction overall. With a more modest contribution from the transport 
sector, the share of both electricity and heat provided by renewables had to be substantially 
increased to secure a 60% cut. Gas-fired CHP is scaled back in order to make way for zero 
carbon options, and supplies less than 1/3`d of electricity demand and accounts for just over 
1/3rd of heating fuel use. The scenario is as decentralised as was originally envisaged, but it 
can be concluded that achieving rigorous climate change objectives requires that action is 
taken to promote renewables development: If fuelled by gas then CHP cannot deliver 
alone. Whilst non-climate drivers may encourage expansion of decentralised gas-fired 
generation (as described in the introduction to this section) policy actions to promote 
renewables are also needed to deliver deep cuts in emissions. 
The DGE scenario could present problems for electricity system operation, due to the 
intermittent output of both PV and wind, and heat-load following CHP. It would also be 
expected to change the location of emissions, requirements for long distance transmission 
of electricity and operation of distribution networks relative to the current system and to 
the BiB scenario. These issues are the subject of the next subsection. 
6.7.5 Potential implications for infrastructure of the DGE scenario 
6.7.5.1 System balancing and intermittency 
As noted in the discussion of intermittency in the BiB scenario, Sect. 6.6.4, a range of 
studies indicate that modest penetrations of intermittent generation (up to around 30% of 
output) can be accommodated with little technical difficulty, but at some cost in terms of 
additional reserve plants and additions to capacity (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, 
Leach, & Skea 2006). No studies that explore electrical engineering issues in the level 
detail described for wind power could be found for much larger contributions from 
decentralised intermittent options, particularly PV. Yet in some respects the DGE scenario 
is far more challenging in terms of system operation. In this section the key principles at 
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stake are explored. The analysis that follows assumes familiarity with the concepts 
explained in 6.6.4, and should be read in conjunction with that section. 
Most analyses of the additional system balancing reserves due to intermittency have 
focused upon wind power (see e. g. (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & 
Skea 2006; Grubb 1991b; Halliday et al. 1983; Ilex & Strbac 2002)). This is because wind 
power is the most widely utilised and lowest cost intermittent renewable option in the UK 
context. It is the only uncontrollable renewable source installed anywhere in the world in 
sufficient volume to have impacts on electricity grids. Wind power contributes around 12% 
of electricity in the DGE scenario, this is not insignificant and the issues discussed in Sect. 
6.6.4 are equally relevant to the DGE scenario. However, the DGE scenario presents an 
even greater set of challenges in terms of system operation because it combines a 
substantive role for CHP plant with almost 1/3`d of electricity from PV and at least as 
described above (for the purposes of evaluating energy and carbon balances) it has no 
conventional generation on the system at all (we revisit this assumption below). 
Electrical engineering concerns such as frequency control, maintaining power quality and 
moderating voltage drop (and a range of other attributes such as response to faults) all need 
to be addressed within the DGE system. It appears prima facie that electrical engineering 
norms are likely to be more difficult to secure in a network with no conventional 
generation. It is not possible to do justice to the full range of such issues here. However 
researchers working for the Tyndall Centre provide a review and suggest that it is perfectly 
feasible for a `micro-grid' based upon large penetration of decentralised generators to meet 
these requirements, provided the system includes local electricity storage able to respond 
to demand changes quickly (Abu-Sharkh et al. 2005). The focus of this section is on a 
number of relatively simple concerns, such as the ability to meet winter peak demands and 
the possibility that energy might be spilled on sunny summer days when demands are low. 
The following points summarise the main implications for system balancing of the 
electricity supply mix in the DGE scenario. This allows us to consider the primary impacts 
for path dependence. 
a) Winter peaks not met 
Winter peak demand for the scenario is pro-rated on an energy basis as described in 
Section 6.5.4, and peak demand for the scenario is 51 GW. PV cannot contribute to winter 
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peaks, as these occur after dark. Peak output from wind and CHP plants is 57 GW, but if 
we assume that the capacity credit for wind is around 20% of installed capacity then `firm' 
capacity at peak is around 47 GW and there is a shortfall of 4 GW given `typical' wind 
output. However, capacity credit for wind is not a guarantee of output; indeed it is a 
statistical property useful only in the context of determining the amount of system margin 
over and above peak demand needed to maintain reliability. Output from CHP plant alone 
is 44 GW, and on occasion wind output would be zero. The scenario will on occasion be 
7GW short of peak electricity loads unless it includes some energy storage capacity, load 
management or peaking plant. If demand is higher than expected or if some of the CHP 
plant is down the shortfall could be even larger. The amount of peaking plant that would be 
needed to provide system margin is revisited in Sect. 6.7.5.2 below. 
Peaking plant utilisation 
Utilisation of gas fired peaking plant throughout the winter peak need not have a 
substantial adverse impact on emissions: Peak demand is 51 GW. If we further assume that 
the daily load duration curve is broadly similar in shape to that of the current British 
system (see Figures 6.9 and 6.7, in section 6.5 above) then the peak that would have to be 
met over and above the daytime winter load increment would be around 7 GW, and around 
5 hours in duration, or around 465 hours per year for the winter quarter. 7 GW is also equal 
to the difference between maximum CHP output and peak demand. Using 7 GW of gas 
fired peaking plant for 465 hours per year would provide around 3 TWh per year. Periods 
in the winter with high wind output would reduce the use of peaking plant. However there 
could also be periods with CHP output below maximum, or demand exceptionally high. 
There may also be occasional need for peaking plant outside of the winter quarter. Given 
the absence of data to allow a statistical analysis of CHP availability, demand prediction 
errors and wind availability 3 TWh/yr appears to be a reasonable proxy for peaking plant 
utilisation. Not surprisingly, given that 3 TWh is such a small fraction of total electricity 
supplied in the DGE scenario, modelling indicates that this scale of utilisation of peaking 
plant would have an almost negligible impact on overall emissions (of the order of 0.3%). 
Winter peaks and storage plant 
Storage capacity could reduce the need for peaking plant if it were able to store any 
daytime PV output and output from wind power. However it would be unlikely to 
eliminate the need for winter peaking plant, as average winter output from PV would be 
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relatively modest, see Figure 6.18. Moreover, prolonged periods of high cloud or fog 
could accompany low wind conditions. Peak output from a PV array may vary by a factor 
of 20 due to atmospheric conditions, see Figure 6.19. Whilst this graphic is for a single 
array and significant smoothing would be expected for a widespread distribution of PV it is 
important to note that output can fall to very low levels for entire days even in summer. 
Hence winter output would be close to zero in heavily overcast conditions, which may last 
for several days and cover much of the country. Storage plant is likely to have an 
important role in the DGE scenario (see below), but is unlikely to be able to eliminate the 
need for winter peaking plant. 
Figure 6-18: Solar insolation at Sutton Bonnington monitoring station (University of 
Nottingham 2000) 
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Figure 6-19: Variation in PV output by time of day due to cloud cover (metered 
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b) CHP output and the daytime load increment 
Note again the assumption that the DGE scenario has a load profile similar to that of the 
current system (Figure 6.7). The current pattern is for winter demand to increase by around 
10 GW during the early morning, a further 2 GW or so during the afternoon, before the 
evening peak begins. The problem for the DGE scenario is that a significant chunk of the 
CHP output, for domestic heating and hot water, would be present during the `breakfast' 
period, but fall away during the daytime. CHP units would then come back into operation 
in the early evening, as represented in Figure 6.20. Studies that have explored this issue 
suggest that a combination of short term electricity storage and thermal storage/inertia can 
significantly smooth daytime heat demands and allow CHP to meet domestic electricity 
demands (Abu-Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 
2005). The role of storage is explored in more detail below. 
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Figure 6-20: Domestic heating load profile in winter (Abu-Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, 
Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 2005) 









c) Energy spilled in summer 
Output from PV plants is likely to be highest in summer, when demands are relatively low. 
In the DGE scenario, with an installed capacity of around 75 GW of PV; this would 
correspond to peak output on a clear sunny day. In summer, the output from PV follows an 
approximately normal distribution between the hours of 0700 and 1900. Before 0900 
output is less than half peak output and output would be above 75% of peak for around 4- 6 
hours duration, being negligible in the early morning and late evening (see Figures 6.18 
and 6.23). Using a simple pro rata from the year 2000 load duration curve, minimum 
summer daytime demand might be around 30 GW. At peak, output could exceed demand 
by up to 45 GW. 
This appears as if it could be a show stopper for PV. However, energy storage facilities 
could allow daytime peak output to be utilised at night, likely to be particularly important 
during high summer, when CHP would be operated much less than during the winter 
heating season. Estimating the capacity of storage needed is relatively straightforward, 
being a function of the duration of periods and size of surplus when peak outputs exceed 
demand, and load and duration of periods when demand exceeds output. To take a very 
simple example, if average output exceeded demand by 45 GW for 4 hours per day then 
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180 GWh could be stored, which could be used to supply a 20 GW, 9 hour long night-time 
demand. Of course, more sophisticated treatment would assess the frequency distribution 
of demand and output throughout the day and hence match storage capacity, renewable 
plant and conventional plant capacity accurately. Indeed storage might be able to mitigate 
both summer and winter demand/supply mismatch problems. How much storage has not 
been explored for the UK overall, as far as the author has been able to ascertain but has 
been assessed in recent research that focuses on individual PV arrays and C'HP 
installations, explained in part d) below. 
d) Role for storage in correlating output and demand throughout the year? 
The Tyndall centre paper on micro-grids concludes that 100 house micro-grid with a 
combination of 1.2 kWpcak PV installed on every house, a 3kW, CHP unit in every other 
house and a 2.7 kWh battery storage unit in every house would be sufficient to allow 
matching of demand to load in both winter and summer load/output conditions, see Figures 
6.21 to 6.24 (Abu-Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 
2005). 
Figure 6-21: CHP-PV output for a typical winter day (Abu-Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, 
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Figure 6-22: Storage requirements associated with Figure 6.20 
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Figure 6-23: Figure 6.22 CHP-PV output for a typical summer day (Abu-Sharkh, Li, 
Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 2005) 
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It is important to note that the micro-grid analysis is concerned solely with domestic 
consumption and micro-generation. The DGE scenario encompasses industrial and 
commercial electricity demand and CHP output. Storage requirements and load profiles 
would not be identical, and the total storage needed on the system would be larger. A crude 
approximation of the amount of storage capacity needed for diurnal balancing is provided 
above. For the purposes of this analysis it is sufficient to note that the DGE scenario 
requires storage with a peak power of 10s GWr with an energy capacity of 100 - 200 GWh 
to balance diurnal demand with supply. The Tyndall centre work provides an illustration of 
how this might look in practice using decentralised battery storage. Moreover, longer-term 
(i. e. inter-seasonal) storage would not appear to be necessary because there are correlations 
between average CHP output and winter demand, and PV output and summer demand - 
provided the system is also equipped with at least 7 GW peaking plant for winter use. This 
conclusion is tentative, and more detailed modelling of load-duration of load and output is 
needed to determine the amount of storage required in the DGE scenario. For the purposes 
of this thesis it is not necessary to quantify storage requirements precisely: DGE requires 
storage and since development of such technologies might be path dependent that is all we 
need to know. 
e) Short term intermittency. from PV 
In addition to predictable diurnal and annual fluctuations in average output PV outputs are 
variable as a result of cloud cover, as Figure 6.19 illustrates. Whilst a significant degree of 
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smoothing would be expected for the UK as a whole during days of broken cloud, and 
variations as dramatic as shown in the figure would not manifest country-wide, managing 
local fluctuations is likely to present a challenge for distribution network operators (for 
more detailed discussion of distribution network issues see (EA Technology 2002) 
(Thomson & Infield 2007)). 
The following excerpt from (Abu-Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, 
Kohler, & Arnold 2005) indicates that it is possible to use the frequency distribution of 
solar output to provide an indication of energy not served as a result of output variability 
(the frequency distribution of the mean daily solar radiation data is shown in Figure 6.25): 
`Solar radiation is the principal source of energy for the micro-grid outside the 
heating season. Rather than consider the complexities of the full probability 
distribution of daily solar radiation, a sufficiently accurate estimate can be obtained 
by using the following expression for the expected annual energy deficit LiEPV 





Where ßG is the standard deviation of the distribution from the average daily solar 
radiation value Gd, and Epv is the photovoltaic energy produced. Using measured 
1997-99 solar radiation data at Southampton the for the period from the beginning 
of May to the end of September, the standard deviation ßG has been found to be Gd 
a=0.40G (5.9)' 
Abu-Sharkh et al conclude that this could be covered by importing around 15% of energy 
requirements into the micro grid, presumably from conventional fossil generation. The 
DGE scenario is rather different from the micro-grid concept in that it is a country-wide 
model rather than a representation of local demand and supply, and includes wind power. 
The penetration of PV into the overall DGE system is rather higher than that which would 
be implied by the Tyndall micro-grid analysis, were this to be extrapolated to the UK 
overall. One means by which the additional output, and greater fluctuation in output, might 
be accommodated is through expanded storage capabilities. As discussed in parts a) and b) 
above, we have already concluded that the DGE scenario requires some peaking plant to 
ensure winter loads are met. The assumptions about the utilisation of such plant assume in 
addition that very little PV output is available in winter. The issue therefore is how much 
peaking plant might need to be drawn upon to manage fluctuations due to weather 
variations when average PV outputs are relatively high. It is difficult to draw unequivocal 
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conclusions about this. It is possible that the scenario may need substantial expansion of 
the peaking plant operating time in order to account for these effects. However, average 
energy flows ought to be sufficient, at least in principle, to maintain the energy (and 
carbon) balance of the scenario given adequate storage capacity. 
Figure 6-25: The probability distribution of daily solar radiation (kWh/m2 in 
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System reliability 
The PIU model is intended to represent average energy provision rather than power flows, 
and peak demand in 2050 is not easy to estimate. As we have already noted, for simplicity 
it is assumed that peak demand is related to annual energy by means of a simple pro-rata of 
the year 2000 ratio. Using this assumption peak demand in the DGE scenario would be 51 
GW. This may be an overestimate as the predominance of CHP in the DGE scenario would 
be expected to reduce the electrical heating element of current demand peaks. 
The derivation of peak electricity demand for the DGE scenario allows us to take a very 
approximate view of system reliability, using use system margin as an indicator of the 
extent to which the DGE system would be reliable. Existing literature on the capacity 
credit of renewable generators is used to assess their contribution to reliability at peak. 
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The figure below (Figure 6.26) shows the total installed electrical capacity implied by the 
mix of CHP and renewable outputs described above for the DGE scenario. This assumes 
the following load factors: PV 10%, wind 35%, biomass/gas CHP 40% (average of MCHP 
and industrial CHP). Capacity credit is assumed to be 25% for wind and zero for PV 
(Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 2006), and no different to thermal 
plant for biomass plant and gas fired CHP plant. The latter assumption reflects the fact that 
these plants, though intermittent, are not unpredictable - since CHP plant is operated to 
follow consistent heat loads. As a result, the very low capacity credits that have been 
ascribed to intermittent renewables do not apply to CHP. For CHP, firm capacity simply 
reflects availability at peak. Note that this assumes that heating loads are positively 
correlated with peak electricity demand; in the UK this is a reasonable assumption. 
Moreover, existing analysis of the capacity credit of wind in Britain assumes that wind 
power is widely dispersed and the benefits of dispersion can be realised using the existing 
national grid. However it is not the objective of this thesis to explore these issues in more 
detail. In what follows a simple quantification of the ability of the DGE capacity mix to 
provide a reliable supply of electricity is provided for illustrative purposes. 
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`Firm capacity equivalent' is based upon capacity credits. Perhaps surprisingly, given the 
important role of PV and wind power in the scenario, the `firm capacity equivalent' (47 






because biomass and gas fired CHP plant is assumed to be available (subject to outage 
rates not different from conventional generation) at peak demand periods, and hence is no 
different from conventional plant in terms of its contribution to reliability. But despite a 
very large installed capacity, intermittency effects result in a firm capacity deficit of 
around 14 GW, if a system margin of 20% is required to maintain reliability. 
The analysis of system balancing impacts already indicated that the DGE scenario is likely 
to require some gas peaking plant to make up the shortfall that will occur whenever wind 
output falls below mean output. Providing a 20% margin would require a doubling of the 
peaking capacity described above, from 7 GW to 14 GW. Such plant would operate at a 
very low load factor, around 2%. This is similar to the current utilisation of some old open 
cycle and oil fired plant in the current generation mix (DTI 2007a). It might be that the 
large penetration of small scale generators on the system would decrease the probability of 
faults, and allow reliability to be maintained with a smaller system margin. However it is 
not possible to examine this possibility and the impact would not be material from the 
perspective of this thesis. 
System balancing and reliability: Conclusions 
The DGE scenario requires the following amendments to provide system balancing: 
- Short term storage: Diurnal storage is needed to manage summer PV peaks and the 
mismatch between PV output and peak demand and help meet winter peaks and 
manage the mismatch between CHP output and daytime load. Diurnal storage would be 
essential for the scenario. System balancing could be achieved without the need for 
inter-seasonal storage. Diurnal storage needs can be quantified on the basis of time of 
day data for average output and expected demand. It has not been possible to quantify 
the additional effects of unpredictable fluctuations in PV output (due to weather) on 
storage requirements. 
- Load management: The need for storage could be reduced through a greater role for 
load management, for example switching loads from evening to afternoon in summer 
and from day to evening in the winter. 
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- Peaking plant: The DGE scenario is deficient 
in firm capacity to maintain reliability 
and is also likely to need to operate peaking plant during the winter period to make up 
for any shortfall in wind generation. Uncertainty with respect to wind output and solar 
fluctuation over a period of days to weeks, and low overall winter PV output, make use 
of storage to meet this need problematic. However, even if the winter peak increment 
were met entirely by gas fired plant the impact on emissions is negligible. 
- System margin: Whilst around 7 GW of peaking plant would 
be sufficient to meet 
winter peaks this would not allow any contingency for exceptional demand peaks or for 
plant failure. An additional 7 GW is needed to maintain a system margin of 20% over 
peak load. 
Distribution networks 
The principal changes that could be required of distribution networks should the capacity 
of generation connected to them increase are as follows (from (Ilex & Strbac 2002): 
- Additional substation capacity to manage voltage (avoid excessive voltage rise due to 
electrical output from distributed generators) 
- Additional circuit breaking capacity to maintain response to faults 
- Additional cable capacity, to accommodate additional power flows 
The principal reason that problems occur for distribution network connected generation is 
that these networks were designed with a one way flow in mind (Green & Haernandez 
Aramburo 2006; Thomson & Infield 2007)). It was expected that voltage would drop along 
feeder lines as a function of distance from substations, reflecting loads. Appliances have to 
meet specified standards that relate to their impact on the network, for example with 
respect to power quality. Power cables and substation density were planned accordingly, 
but planners had no reason to consider the possibility of generators connecting to these 
networks. Distribution connected generators change all this, introducing supply can cause 
voltage rise and affect power quality (Green & Haernandez Aramburo 2006). Intermittency 
adds an additional dimension; whilst uniform output from distributed generators would be 
expected to cause voltage rise, any sudden reduction in output, such as might occur when 
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passing clouds cause the output of PV to drop, can cause short term voltage dips (Thomson 
& Infield 2007). 
In addition to network upgrading, these issues can be addressed through the application of 
more advanced techniques that use power electronics to modify the effects of the 
intermittent generators and through the active management of loads. Following (Green & 
Haernandez Aramburo 2006) the principal possibilities are as follows: 
Supply side and network power electronics 
- Uninterruptible power supply: Back up power for sensitive loads that can also 
help 
manage voltage and power quality on the network 
- Dynamic voltage restorer (DVC): a device that can inject voltage (real or reactive) to 
correct voltage (both voltage rise and voltage drop) 
- Active power filter (APF)27: a device that injects series or shunt current to correct 
harmonic distortion 
Power electronic devices in the form of invertors (for PV) and power converters (for 
variable speed wind turbines) would be a feature of the DGE scenario, and Green notes 
that these may be designed such that they can provide the services described above. Green 
also notes that the concept of a micro-grid discussed above could be utilised in order to 
actively manage a distribution network as if it were a mini transmission network. In many 
respects this would be the same as is already practiced in small remote or island systems. 
Demand side interventions would also assist in the operation of distribution networks 
connecting large volumes of variable generation such as the PV and CHP envisaged for the 
DGE scenario. Loads that could be controlled in response to network conditions would 
help manage voltage, frequency and power quality. 
Modelling studies indicate that even relatively large penetrations of PV into domestic 
buildings (20 - 50% of dwellings) need not create significant problems; voltage rise would 
be modest (around 1%) and losses reduced (Thomson & Infield 2007). 
27 DVR and APF functions can be combined into technologies known as unified power quality controllers 
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The final point to note is that the impact of distribution network connected generation need 
not be negative. It also has the potential to reduce losses, and may be able defer network 
upgrading (Thomson & Infield 2007). This is particularly likely to be the case when output 
and peak loads coincide, for instance in the case of PV output in warm, sunny countries or 
CHP output in the UK. As with the impact of intermittency on transmission operation and 
reliability (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, Green, Leach, & Skea 2006), the impact of 
generation in distribution networks is context specific. Timing and duration of output, 
nature of loads, mix of generators and network condition are all relevant variables. 
The electrical engineering details need not be explored in further detail for the purposes of 
this thesis. Ilex and Strbac investigate costs, based largely upon assumptions of capacity 
upgrade. The important point to note in respect to this thesis is that there is rich ground for 
development and deployment of active management of networks using power electronics 
in the DGE scenario, and it is reasonable to expect that this will give rise to economies of 
scale and learning effects; path dependent processes. 
Transmission networks 
Under the DGE scenario large power stations disappear. Electricity is produced at or (in 
the case of wind power) relatively close to the point of use. This must call into question the 
role of and need for a national electricity grid. Is it possible that the high voltage 
transmission infrastructure could be dismantled? 
Why would this be considered? As noted in the discussion of the BiB scenario, in very 
simple terms, neglecting locational price signals and a range of other factors, the cost per 
unit of electrical power `moved' along a 400kV transmission line is estimated to be 
approximately equivalent to £ 114/MWkm (National Grid Company 2007). This is based 
upon the full cost of building electricity lines (which lies in a range of £450k - £700k/km) 
(National Grid Company 2007). NGC also publish an annualised figure, taking into 
account business overheads and maintenance and using an annuity rate based upon NGC's 
regulated rate of return, in this format the cost is around £10/MWkm/yr (National Grid 
Company 2007). The England and Wales transmission network extends to around 9000 km 
and peak transmission capacity is around 50 GW. In very approximate terms the 
annualised cost of financing the existing transmission system is therefore of the order of 
£4.5 billion/yr. Of course the system requires ongoing maintenance and periodic 
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replacement. In the extreme, if the British national grid were no longer needed in future 
decades, the absolute avoided cost would be of the order of £51 billion. 
These figures are simplifications, intended only to illustrate orders of magnitude. 
Moreover, it is not reasonable to assume that the transmission grid could be dismantled 
were the DGE scenario to come to pass. The principal reason for this is that power would 
need to transfer between distribution networks in order to assist with balancing supply and 
demand and to allow for a range of contingencies. Managing intermittency becomes more 
costly if renewables are not geographically dispersed (Gross, Heptonstall, Anderson D, 
Green, Leach, & Skea 2006), which of course they could not be were local distribution 
networks to be operated without interconnection. Even the micro-gird concept discussed 
above relies upon input from a wider grid to help manage renewable fluctuations (Abu- 
Sharkh, Li, Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 2005). This is only 
partially mitigated by the availability of storage in the scenario. Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that the DGE scenario would require anything like the MWkm capacity currently installed 
in Britain in order to move power from large scale (often remote) power stations to 
demand centres. Some of the existing `spurs' to remote power stations (see Graphic 6.1) 
would no longer be needed at all. Should the micro-grid concept become established, and 
local storage widely implemented, it might be possible to operate distribution networks 
with very little power flow between regions. 
A full blown electrical engineering simulation of the locational and temporal output of 
various categories of decentralised generator is needed in order to quantify the extent to 
which the transmission network could be scaled down and how distribution networks 
would be operated. However the potential to substantially reduce the size and capacity of 
the electricity transmission system does have profound implications for the extent to which 
energy system development is path dependent. If a substantial fraction of the transmission 
system costs/investments could be avoided through the DGE scenario, and the transmission 
system were allowed to fall into significant decline, then the alternative scenario explored 
in the BiB section (which would require an expansion of the transmission network) could 
not come to pass. Another way of looking at this issue is in terms of the option value (the 
option to exploit large scale sources) provided by the transmission system. This option 
costs several billion per year to maintain under the DGE scenario. 
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Location and nature of emissions 
The decentralised generation expands scenario would result in a radically shifted pattern of 
CO2 emissions from electricity generation, from the current pattern dominated by large 
point sources to distributed and dispersed emissions from millions of small generating 
units. 
Existing point source emissions from the fifteen largest sources (a11 of which emit over 4.5 
million tonnes per year) are provided in Table 6.1. Total emissions from these 15 stations 
are around 107 Mt CO2. This represents around 20% of total energy related CO2 emissions 
in the UK (DTI 2003c). All but two of these large point sources are power stations, which 
would definitely disappear in the decentralised generation expands scenario28. The UK 
government have estimated that total emissions from plants theoretically suited to CCS 
(mostly large power stations) amount to 190 Mt CO2 (DTI 2003c), or 40% of energy 
related CO2 emissions. 
It follows that the DGE scenario removes a significant opportunity to capture and store 
CO2 emissions from the power sector. Whilst the scenario shows that this is far from 
inconsistent with deep emissions reductions and the DGE scenario does still contain CCS 
because of the assumption made about its role in producing hydrogen, the implication is 
that an important option for low carbon electricity is effectively foregone. We have seen 
that deep CO2 emission reductions depend instead upon both the efficiency improvement 
that can be delivered by CHP and significant uptake of renewable energy. 
28 No judgement is made about the longevity of the steel works that appear in this list. 
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Table 6-1: Top 15 UK emission sources C02/annum - EPER 2001data 
29 
C02 tonnes 
1. AES DRAX POWER LTD 16,400,000 
(Drax power station) 
2. Scottish Power Generation uk 10,000,000 
(Longannet power station) 
3. POWERGEN UK PLC 9,150,000 
(Ratclift on Soar power station ) 
4. EDF ENERGY (COTTAM POWER) LTD 7,240,000 
(Cottam power station) 
5. CORUS UK LTD 6,780,000 
(Scunthorpe steel works 
6. AEP ENERGY SERVICES UK GENERATION LTD 6,680,000 
(Ferrybridge power station) 
7. EDF ENERGY (WEST BURTON POWER) LTD 6,600,000 
(West Burton power station) 
8. POWERGEN UK PLC 6,540,000 
(Kingsnorth power station, Rochester) 
9. CORUS UK LTD 5,690,000 
(Redcar steel works, Teeside) 
10. RWE INNOGY PLC 5,650,000 
(Aberthaw power station, Glamorgan) 
11. BRITISH ENERGY PLC 5,600,000 
(Eggborough power station) 
12. npower PLC 5,550,000 
(Didcott A power station) 
13. AEP ENERGY SERVICES UK GENERATION LTD 5,390,000 
(Fiddlers Ferry power station, Warrington) 
14. PX LTD 4,850,000 
(Teeside Power) 
15. npower PLC 4,850,000 
Tilbury power station 
Total 106,970,000 (107 Mt 
6.7.6 Decentralised generation expands - summary of key findings 
A decentralised system based on natural gas-fired CHP can help to reduce CO2 emissions, 
but the scenario modelling outlined above suggests that this would limit reductions to less 
than 40%, unless radical action is also taken in the transport sector. Deep cuts in emissions 
under a decentralised generation scenario are possible only if there is widespread 
utilisation of small scale renewables and biomass. Large point sources of CO2 disappear, 
29 
http: //eper. ec. europa. eu/eper/Find_facility. asp? CountryCode=UK&EmissionSelectionAir=on&Year=2004&f 
acilityname=&address=&Pollutantld=5 &Activityld=0 
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and the role of the long distance transmission network may be dramatically reduced. 
Extensive use of intermittent renewables and CHP will have implications for system 
balancing and reliability. It appears that energy storage would be essential, and it might be 
desirable to locate this within the distribution network as described by (Abu-Sharkh, Li, 
Markvart, Ross, Wilson, Yao, Steemers, Kohler, & Arnold 2005). A relatively large 
capacity of gas fired peaking plant, operating at a very low load factor would be needed to 
meet winter demands and provide reliability. 
6.8 Summary of findings front both scenarios 
Both worlds can deliver the 60% cut in CO2 emissions envisaged. Achieving the target 
emissions reductions throws up an interesting set of challenges, some scenario specific 
some generic. 
The generic challenge is the construction of a large amount of new plant, both electricity 
generation and for conversion of energy to heat (CHP and electric boilers). This is not a 
carbon emissions related challenge per se, since over a period of several decades new plant 
would be needed irrespective of climate change. The challenge for both scenarios is that 
the nature of the investment needs to be markedly different from what might be envisaged 
under `business as usual' - which most scenario exercises assume to imply the increasing 
dominance of natural gas in the electricity sector and continued reliance upon it for heat 
(DTI 2003b; PIU 2001a; PIU 2001b). Moreover many BAU scenarios envisage much higher 
levels of demand growth than that in the PIU energy service demand proposition used for 
both scenarios. This challenge is more significant in the electricity sector because the 
expected lifetime of all generating plant is at least three decades, often four or five (See 
Ch. 3 and (PIU 2002b). Hence construction of low carbon generation needs to begin to 
replace conventional generation within the next few years unless many power stations are 
to be retired before the end of their working lives. However a few generic points stand out: 
- Both scenarios require incremental technical progress. For example, to reduce the cost 
of renewables and expand the utilisation of CCS. 
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- Neither scenario requires fundamental technological breakthroughs such as nuclear 
fusion, hydrogen storage in cars, bio-hydrogen, superconductivity or advanced biomass 
based liquid fuels. Notably: 
- Neither scenario requires inter-seasonal storage of energy. 
Other issues are differentiated by scenario. The following points summarise the key 
scenario specific findings: 
The DGE world 
CHP and fuel cell efficiency and reduced losses were not sufficient to deliver deep 
emissions reductions. Achieving a 60% emissions reduction also requires extensive 
development of small scale renewables. Hence: 
Technological advancement in small renewables would be required. Several small scale 
renewable options are currently expensive in comparison to conventional generation, some 
markedly so (see Ch. 5). 
Development of fuel cell CHP or much more efficient micro turbines would be required. 
The scenario is predicated on CHP plants with high efficiency over a wider range of 
heat/power ratios that is typical of current designs of micro-CHP. 
Distribution networks must be upgraded. Electricity distribution networks will require 
upgrading and more sophisticated management of loads and decentralised generators. 
Storage is needed. Because of intermittency it is impossible to combine this world with a 
60% emissions reduction without electricity storage, probably embedded within 
distribution networks. 
Peaking plant is required. A relatively large capacity (14 GW) of peaking plant operating 
at a low load factor would be needed to maintain reliability and manage intermittency. 
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The DGE world is not compatible with a large role for carbon capture and storage in the 
stationary sector since electricity generation currently represents the most significant point 
sources of CO2 emissions and large power stations disappear in the DGE world. 
The DGE world would be consistent with a considerable reduction in the capacity of the 
high voltage electricity transmission grid. The grid would be needed to provide only for 
interconnection between distribution networks to facilitate management of intermittency 
and to help cope with faults. Transmission lines that currently exist to transport power long 
distances from remote power stations might be removed. 
The BiB world 
The BiB world was able to deliver approximately 60% reduction in emissions largely as 
predicated. The combination of (approximate shares) 40% nuclear, 40% large scale wind 
and marine renewables and 20% CCS, and an expanded role for electrical heating is 
sufficient to decarbonise the electricity sector and reduce emissions in the stationary heat 
sector. The following points stand out in comparison with the DGE world and with the 
year 2000 system: 
Technical advancement is required in marine renewables, nuclear power and CCS. The 
scenario is predicated upon a significant role for renewables that are at an early stage of 
development and CCS, which is unproven on a large scale. It also requires nuclear stations 
to partake in a degree of load following, which may require development. However, it 
would be possible in principle to substitute offshore wind for wave power should the latter 
fail to improve technically. 
Extension and expansion of electricity transmission is essential. The scenario requires an 
additional 26 GW and around 1000 km of transmission line capacity. However distribution 
network operation would be largely unaffected. The traditional 'dumb' role of local power 
networks would not need to be modified. 
Storage capacity could help manage intermittency, but is not essential. This is because the 
intermittency associated with the scenario could be accommodated by a combination of 
load following by CCS plants, peaking plant without CCS and a degree of load following 
176 
by nuclear power stations. Management of loads would also help, since a significant 
problem is excess generation during periods of low demand. 
CCS infrastructure would be required. Logistically and economically it would make most 
sense if CCS stations were clustered around nodes for offshore piping of CO2 to 
repositories under the North Sea. This would also tend to favour the development of large 
or co-located stations, to optimise the use of CO2 pipelines. Such pipelines could in 
principle also carry CO2 from hydrogen production facilities and the presence of power 
sector CCS in the BIB scenario has the potential to improve the economics of transport 
sector CCS. 
Peaking plants are required. Whilst CCS plant could be installed in sufficient capacity to 
provide both system balancing and to maintain reliability the practicality and economics of 
CCS infrastructure militate against this. If CCS were to be operated on `baseload' then 
around 27 GW of peaking plant, operating at a very low load factor, would be required. 
Each of these observations has potential implications for path dependence, which are 
summarised in Table 6.2, below. 
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F CCS pipeline Electricity 
infrastructure storage 
The scenarios developed in this section are only sketches. Nevertheless Table 6.3 indicates 
that there significant and pronounced differences between each scenario. These differences 
might amount to path dependent development. It is interesting to note that the only 
scenario specific option that is closed off by definition is use of CCS in the DGE scenario, 
as it is fundamental to that scenario that decentralised generation replaces large power 
stations. Other options in the `not possible' category (shown in italics) are incompatible 
with aspects of the infrastructural requirements of each scenario, but are not fundamentally 
incompatible with the scenario per se. For example the DGE scenario could be extended to 
allow transmission spurs to remote renewables and CHP could be installed in the 
distribution networks of the BiB scenario. The approach taken by the Supergen scenario 
team (Elders, Ault, Galloway, McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & Lampaditou 2006) envisages 
just such combinations of large and small scale options. The next section therefore returns 
to the properties of path dependence in order to evaluate path dependency in the scenarios. 
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7 Scenarios and path dependency 
7.1 Introduction 
Section 6 defined two markedly different, but internally consistent scenarios to deliver a 
60% cut in C02 emissions in the UK, with the principal differences between the two 
reflecting different supply-side mixes in the stationary sector. In this section the nature of 
the two scenarios is discussed in the light of existing literature on `lock-in' to high carbon 
energy and the analysis of path dependence provided in Ch. 4. It seeks to identify areas of 
technical or institutional development likely to be subject to path dependency, and 
discusses how these differ in each scenario. 
Ch. 4 provides the following criteria against which path dependence might be assessed: 
- Are there increasing returns to the adoption of particular component technologies or 
energy systems that lead to cost decreases? These may arise as a result of: 
o learning effects reducing costs relative to alternatives 
o high initial costs/economies of scale 
- Are there increasing returns due to network externalities? These include: 
o infrastructure requirements 
o fuel source/energy carrier and end user device compatibility 
o institutional and regulatory needs 
- Are there increasing returns due to `adaptive expectations' and `mental frameworks'? 
For example: 
o consumer confidence in fuels or technologies 
o managerial experience with key technologies and/or systems 
o investor confidence 
o the need to develop particular `knowledge sets' that apply to particular 
technologies but not others 
In the sections that follow the component technologies, infrastructural requirements and 
other characteristics of the DGE and BiB scenarios are discussed in with respect to each of 
these criteria and with reference to the path dependency literature. 
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7.2 Scenario differences and sources of path dependence 
7.2.1 Increasing returns to adoption of generating/conversion technologies 
The two primary sources of increasing return adoption of component technologies (e. g. 
power stations, PV, CHP) are 1. the learning effects described by Arrow and others 
(learning by doing, learning by using) (Arrow 1962; Foxon 2003; Neuhoff 2005) and 2. the 
cost reductions that accrue to projects that exhibit economies of scale. Each scenario is 
likely to be subject to a combination of both. Moreover, learning effects and economies of 
scale are not mutually exclusive. For example, learning effects associated with series build 
have played an important role in analyses of the future costs of nuclear power, but nuclear 
power is also subject to very important economies of scale (British Energy 
2001; MacKerron, Colenutt, Spackman, Robinson, & Linton 2006). 
In very general terms economies of scale will tend to be more significant in the BiB 
scenario, whilst learning effects will dominate in the DGE scenario. This is because large 
scale technologies and a variety of supporting infrastructures that are also subject to 
economies of scale dominate the BiB scenario: nuclear power, large power stations with 
CCS, long distance transmission of electricity, large offshore civil engineering projects, 
CCS pipelines. In contrast the DGE scenario would require CHP units and PV modules to 
be produced in their tens of millions, and a large capacity of decentralised storage 
facilities. The `roll out' of such technologies would offer great opportunities for learning 
by doing and using, feedbacks that would generate technical improvement and cost 
reduction. Such units would also be subject to a relatively rapid rate of replacement 
(perhaps 10 - 15 years for domestic CHP), further increasing the scope for learning effects 
as designs and manufacturing processes improve. Economies of scale would also be 
present in the DGE world, for example in plants for manufacturing of decentralised 
generators. The presence of each effect in the scenarios is important, as it provides a 
number of different potential sources of path dependence. The categorisation below is the 
author's own. It may not be exhaustive. 
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Learning foregone? 
The presence of learning by doing and learning by using imply that cost reduction is 
correlated with market growth. Learning effects have multiple causes, which need not 
detain us here, but the link between market expansion and cost reduction is well proven 
empirically (see IEA 2000). For most energy technologies every doubling of cumulative 
capacity or output will deliver cost reductions of between 10% and 20% (Ibid). If market 
growth is absent then the cost reductions that depend upon it will not be delivered. For 
example the DGE scenario relies heavily on PV, which is currently a very expensive way 
to make electricity in the UK (see Ch. 5). Learning effects have been observed for PV (IEA 
2000; IEA 2003), and learning analyses have suggested that provided global market growth 
and historical rates of learning continue the cost of PV will enter a region where cost 
competitiveness with conventional technologies appears possible around 2025 (PIU 2001d) 
(IEA 2004). Whether learning will continue in line with historic trends is subject of debate; 
recently solar module prices turned upwards before levelling off (market data from 
www. solarbuzz. com). This is not inconsistent with learning analyses as a series of 
discontinuities may be accommodated within a longer term learning trend (IEA 2000). In 
any case, irrespective of whether and to what extent learning effects will occur it is 
reasonable to consider the implications of continued or absent learning effects for path 
dependence. 
Growth of PV markets has been dominated by investment driven by subsidy programmes 
in several countries; particularly Germany, California and Japan (see e. g. 
http: //www. solarbuzz. com/EuropeanMajorMarkets. htm). Suppose however that the BiB 
scenario applies not just in the UK but in all countries, or at least all countries with broadly 
similar climates and opportunities to develop CCS - much of North America and Europe 
as well as Russia, Japan and parts of China (IPCC 2005). Would PV programmes be 
continued in a scenario where large scale options are also supported by policy, and/or 
preferred by investors? 
Learning analyses can provide a quantification of the scale of cumulative investment 
required to `buy down' costs. These learning investments are large (lEA 2003), a recent 
estimate for PV provides a range from 6 to over 100 billion Euros depending on the rate of 
learning (Neuhoff 2005). Moreover the levels of subsidy provided to PV in several 
counties are extremely high in comparison to lower cost renewables such as wind power. 
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In the BiB scenario it is perfectly feasible that political support for PV subsidies would 
decline. It is therefore possible that PV cost reduction trends would falter should there be a 
marked and international trend towards an energy system along the lines described in the 
BiB scenario. In an extreme case this could undermine the potential to use PV extensively 
as described in the DGE scenario. Irrespective of any network inconsistencies (see below) 
PV would be unattractive in terms of costs. This form of path dependent effect might be 
termed `learning foregone'. It is similar to the concept of `lock out' developed by Neuhoff 
and others (Neuhoff 2005). 
The relationship between global markets and the UK energy system is important. It is 
possible that individual country decisions will have only a marginal effect on global 
learning. The scale of influence of any one country, region or sector on learning is a 
function of its share of global markets. One result of this is that learning foregone may be 
less likely to arise in the case of technologies such as PV that are modular with highly 
differentiated global markets, since there are a range of different market sectors where 
growth could occur. For example, if subsidies were removed in Europe and the US, the 
market for PV for rural electrification in Africa or grid connected use in tropical Asia 
could continue to drive market growth. However this form of path dependence is profound 
in its consequences if it does occur, since options highly dependent on future learning 
effects for their economic or technical feasibility could fall by the wayside if such effects 
do not materialise. Learning effects are cumulative and intrinsically inter-temporal - 
decisions made now beget benefits in future. 
Learning and scale economy asymmetries 
Any path dependence created by learning and path dependence created by economies of 
scale are not entirely symmetrical. Firstly, because the former might continue elsewhere 
irrespective of UK decisions whereas the latter can only occur in the UK if UK projects go 
ahead. Secondly, because scale economies are not cumulative and inter-temporal to the 
same extent as learning effects. This point may be illustrated by considering technologies 
that exhibit both forms of learning. Nuclear power reactors are subject to both learning 
effects and economies of scale. Learning effects in nuclear power reactors mean that 
developments in China or Finland have at least the potential to help reduce costs of future 
developments in Britain. But the economies of scale that are associated with building large 
reactors occur in each separate instance of reactor construction. 
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The temporal asymmetry between learning effects and scale economies is notable for its 
impact on path dependence. Deferring, ceasing or scaling down of global support for 
market growth in technologies (such as PV) where learning effects dominate cost reduction 
could result in the absence of learning and hence an option could be `locked out'. By 
contrast, at least in principle it ought to be possible to benefit from economies of scale 
irrespective of the timing of a decision. Scale, not a cumulative series of learning events, 
delivers cost reduction. This is not to suggest that the temporal dimension is non-existent. 
Of course the economies of scale that would accrue to a CCS infrastructure or nuclear 
build programme only occur once the programme is initiated, and the benefits of a project 
are delivered only once it is operating. Delay to a large programme or project would delay 
the benefits that might arise from scale effects. However, they are not `lost' in a temporal 
sense in quite the way that learning effects from cumulative production may be lost if 
market growth does not take place. Economies of scale will be available in 2020 
irrespective of any decisions made today. Learning benefits will only accrue by 2020 if 
market growth occurs between now and then. 
Implications for the scenarios 
With respect to the scenarios developed in Ch. 6 it is possible to conclude that as learning 
effects are likely to occur in both scenarios, learning foregone and lock-out could occur in 
either case. This could make `switching' between the main options in each scenario 
difficult or impossible. Development of the BiB scenario would tend to preclude learning 
in PV technologies, which would remain high cost. There are some important caveats on 
this, in particular that the BiB scenario would need to extend to all of the main global 
markets where PV might otherwise experience market growth. Similarly, the DGE 
scenario would rule out learning in nuclear and CCS (at least in the power sector). 
However, the asymmetry between learning effects and scale effects also means that lock- 
out might be less profound for the large scale options. Scale economies are a significant 
source of cost reduction for large scale technologies and scale economies do not depend on 
previous market experience. 
Lock-out due to foregone learning is not the only form of path dependence. It is equally 
possible that strong growth and a lot of learning in one option could render other options 
uncompetitive, as the following section explains. 
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Winner takes all 
The corollary of the `learning foregone' or `lock out' example is the potential for learning 
effects to create a dominant technology, such that competing options fall by the wayside. 
This is the classic case of path dependence explored in the literature reviewed in Ch. 4 (see 
e. g. (Arthur 1989; David 2000)) and it connects strongly with the notion of `dominance' 
found in the wider literature on innovation (Utterbach 1994), though often such analyses 
focus on the presence of other sources of lock in, such as network externalities. This type 
of path dependence is in some respects the opposite of the lock out described above. The 
absence of learning may prevent a technology from becoming commercially viable, but the 
presence of learning in a particular option may deliver such extensive cost reductions or 
improvements that other technologies are no longer attractive or viable. The idea here is 
that even if all technologies initially benefit from learning effects a particular option 
outperforms alternatives, either because learning effects are more pronounced (a higher 
progress ratio) or because the potential for market growth is much larger for a particular 
option than it is for others. In time the advantages to this technology begin to accumulate 
and investment in alternatives diminishes. In contrast to what I have termed `learning 
foregone', this form of increasing returns might be titled `winner takes all'. 
A very interesting example of this phenomenon was recently described to the author by 
Professor Paul Ekins, who directs the UK's `Markal' (Market Allocation) modelling 
exercise (see www. ukerc. ac. uk) (Ekins 2007). The Markal model is a cost optimisation 
linear programming model that seeks least cost combinations of energy technologies and is 
used for scenario planning by energy industry and ministries (see e. g. (DTI 2003b)). In a 
recent run of the model a linear progression towards a 60% cut in C02 was imposed. This 
required the immediate development of low carbon power generation technologies, and on 
the basis that wind power can be constructed more quickly than nuclear power or carbon 
capture, and is cheaper than any other renewable option, the UK Markal model began to 
construct wind farms. Since the model incorporates an increasing returns mechanism, a 
learning rate that links deployment to cost reduction, the cost of wind energy was markedly 
reduced by around 2020, when nuclear and CCS were available to the model. In fact the 
`early lead' gained by wind power could never be overcome by the other electricity 
generation options, and it went on to play a central role in the electricity generation market. 
Whether or not such a scenario is realistic is not relevant, the important point is that 
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increasing returns effects that create a `winner takes all' scenario can be modelled, and 
have dramatic consequences. 
Learning and scale economy symmetries 
There does not seem any prima facie reason to distinguish between learning effects and 
scale effects with respect to this kind of dominance. Either would appear to have the 
potential to deliver over-riding advantages to a particular technology or technology type, 
should it benefit from increasing returns to such an extent that alternatives fall behind. 
Implications for the scenarios 
With respect to the scenarios developed in Ch 6 it appears that path dependence of this 
form could result in lock in to either scenario. Several decades of learning by doing in PV 
and CHP could render small scale technologies sufficiently attractive in terms of cost to 
make the large scale alternatives explored in the BiB scenario uneconomic. One factor that 
is important to note here is that the market for PV is currently very much smaller than it 
has the potential to be in theory, which implies a large potential for cost reduction should 
learning effects continue. Similarly, the combination of scale economies and learning 
effects that might accrue to a series build of new nuclear power stations, CCS or marine 
renewables could allow the average costs of electricity from such sources to fall to levels 
that less developed alternatives (PV or CHP) could not possibly match. 
All options open? 
The potential for increasing returns to adoption to both `lock out' options and create 
dominant 'winner take all' technologies might lead to negative outcomes from a public 
policy perspective. What Foray terms public policy regret might result, if at some point in 
future problems with a dominant option became manifest or if the benefits of a `locked 
out' option became sought after (Foray 1997). Would it therefore be possible to explicitly 
seek out ways to maintain options in the face of path dependence? 
In principle it is possible to maintain learning in a range of options, avoiding lock out. It 
may also be possible to continue to invest in options other than a `dominant' design. The 
principal problems that policymakers are likely to face in attempting to avoid path 
dependence are that of availability of resources and opportunity cost. For example, global 
learning investments of the order of £lOs billion are required to buy down costs of PV 
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(Neuhoff 2005). Similarly, investments in new nuclear power stations, CCS plant and large 
scale renewables will each be of the order of £10s billion. Using current UK government 
cost estimates for new nuclear, a series build of new stations (needed to deliver scale 
economies and learning effects) might cost of the order of £10 billion (eight I GW power 
stations, £1.3 billion/GW) (DTI 2007b). In both cases costs, at least at first, are higher than 
the cost of conventional generation and a subsidy of some form will be needed. Consumers 
or taxpayers will be required to fund learning investments. 
If either path is followed consumers or tax payers will be required to bear the cost of 
developing lower carbon technologies. If both paths are chosen they will in addition be 
required to bear the cost of developing alternative sets of low carbon technologies, in effect 
paying extra to retain the option of developing both technologies. Formal valuation of the 
`option' retained in this way is outside the scope of this thesis (see (Gross, Heptonstall, & 
Blyth 2007) for a review of the theory of option valuation), however given the orders of 
magnitude expenditures outlined above it is not unreasonable to conclude that the cost of 
developing all options is likely to be large. This has a direct cost in that resources will be 
tied up in energy systems and a direct opportunity cost, since these resources will not be 
available for more productive uses elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, if holding a range 
of options open requires, or results in, `holding back' an option that would otherwise have 
become dominant a further opportunity cost will arise, since learning and cost reduction 
will be lower than they might have been. Hence there is an `opportunity cost of learning 
foregone' associated with attempting to keep all options open. 
Recognising the economic constraints that make it impossible or irrational to `back all 
horses' path dependence analysts have developed strategies to attempt to optimise policy 
responses to the risk of lock in (Cowan 1991; Foray 1997). These are not unique to path 
dependence created by learning and scale economies, and are therefore returned to in the 
light of a discussion of the other sources of path dependence, in Section 7.3 below. 
7.2.2 Network externalities 
Systems and networks 
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Network externalities (also referred to as coordination effects (Pierson 2000)) arise when 
there is a need for technologies to be compatible, or a coordinated system is required (see 
Ch. 4). Examples include computer hardware and software, video tape or DVD formats, 
road vehicle engines and refuelling systems. Analysis of lock-in in the energy system often 
refers to network externalities (see e. g. (Unruh 2000)). Ch. 6 identified important network 
and infrastructural differences between the BiB and DGE scenarios: 
- The DGE scenario requires upgrading and more active management of local electricity 
distribution networks, BiB does not 
- The BiB scenario requires extension and upgrading of the high voltage transmission 
network, DGE does not, indeed parts of the national grid might be dismantled 
- The BiB scenario requires the development of a more extensive CO2 pipeline 
infrastructure for CCS, indeed CCS in the power sector is impossible in the DGE 
scenario 
Difference need not imply path dependence 
The scenarios have different systemic characteristics, so it might be concluded that 
network externalities will be pronounced, a source of path dependent differentiation 
between the scenarios. However, in many cases it appears as if the different network 
configurations needed for each scenario need not preclude one another. There is no reason 
why the developments to distribution networks described in the DGE scenario could not be 
combined with electricity transmission extensions to access offshore wind (or even CCS 
and nuclear power stations). Similarly the upgraded transmission system of the BiB 
scenario could be connected to upgraded distribution networks with a large role for small 
scale renewables. Other scenario exercises have incorporated large amounts of both 
decentralised generators and large scale sources; engineering led studies suggest that these 
kind of combinations are feasible (Elders, Ault, Galloway, McDonald, Kohler, Leach, & 
Lampaditou 2006). 
As already noted the DGE scenario as described would be incompatible with the 
development of a CCS transport infrastructure in the power sector, simply because there 
would be no large power stations. Moreover, developments that extended transmission in 
the DGE world or introduced small renewables into BiB would change the scenarios as 
described above, and might cause additional technical problems, for example related to 
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system balancing. However for the most part the system requirements are not mutually 
exclusive in themselves, rather there would be additional cost associated with providing 
both transmission extension and the distribution network modifications needed for 
decentralised generation. This can be contrasted with a situation where networks, standards 
or systems are physically or practically incompatible and/or competition with one another 
- formats for data storage (CD, DVD, cassette etc), railway gauges, etc. The path 
dependence literature even explores the network externality associated with what side of 
the road we drive on (Foray 1997). It simply is not possible to maintain a system where 
vehicles drive on both sides. Moreover, whereas the initial choice might be entirely 
costless and arbitrary, subsequent change could be very costly indeed. Such `strong' forms 
of network externality do not appear to be a feature that differentiates the scenarios 
developed in this thesis. 
The path dependence related to networks is a path dependence of cost. As with the path 
dependence associated with keeping options open in the face of increasing returns from 
learning and scale economies, the principal issue is the need for choices driven by 
considerations of cost effectiveness. Why, for example, would policymakers or private 
companies wish to bear (i. e. impose on voters and customers) the cost of a high voltage 
transmission system more extensive than needed in the DGE scenario? Similarly, why 
introduce the active management and upgrading of distribution networks needed to bring 
PV into the BiB scenario when the scenario is predicated on expansion of large scale 
renewables? 
As with learning and scale effects, however, the inability to develop certain options 
because of network constraints might give rise to `regret'. What if a technological 
breakthrough in PV that emerged from overseas could not be utilised in Britain because of 
limited distribution network capability? What if terrorist threats or an accident in another 
country led to a moratorium on new nuclear or CCS? There is an option value attached to 
maintaining choice. Just as with learning and scale effects, however, this option comes at a 
cost and this cost has the potential to be large. For example Ch. 6 indicates that the 
`savings' in transmission capacity delivered by the DGE scenario relative to the BiB 
scenario might amount to tens of billions of pounds. Neither scenario is costed in detail, as 
comparative cost is not the principal issue for this discussion, but there will always be 
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additional cost attached to maintaining system requirements from one scenario that are not 
needed in the other. 
Regulations and institutions 
Several analysts of lock in and path dependence emphasise strongly that systems are not 
just physical agglomerations of pipes and wires, they are also a complex human system 
that comprises of rules and standards, skills, norms and expectations (Foxon, Gross, & 
Anderson D 2003; Foxon & Gross 2003; Unruh 2000). Examples include standards such as 
appliance voltage and frequency (110 V 60 Hz, 240 V 50 Hz, etc) that apply to both 
appliances and electricity generators. Other example of standards abound, vehicle fuel 
octane, software systems, electrical equipment and even the sizes of plumbing components. 
Standards are an obvious example of institutional systems but there are many others. They 
all require an `architecture' that defines roles and processes by which standards are 
designed and enforced, and a system through which they are delivered. More complex 
manifestations of standards include things such as grid codes for electricity generators and 
trading arrangements for electricity. Unruh (2000) refers to the `techno-institutional 
complex' that he believes is intimately bound up with `carbon lock-in'. 
Viewed in isolation, institutional lock in is rather difficult to discern. Institutional 
arrangements would differ by scenario. For instance the BiB scenario would require 
systems to manage nuclear waste and C02, the DGE scenario would not. The DGE 
scenario would require standards and regulations related to the connection of distributed 
generation, BiB would not. It is possible that both scenarios would require market rules 
rather different from those extant in Britain at the time of writing and different from each 
other. The BiB world would need to be conducive to investments in large and capital 
intensive projects, and the author has argued elsewhere that the way the British electricity 
market functions at present is not conducive to such investments (Gross, Heptonstall, & 
Blyth 2007). Other analysts have considered what form of market and market regulation 
might best suit decentralised generation (Mitchell & Woodman 2006). However it is not 
clear that such arrangements are of themselves a source of path dependence, though they 
would certainly be more likely to become so if institutional arrangements were particularly 
difficult to amend. For this reason it is important to understand the underpinnings of 
institutions in terms of factors such as skills, and educational facilities to provide them, 
investment and a range of other factors. These are reviewed in section 7.2.3, where the 
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concept of adaptive expectations is discussed. Adaptive expectations are important to 
understanding institutional lock-in, since institutions are underpinned by skills and 
expectations, and even by lifestyles (Unruh 2000). 
7.2.3 Adaptive expectations and mental frames 
Definitions 
Chapter 4 provides a definition of adaptive expectations that focuses on consumer choices; 
`as a leading design emerges consumer uncertainty is reduced and more consumers are 
encouraged to adopt the leading design, further encouraging its adoption and hence feeding 
back into yet more widespread use. ' However, expectations (and perceptions) are also 
important to investors, regulators, engineers. The discussion of increasing returns due 
learning or scale is fundamentally `economic'; concerned with relationships between scale 
or volume and price. Indeed, increasing returns effects can be modelled numerically 
(Arthur 1994) and learning can be quantified (IEA 2000). It was not necessary for the 
analysis above to explore any underlying factors related to learning, nor to comment on 
wider economic and societal factors such as the motivations of economic agents or 
economic power. Indeed the literature on learning effects explicitly distances itself from 
the reasons for learning effects, focusing instead on the empirical evidence for learning 
(IEA 2000). Similarly the discussion of network externalities above dealt principally with 
technical differences in the networks required for the DGE and BiB scenarios. 
By contrast, the literature on adaptive expectations and a range of other factors, such as 
what Dosi terms the `mental frames' of agents in a technical system (Dosi 1997), is 
inherently more `sociological'. It is concerned with what motivates different categories of 
actor in an economic system, the power relationships between firms, consumers, 
policymakers and psychological factors such as education, skills and openness to change. 
For example Unruh's (2000) discussion of `carbon lock-in' encompasses market and social 
power, the relationships between interest groups, `capture' of regulators by the regulated, 
the `rules of thumb' experts use to address problems and the role of knowledge based 
institutions in shaping institutions, expectations and so on. 
In order to assess the extent to which such factors will lead to path dependent differences 
between our two scenarios I am going to focus on consumer, investor and firm level 
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expectations, skills and knowledge, and knowledge based institutions. I will avoid 
commentary on issues such as the relationship between regulator and the regulated, vested 
interest and `capture', market power or power relations between social groups. This is not 
because such issues don't matter, they matter greatly and can have very important 
consequences for investment in energy technologies (see for example (Walker 2000)). 
However it is hard to speculate in any meaningful way about such factors in the context of 
the scenarios described above. They are more useful in exploring responses to current 
`lock-in' (see e. g. Unruh 2002). 
Consumer expectations and investor confidence 
The principal difference between the scenarios from a consumer perspective is that in the 
DGE world domestic consumers and many individuals working in a wide range of 
commercial enterprises would be directly acquainted with energy conversion technologies. 
PV and CHP would be integrated into buildings and hence everyday life. It appears likely 
that consumer confidence in decentralised generation would need to be developed in order 
for the technologies to succeed on a large scale, as envisaged for the DGE scenario. The 
BiB world would not expose consumers to such technologies, so a form of `lock-out' 
might emerge. Consumer confidence in decentralised generation would not arise in the BiB 
world, and its absence could provide a barrier to adoption of decentralised generation. 
However, the BiB scenario could only come to pass if the public at large were accepting of 
a new generation of nuclear power stations, and more accepting of geological of CO2 
pipelines and extensive utilisation of marine renewables. Lack of exposure to such 
technologies might also create a barrier to adoption, perhaps in the form of resistance to 
developments by local residents. The literature on public perception of wind turbines 
suggests that acceptance of wind farms increases with familiarity with the technology. 
Beyond the rather vague notions of `exposure' and `acceptance' it is difficult to draw any 
kind of firm conclusion about the significance of consumer expectations. It is not clear that 
there would be any meaningful differentiation between the scenarios in terms of consumer 
services. Consumer expectations as discussed in other analyses of path dependence tend to 
relate to factors that differentiate products such as reliability, performance and so on. 
These are absent in this instance, both scenarios meet identical demands for energy 
services. 
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The importance of investor confidence in new technologies, and expectations about 
policies and technologies has been highlighted in the literature on innovation (Foxon 2003) 
and analysis of energy policy (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). The scenarios are 
sharply differentiated in terms of the technologies that dominate in each, so investor 
confidence could provide a significant source of path dependence. Investors would be far 
more familiar with decentralised generation in the DGE world, and with large centralised 
facilities in the BiB world. Investor confidence (hence perceived risk) affects the cost of 
capital for investment and the `hurdle rate' (of return) that companies seek for different 
types of project. This in turn can have a profound impact on economics of different forms 
of generation, particularly when generation plant is capital intensive (Gross, Heptonstall, & 
Blyth 2007). Moreover the nature of investors would differ, since individuals and non- 
energy companies could own a large proportion of the `generating capacity' in the DGE 
world. By contrast and as noted in the previous section, in the BiB scenario policy and 
market arrangements would need to be conducive to the financing of large and capital 
intensive projects. As also noted above, present UK market and policy structures do not 
make capital intensive generation plant attractive to investors (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 
2007). For this reason the institutional and market arrangements would be likely to be both 
different from those at the time of writing, and very different in each scenario. This may be 
an important potential source of path dependence and lock-in that is differentiated by 
scenario. 
Knowledge sets, skills and training 
Analysts of path dependence highlight the importance of `knowledge based institutions' 
(Dori 1997). It is possible to delineate a whole range of skills and knowledge sets that 
would be needed in one scenario but not the other; skills and training at all levels related to 
nuclear physics and engineering, waste management, safety are all needed in BiB but not 
DGE. BiB would also require the skills for development of CCS on a much larger scale 
and on power stations. By way of contrast the DGE world would require a legion of trained 
electricians and plumbers, able to install and maintain PV and small scale CHP. Electrical 
engineering capabilities related to decentralised generation, including the operation of 
storage devices would be needed. Manufacturers of PV and CHP plant would need 
appropriately skilled personnel. The extent to which such considerations constitute lock-in 
is not easy to quantify. They have the potential to be important sources of lock-in, since it 
will take anything from a few months to many years to train individuals, depending on the 
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skill set in question. Moreover training and education facilities and staff will need to be in 
place as appropriate, and these also require time and investment to develop. However it is 
also possible that both sets of skilled personnel, skilled trainers, underpinning intellectual 
capital, and education and training institutions could co-exist. 
Even more difficult to assess quantitatively, but perhaps as important, are the `mental 
frames' and `rules of thumb' that are associated with particular skill sets, technologies and 
processes. These have also been referred to as `technological paradigms' (Dosi 1997) and 
`technological frames' (Nelson & Winter 1977; Perkins 2003). Several analysts have 
highlighted the importance of these aspects of behavioural lock-in in terms of their impact 
on the behaviour of firms when faced with radically different competitor innovations (Dosi 
1997). The response of learned societies and professional bodies to consultations over the 
future of energy systems is often cautious and conservative, stressing the difficulties in 
changing the status quo, the benefits of existing arrangements and propounding solutions 
that are established and well proven (see e. g. (Royal Academy of Engg 2003)). Analysts 
have highlighted the importance of these `mental limits' to thinking alternative 
technologies in general (Cowan 1990; Dosi 1997) and about solutions to carbon lock-in in 
particular (Unruh 2000). If we assume that mental frames evolve to suit the established 
status quo then if either of our scenarios came to pass it would be likely that expert 
practitioners would regard the alternate scenario as `radical' or infeasible. This might 
militate against developing the intellectual framework and training institutions required to 
develop both sets of knowledge and skills simultaneously. 
Changing everything? The techno-institutional complex 
Unruh's (2000) analysis of lock-in to high carbon provides a holistic assessment of the way 
in which many of the factors discussed above interact to create and compound lock-in. 
This is important, because it is not simply that each scenario separately requires different 
infrastructure, institutions, consumer and investor expectations, skills and training 
facilities, but also that each scenario requires all of these things to be different. They 
interact and reinforce one another in complex ways. For example investor confidence is in 
part determined by technical due diligence work, which is undertaken by experts, who 
must in turn have the right skills, which requires the right training facilities, and so on. The 
`mental frame' that the experts use to assess a technology will affect the view that they 
provide to investors, who will also have an expectation of investment behaviour, and so on. 
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Similar interactions can be drawn out for consumers, institutions and policy makers. One 
important point to note here is that lock-in may emerge not because one particular over- 
riding factor is especially powerful or important, but because a significant number and 
combination of effects, in the round, lead cumulatively to path dependence. 
7.3 The evidence for path dependence 
This chapter has identified a wide range of potential sources of path dependence, and 
highlighted how each of these has the potential to encourage lock-in to one or other of the 
scenarios presented in Ch. 6. Moreover the sources of path dependence are interrelated, 
and may reinforce one another. In table 7.1 this relationship between the sources of path 
dependence and the key findings from the scenarios are summarised. 
Table 7-1: Summary of path dependency in the energy system scenarios 
Path dependence Scenario Comments 
criteria BiB DGE 
Increasing returns due Nuclear power stations, Manufacturing of Scale economies 
to economies of scale power stations with CCS, decentralised generation. and learning effects 
marine RE. can both deliver 
lock in, but differ 
in that learning 
effects are more 
difficult to reverse. 
Increasing returns to Learning in C&S, marine Learning in small scale Potential for `lock- 
adoption through and nuclear. renewables and CHP out' in the absence 
learning effects systems. of market growth. 
Potential also for 
'winner takes all' 
in the presence of 
strong market 
growth. 
Network externalities CCS network Distribution networks Infrastructures not 
adapted to small scale mutually exclusive 
Electric heating renewables and CHP. per se, but cost 
associated with 
Transmission system option to maintain 
upgrade both. 
Adaptive expectations Investment conditions Consumer acceptance of Consumer 
conducive to investment in small scale RE and CHP. expectations not 
large scale and capital strongly 







Mental frames or Nuclear power station Active management of Strongly 
knowledge clusters operation and waste distribution networks. differentiated by 
management scenario. 
Installation of PV and 
Transmission system CHP Interaction of 
operation institutions, skills, 
Manufacture of PV and training facilities 
Load management CHP and mental frames 
is important 
CCS on power stations Load management/storage 
Limitations and further work 
The analysis set out above provides compelling evidence that when taken in the round 
there is significant potential for path dependent development that differs between the 
scenarios developed in Ch. 6. However this analysis is indicative rather than definitive. It 
points up lots of potential sources of path dependence, but cannot determine for certain 
whether and to what extent each will occur. As noted above, it is possible that several of 
the path dependence driving effects could be over-ridden. For instance, both large and 
small scale technologies could be integrated into the electricity network given adequate 
investment, and training in technologies and systems common to both scenarios could be 
provided to engineers and installers. Some of the sources of path dependence do appear to 
be more difficult to overcome; particularly the risk of `lock-out' if learning does not take 
place and the influence of `mental limits' or technological paradigms on how technologies 
are viewed by experts and investors. However, the sum and interaction of different 
potential sources of lock-in is also important; it is the combined impact of a range of 
individual effects that is likely to result in lock-in. 
A range of approaches could be tried in order to quantify path dependence more precisely. 
The potential to endogenise some increasing returns effects, such as learning rates, in 
numerical models like Markal was noted above. It might be possible to build some form 
of `agent based' model (Wooldridge 2002) of the energy system, which incorporates some 
of the more behavioural positive feedbacks described above and in Ch. 4. The advantage of 
using agent based modelling is that agents could be programmed with the characteristics of 
adaptive expectations, such as a greater willingness to adopt a product given greater 
adoption of it by other agents. Multiple model runs would allow any tendency toward path 
dependence to be explored. Arthur (1989) models the impact of learning effects 
quantitatively, finding multiple equilibriums under conditions of increasing returns. 
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Similar effects can be demonstrated using a range of `random walk' and `choice games' 
such as `bandit games' (from `one armed bandit' gambling machines) (Cowan 1991). An 
agent based model would extend and enrich such analysis to include the behavioural 
drivers of path dependence. 
Implications for policy 
If, as seems reasonable, we accept the existence of path dependence that is differentiated 
by scenario, the question arises as to how best policymakers should deal with it. The first 
point to note is that policymakers can take active steps to ameliorate, guard against or 
delay the risk of making the wrong choice. Physical networks could be made compatible 
with a broad range of technologies, learning facilities, institutions, could be designed as far 
as possible to be inclusive. It is less clear how adaptive expectations amongst investors and 
consumers could be managed by government, but both are partially determined by 
institution and regulation. Avoiding lock-in would have costs - direct costs (infrastructure, 
technology learning) and opportunity costs (since some increasing returns would be 
foregone). Sooner or later it is not economically rational to attempt to avoid lock-in 
altogether. One important implication of path dependency analysis is what some analysts 
have described as the `paradox of entrenchment'; in order to escape from a condition of 
lock-in to one system or technology the conditions that allow lock-in to another must be 
put in place (Marechal 2007). 
In chapter eight, the implications of these considerations are discussed with regard to the 
principles of policy intervention, and existing policies in the UK and elsewhere. 
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8 Path dependency and policy options 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter attempts to bring together the analysis undertaken in the preceding 
sections and apply it to policy choices in the UK and elsewhere. Its primary objective is to 
consider what, if anything, policymakers might do about path dependence and the 
existence of radically different possibilities in terms of future energy systems. It begins by 
reviewing historical policy development in energy markets and existing thinking on 
policies to address climate change and then considers what might change in the light of the 
analysis of energy system scenarios and path dependence provided in the chapters above. 
8.2 Recent policies and a classification of intervention 
Recent policy developments relevant to UK climate goals include amongst many (Defra 
2006; DTI 2003b; DTI 2007b): 
- The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
- The EU Renewables Directive 
- The Energy Efficiency Commitments (to become Carbon Reduction Targets) 
- The Climate Change Levy 
- The Renewables Obligation (RO) 
- The Large Combustion Plants Directive and other pollution control regulations 
- Consultation over measures to address barriers to new build for nuclear power 
-A commitment to the development or demonstration of carbon capture and storage 
- New funding for RD&D in energy technologies 
- Vehicle Excise duty differentials based on CO2 emissions 
- Company car tax differentials based on CO2 emissions 
This list is not exhaustive. However it illustrates that the policies aimed at promoting a 
lower carbon energy system are diverse and target a range of sectors using a range of 
approaches. The Stern Review provides a classification of interventions that links climate 
policy objectives to policy instruments. This is threefold (Stern 2006): 
197 
1. Measures to price carbon (including taxes, levies and permit trading schemes). 
2. Measures to overcome non-price or behavioural barriers to the adoption of lower 
carbon technology (including product standards, information provision, labelling) 
3. Measures to promote innovation in low carbon technology (RD&D, measures to create 
niche markets) 
In the sections that follow the potential for path dependence to change the relative 
importance of each of these categories of intervention, or indeed to require new forms of 
intervention or analysis are reviewed. Before considering the implications of path 
dependence for policy, it is helpful to revisit the fundamental tenets of energy policy, and 
the historical development of energy policies. 
8.2.1 The history of and basic rationale for intervention in energy markets 
Policymakers have intervened in electricity and gas markets from the earliest days of 
electricity generation and networks for gas (initially in the UK so called town gas, 
produced from coal, then natural gas). As noted in Ch. 3 it is possible to identify three 
principal rationales for intervention in these markets, reviewed in Box 8.1. (PIU 2002b): 
- market failure, such as the `natural monopoly' status inherent in electricity networks, or 
environmental damage such as acidification and climate change 
- social/equity issues 
- geopolitical and security of supply concerns (which may also include support for 
domestic resources or technologies) 
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Box 8.1 Rationale for intervention in electricity markets (from Gross et al 2007) 
1. Market failure of three main kinds (monopoly, environment, innovation) 
- `Natural monopoly'; the `network' characteristics of electricity and gas systems preclude the 
operation of wholly competing power systems. At different points in history this has been 
justification for creation of nationalised monopoly and for regulation to create and maintain 
competitive markets in power generation and supply. 
- Negative environmental externalities; since in many cases the damage costs of pollution associated 
with energy production are not captured in costs of generation these may also be viewed as market 
failures. Environmental problems have been tackled in a range of ways over time. Historically 
regulation was the preferred route (and with some notable successes such as controls on smoke and 
SO2 emissions); more recently fiscal incentives and market based instruments have been introduced 
(see text). 
- Positive externalities of innovation; there is a long standing economic rationale for public investment 
in RD&D that relates to the public good characteristics of innovation. For example, investment made 
now in a new technology may lead to future cost reductions in that technology - which will benefit 
future investments. Private investors may not be able to fully capture the benefits to society of 
developing new products, hence under-invest in innovative effort. Recent academic work and policy 
documents have focused on innovation in the context of energy policy, particularly the development 
of low carbon options (see e. g. Anderson et al 2001 and Stern 2007). 
2. Equity/distributional effects 
- Energy policy may need to address issues linked to social equity, including the potential for both 
geographical and economic exclusion from access to energy services. Policy may therefore use direct 
or cross subsidy to provide access to energy services for poorer consumers and/or to finance 
connection for those in remote locations. 
3. Security/geopolitics 
- Energy policy may need to impose measures to ensure security of supply, and a degree of resilience 
to threats resulting from geopolitics, technical faults and natural phenomena (severe weather or 
natural disaster). This is often linked to the promotion of diversity (both technology and locational 
diversity) in the electricity generating mix, and may include measures to ensure adequate levels of 
reserve generation capacity are available on the system. 
- In the specific case of nuclear power, governments also intervene for reasons of safety and with 
respect to concerns about proliferation of weapons usable materials (IAEA 1970; SDC 2006). 
The role of policy in oil and coal markets has not followed the same pattern as electricity 
and gas. Although very much subject to policy intervention, oil and coal have tended to be 
treated as strategically important commodities rather than natural monopolies. 
Nevertheless they have also been subject to nationalisation and privatisation, subsidy and 
regulation, and markets for both are now affected by a range of policies such as the climate 
change levy, large combustion plants directive and EU ETS. 
Historical developments and changing energy policy priorities 
The principles outlined above and in Box 8.1 have sustained through time over many 
decades and have relevance to energy policy irrespective of market arrangements or 
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ownership structures. However, they have been interpreted and acted upon in very different 
ways at different points in history. The resulting policy mix is complex, and it is useful to 
consider how and why different objectives and different delivery mechanisms have 
emerged over time. 
The idea that electricity and gas systems are `natural monopolies' played a predominant 
role in regulation and policy from an early stage in each industry's development. The view 
that state ownership of such monopolies was in the public interest underpinned the 
nationalisation of the electricity industry that took place in many countries from the 1940s 
(Hannah 1982). The British experience with natural gas was also one of public ownership 
of the onshore supply infrastructure. In many countries state ownership and/or regulated 
monopoly status helped finance the large investments needed to achieve economies of 
scale, allowing a planned expansion of electricity output and gas service intended to fuel 
economic growth and provide universal, affordable and reliable service (Chesshire 
1996; Helm 2003). For many decades, at least until 1979, this industrial structure seemed 
`normal' and was not challenged politically (Helm 2003). Yet in the late 1980s the 
approach to monopoly changed, in large part for ideological reasons30, from state 
ownership to the facilitation of competitive markets. This also reflected a shift in emphasis 
as electricity and gas systems matured; from system expansion to improving economic 
efficiency, partly through competition (Surrey 1996). Changes to policy have also occurred 
as a reaction to `shocks' such as fuel price volatility and environmental problems, or 
concern about increasing import dependence and the impact of market developments on 
the fuel supply mix used in generation. However by the late 1990s there was widespread 
political consensus in Britain on the need to tackle such problems through the operation of 
private markets. 
The relationship between liberalisation and energy policy objectives 
Throughout the 1990s the predominant focus of UK energy policy was market 
liberalisation, increasing the amount of competition in the emerging electricity generation 
market and unbundling the gas supply and retail markets. Environmental problems were 
addressed through regulation such as the Large Combustion Plants and Integrated Pollution 
30 The belief that markets and private investment are in general more efficient at delivering goods and 
services and that state involvement in all markets ought to be kept to a minimum was highly significant when 
electricity industries were privatised (Helm 2003; Hutton 1996). 
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Prevention and Control Directives (EC 2001; HMSO 2000). A number of interventions 
served to address particular political concerns, or difficulties related to liberalisation 
31. It 
has been observed that during the 1990s liberalisation served most policy objectives 
simultaneously; reducing costs and emissions, diversifying supplies (PIU 2002b). More 
recently however, market drivers and policy imperatives appear to have diverged. Some 
commentators even suggest that energy policy goals are no longer fully compatible with 
market imperatives (Helm 2003). In particular, increasing concern about climate change 
has given rise to new policy measures and a reformulation of policy goals. Hence, in 2000 
UK Energy Policy was summarised as follows (DTI 2000b): 
`To ensure secure, diverse and sustainable supplies of energy at competitive prices' 
By 2003, the Energy White Paper recast energy policy with a specific focus on climate 
change, as follows (DTI 2003b): 
- to put ourselves on a path to cut the UK's carbon dioxide emissions - the main 
contributor to global warming - by some 60% by about 2050, as recommended by the 
RCEP, with real progress by 2020 
- to maintain the reliability of energy supplies 
- to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise the rate of 
sustainable economic growth and to improve our productivity 
- to ensure that every home is adequately and affordably heated. 
In the period since 2003, concerns related to overall levels of electricity generating 
capacity, access to natural gas resources and concentration of investment in gas-fired 
power generation have played a prominent role in policy analyses (DTI 2007b). Whilst the 
`four pillars' of policy introduced in 2003 have not changed, their relative importance may 
have shifted - with security/reliability of supply becoming a higher priority, particularly 
for the electricity and gas sectors (Ibid). 
31 E. g. The non-fossil fuel obligation which provided a subsidy for nuclear generation, and the temporary 
moratorium on gas fired generation put in place in the late 1990s in part to protect the British coal mining 
industry (House of commons 1998; Mitchell & Connor 2004) 
201 
The impact of changing models of intervention on policy instruments 
As goals change the targets for and means of intervention shift. New policy goals led 
directly to many of the policies reviewed at the start of this section. Concern about climate 
change led to policies such as the Climate Change Levy or Renewables Obligation. 
However, policy changes can also reflect changing models of intervention; analyses of not 
just why or whether to intervene but how to do so. For example the emergence of 
economic concepts related to pollution abatement (Pearce 1991) have had a fundamental 
impact on the design of policy and emerging understanding of which policy instruments 
are most effective. 
An influential set of economic arguments has led to increasing use of market based 
instruments (MBIs) such as permit trading schemes in areas that might historically have 
been dealt with through direct regulation, notably environmental problems (The Royal 
Society 2002). These arguments turn upon the idea that markets reveal efficient solutions 
whereas central planners do not. They also play well to the fact that in most cases British 
governments prefer to avoid technologically prescriptive interventions. There is an oft- 
stated aversion (at least in the UK) to `picking winners'(DTI 2006e; Gross, Heptonstall, & 
Blyth 2007; PIU 2002b; Watson 2006). This appears to have its origins in a perception of 
high profile `failures' during the 1970s and 80s that resulted from commercially 
unsuccessful attempts by governments to use state funds to back technologies such as 
supersonic aircraft or prop up ailing industries (steel, cars, shipbuilding) or indeed new 
companies making sports cars in Northern Ireland. 
Despite the failures of the 1970s policy analysis has begun to re-engage with interventions 
that have a degree of technological specificity, and UK policy has endorsed the argument 
that policymakers need to actively promote innovation (Stern 2006), which cannot be 
entirely `technology blind' for reasons discussed below. Support for Research and 
Development (R&D) is well accepted on grounds of public good, but more recent attention 
has focused on the importance of learning by doing, and the role for niche markets created 
by policy (Foxon 2003). The case for a more direct approach to promoting innovation was 
set out in detail in an earlier report by the author and colleagues (Anderson, Clark, Foxon, 
Gross, & Jacobs 2001). These are: 
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" The problem of time lags. Whilst the standard instruments of environmental policy - 
fiscal and regulatory measures - have led to substantial environmental improvements, 
this often takes a long time, sometimes decades. Support for innovation can bring 
forward investments in cleaner technologies more quickly, and lead to environmental 
problems being solved sooner. 
" Risks and uncertainties of costs and benefits. The long-term effects of climate change 
on the environment and human activity are far from being fully understood. We do 
know that they are likely to span several centuries and will be irreversible, but this in 
itself gives rise to difficulties in quantification, since complex issues of 
intergenerational equity arise. Hence, we do not know the benefits of mitigating 
climate change to within one, or perhaps two or more orders of magnitude. The costs of 
mitigation are also uncertain, since we cannot know in advance how successful 
attempts to reduce the cost of low carbon options will be. As a result, it is not possible 
to determine in advance exactly what the level of abatement (through caps or 
regulations) or the price of carbon emissions should be. 
" Value of creating options. It is still possible to begin to internalise costs, as the Kyoto 
accord, the European carbon trading scheme and domestic policies will do. But in this 
uncertain situation, the principles of investment and policy making under uncertainty 
also point to the exploration of options. Innovation policy is therefore a robust response 
to uncertainty and risk, because it can create options that would not otherwise exist, or 
alternatively bring options forward in time, whilst ensuring that the marginal cost of 
addressing environmental problems can be reduced over time. 
" Positive externalities of innovation. The cost reductions arising from innovation accrue 
to future investors and users of the technology, and are not fully captured by the firms 
or individuals investing in innovation. Whilst this is true to a degree of all innovative 
activity, in the case of environmental innovation the environmental benefits in question 
accrue to society as a whole. This adds an additional dimension of external benefit, and 
further supports the case for positive policy action to support innovation directly. 
In short, this work suggests that, in addition to measures such as carbon taxes and carbon 
permit trading schemes there is a good case for supporting innovation directly, both on 
environmental and economic grounds. This case applies strongly to sectors, such as 
renewable energy, that are characterised by immature technologies, a degree of lock in to 
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existing technological systems and the potential for strong societal benefit. As a result, 
there is an important overlap between concern about path dependence and policies that 
seek to promote innovation. Indeed innovation policy in part turns upon the existence of 
path dependent phenomena such as increasing returns to adoption. These interactions 
between innovation policy and path dependence are returned to below (Sect. 8.3) 
The author and colleagues built upon work concerned with the case for environmental 
innovation policy and considered the means by which policies to support innovation could 
be developed and extended. Much of this work is contained in a number of reports and 
papers related to UK support for renewable energy (Foxon, Gross, & Anderson D 
2003; Foxon & Gross 2003; Foxon et al. 2005). This work argues amongst other things that 
the UK should seek to learn from the Dutch `transitions management' approach (Foxon 
2003; Kemp, Schot, & Hoogma 1998; Kemp, Smith, & Becher 1998). More specifically it 
argues in favour of measures that provide support (particularly market opportunities) for 
emerging technologies in the `demonstration' and `pre-commercial' phases (see Foxon 
2003 for terminology) and for a set of policies that create support through and beyond the 
early stages of the innovation cycle. Many of these issues are also discussed in Ch. 16 of 
the Stern Review. However neither this work nor the transitions management approach 
deals specifically with the implications of path dependence and the concomitant 
requirement to confront head on a range of arguments related to `not picking winners', 
which are explored in Sect. 8.3. 
There is also a body of literature on policy measures to overcome barriers to the adoption 
of lower carbon options. An important set of arguments related to non-price market failure 
have emphasised a range of barriers to the adoption of energy efficient end use devices in 
particular (PIU 2002a; PIU 2002b; Stern 2006). These can prevent, or delay, adoption of 
lower carbon technologies even once they achieve technological maturity and become cost 
competitive. Such barriers are particularly prevalent in the case of energy efficient end use 
technologies. There is considerable evidence that cost effective energy efficiency 
improvements in buildings, appliances and vehicles are not widely or rapidly adopted even 
where they offer a net economic benefit over less efficient alternatives. A range of market, 
institutional and behavioural barriers has been identified, along with policy options that 
help to overcome them (PIU 2002a). Since many barriers are either 'non-price' or non- 
market they also require policy interventions that go beyond the standard approach of 
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seeking to internalise external costs. One important consequence is that regulation 
continues to play a strong role in many aspects of electricity supply markets and in the 
markets for many end use appliances, vehicles and in buildings. 
Hence our review of the historical development of policies in response to events and in 
response to new analyses brings us back to the three way classification provided by Stern: 
price carbon, promote innovation and overcome barriers to adoption. 
There is little reference to path dependence in most UK policy documents, although the 
Stern review notes the potential for increasing returns to create lock-in (Stem 2006, Ch. 
16). The Stem Review also refers specifically to the longevity of energy assets as a source 
of lock-in, arguing that accelerating the development of lower carbon technologies can 
help avoid such lock-in. This is a perfectly valid and sensible line of argument, but the next 
section considers whether path dependency might have additional implications for policy. 
8.3 Issues for policy under conditions of path dependency 
The principal issue that arises from the path dependence arguments outlined in Ch. 4 and 
revisited in the light of energy system scenarios in Ch. 7 is that there is a trade off between 
the potential for increasing returns to reduce costs and ease the transition to low carbon, 
and the risk of `regret' as a result of lock in to an undesirable outcome. Foray (1997) has 
characterised the problem in terms of a four box matrix, with axes going from 
technological uniformity to diversity and from early choice to delayed choice, as in Figure 
8.1 below. This shows the central dilemma very well - early lock-in may result in the 
`wrong' option being selected (top left), whilst indefinite option creation and preservation 
means the potential advantages of increasing returns cannot be fully realised (bottom 
right). He suggests that the optimal policy is to transit from the top right to bottom left box, 
but even then notes that there is some potential for regret due to lock-in based on choices 
made under previous conditions. 
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Figure 8-1: Foray's quadrant (Foray 1997) 
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Hence it may be that an active pursuit of option maintaining policies is needed to allow for 
options applicable to both scenarios to emerge and benefit from increasing returns until it 
is possible to know more about the relative merits of either. But what would this mean in 
practice in the British environment, where energy industries are in private, competitive, 
ownership? How can the role of markets in selecting technologies be reconciled with what 
appears to be a need for centralised monitoring of technology performance and a central 
planner making strategic technical choices? 
8.3.1 Categories of intervention 
In countries with privately owned energy industries governments cannot determine what 
technologies and systems get built, but they do have a very strong role in shaping the path 
of investment through regulation of energy markets and through a range of incentive 
schemes. As noted above, the Stern Review cites the risk of lock-in as an important 
rationale for innovation policy. It is important to note that the Review is making a case for 
policymakers to pursue measures additional to pricing carbon, particularly to promote 
innovation directly (Stern 2006, Ch 16). This is an important argument, as many 
economists within the British policymaking community have tended to see carbon pricing 
as the sole, or `first best' mechanism for addressing carbon dioxide emissions ((Stern 
2006), (Watson 2006), author's experience working on the 2002 Energy Review (PIU 
2002)). Hence a policy review that explicitly supports innovation policy is departing from 
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economic and (British) policymaker orthodoxy (for an example of the orthodox view see 
the citation of the Interdepartmental Analysts Group in (Watson 2006)). 
Stern was seeking to lay out the rationale for innovation policy and perhaps to defend it 
from `economic purists' who might prefer that price signals alone are used to pursue 
environmental goals. The Stem Review did not set out to address path dependence directly 
or in depth. However it follows from Foray's analysis of path dependence that support for 
innovation alone is neither the only potential response nor necessarily the best response to 
path dependence. Indeed it is possible that over emphasis on innovation policy could risk 
trapping policy in the bottom right section of Foray's quadrant, `excessive diversity', by 
forever creating options and never selecting (or allowing market processes to create) 
`winners' that do in time benefit from increasing returns and become dominant. The impact 
of path dependence on the existing policy mix could be dealt with by policymakers in a 
number of ways (author's classification): 
1. `Laissez faire' or economic orthodoxy: this approach would entirely avoid any active 
response to path dependence, whilst putting economic signals such as carbon taxes in 
place to correct the environmental externality. This might be consistent with a view 
that the implications of path dependence are too difficult to anticipate and government 
is therefore best advised to `keep out of the way'. As such, it would also be entirely 
consistent with the arguments of Liebowitz and Margolis that path dependence is only 
relevant to policy if it can be anticipated, and is `remediable' (Liebowitz & Margolis 
1995a) (see Ch. 4). Liebowitz and Margolis argue that in most instances path 
dependence cannot be understood or effectively guarded against in advance, and is 
therefore of limited interest to policymakers. We are therefore left with the `orthodox' 
economic response of pricing (static) externalities. 
It is not clear whether this approach would be consistent with the arguments in the 
Stem review and elsewhere related to the promotion of innovation, since for reasons 
explored in more detail below it is not possible for innovation policies to be entirely 
technology neutral. The approach certainly carries risks, such as locking into high 
carbon options, making future mitigation more costly. Alternatively it may imply 
forcing carbon prices up to `economic shock' levels before action on low carbon 
options is possible. Nevertheless it also avoids important policy risks related to picking 
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winners and premature lock in to the `wrong' option. As such it is an important 
potential response, discussed further below. 
2. Create options and hold them open: this approach would promote innovation, using a 
range of interventions discussed below, seeking to move technologies from their 
infancy into niche markets and ultimately commercial deployment. However `holding 
options open' creates an additional challenge, since it implies actions that not only 
bring technologies to market but also seek to avoid (or at least delay) the emergence of 
dominant technologies. For the reasons discussed in Ch. 7 this might be problematic, or 
costly to achieve. As explained, there are direct and opportunity costs associated with 
any effort to `head off' the effects of increasing returns to adoption or the various 
network externalities that might begin to emerge around a successful new technology. 
Holding options open risks locking into the bottom right of Foray's quadrant; 
`excessive diversity'. 
3. Create options, gather data, and optimise: This option is the explicit attempt to transit 
from the top right to bottom left of Foray's Quadrant, following the arrow in the 
quadrant at the point in time where the trade off between diversity and learning is 
optimised. In principle this would be the optimal approach, but it may be impossible to 
achieve in practice. Mechanisms for selecting the successful technologies would need 
to be carefully considered as there could be a tension between a government avoiding 
technologically prescriptive interventions and attempting to ensure that premature lock 
in by market processes is avoided. Issues related to `picking winners' are at the heart of 
this problem, as discussed further below. 
Neither category 2 or 3 is inconsistent with carbon pricing as envisaged in category 1, 
but both seek to do more in response to path dependency than merely respond to the 
snapshot offered by economic orthodoxy about getting `prices right'. 
4. Leap of faith: this approach is basically one of explicit and intentional `winner 
picking'. It would entail a judgement being made at an early stage about the potential 
importance or potential of an emerging technology. Governments could then provide 
regulatory support or subsidy, incentives for appropriate infrastructure and political 
commitment to the favoured option or options, thus stimulating early adoption and 
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seeking to maximise the potential for increasing returns effects to decrease costs and 
increase performance. Increasing returns are maximised and, provided the technologies 
chosen are the best option, costs are lowest and performance highest. However this 
approach brings the highest risk if governments make the `wrong' choice, since it 
would maximise lock-in to the inferior technology. Again this creates important issues 
related to `picking winners', which are discussed below. 
The prospective responses to path dependence for policy therefore range from a largely 
`hands off approach that avoids technologically prescriptive intervention and any form of 
judgement about path dependent processes entirely, to one where path dependence is 
embraced, on the basis that winners can be chosen. It is not possible to discuss path 
dependence and policy further without a more detailed investigation of a range of issues 
related to whether policy can or should `pick winners'. Doing so is aided by an 
understanding of the extent to which existing policies are or are not technologically 
neutral. The next section therefore considers existing policies and the `picking winners' 
debate. 
8.3.2 Existing policies and `picking winners' 
As already noted, the idea that governments must not attempt to pick winners predominates 
in recent UK policy thinking, but this has begun to be challenged in the literature (Watson 
2006). Watson points out that picking winners is actually a very desirable thing to do if it 
can be achieved, and that attention should be on the policy processes utilised for making 
technology choices. The existence of high profile commercial `losers' picked by British 
governments in the past, such as supersonic commercial aircraft, appear to play a 
significant role in pronouncements about `not picking winners' However, they need not 
imply that policymakers always or necessarily make bad choices. Instead of a `ban' on 
such choices it would make more sense to assess why previous governments got it wrong, 
and seek to avoid such mistakes in future (Ibid). Watson also points out that the 
relationship between industry and government has changed dramatically since the 1970s, 
as a result of privatisation and liberalisation. This has the potential to allow much greater 
objectivity and transparency in any decisions to support particular technology types and 
removes many of the incentives to support `lame ducks' for political or social reasons. 
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Several commentators point out that many policies that espouse technological neutrality 
may in fact simply `pick' the nearest market option, since that is the only one that is 
attractive to investors (Gross, Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007; Mitchell & Connor 2004; Watson 
2006). In addition, as noted above, the author has argued elsewhere that a range of policies, 
both with low carbon objectives and in the energy security arena, cannot be made 
consistent with the notion that policy can always be technology neutral (Gross, 
Heptonstall, & Blyth 2007). If as Gross et al argue (Ibid) market forces continue to favour 
one particular technology, such as CCGT in electricity generation, then if (for example) the 
government wishes to promote diverse electricity supplies then it has to prescribe 
technologies or fuel types -- if only by prescribing `not gas'. Indeed prescribing `not gas' is 
to all intents and purposes the same as prescribing the next most cost effective option 
(particularly since avoiding a simple freeze on investment, as happened during the 
moratorium on gas fired generation imposed during the 1990s, may require government to 
provide additional incentives for alternative technologies). The current policy mix includes 
both technology specific and technology neutral interventions. Table 8.1 illustrates the 
importance of technology specific interventions in several policy areas, notably in 
promoting innovation. 
Table 8-1: Policy instruments, high level objective and technological specificity 
Option/intervention High level objective Technology 
specific? 
Price Overcome Promote 
carbon non market innovation/new 
barrier technologies'' 
Cap and Trade (e. g. EU Emissions trading yes no possible no 
scheme) 
Carbon tax (e. g. the climate change levy) yes no possible no 
RPS schemes (a cap and trade scheme to yes yes* 
support renewables such as the UK 
Renewables Obligation) 
Feed in tariff (a fixed premium scheme to yes yes 
support renewables, as used in Germany 
and elsewhere) 
Capital subsidy for demonstration of yes yes 
emerging technologies (for example the 
subsidies available for the first round of 
32 Innovation is indirectly induced by most policies, including carbon pricing and regulations however 
some policies are intended to promote innovation directly and these are the object of this column. 
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offshore wind developments in the UK) 
Grants for RD&D no no yes yes 
Direct regulation (e. g. pollution abatement 
regulations in electricity supply) 
yes yes yes (? ) ? 
Regulation (electrical appliances) no yes yes/? ? 
Labelling (electrical appliances) no yes yes/? ? 
Key to table 8.1 
? Possible depending on policy design 
* Technology neutral within a broad technology category unless banded by technology. At the time of 
writing the UK govt is moving to band the RO. 
It is apparent from Table 8.1 that it is impossible to meet policy goals related to promoting 
innovation directly without `picking winners' at least insofar as prescribing which 
technologies are deserving of special treatment. Moreover, policies exist which already do 
pick winners. The author contends therefore that any argument that proceeds from the 
premise that policymakers cannot or do not intervene in a technology specific way is 
misplaced or factually inaccurate. This is not the same as contending that as far as possible 
governments should leave technology choices to individuals and companies; in most cases 
this is almost certainly correct. Policy is not a choice between entirely prescriptive 
`command and control' and wholly neutral `price mechanisms'. Policies to promote the 
development of new technologies can leave a great deal to private sector decision makers. 
However, the notion that policies in response to path dependence (or indeed environmental 
problems per se) cannot or must not entail technological specificity is wrong. 
8.3.3 Existing policy goals and path dependence 
If the categorisation of responses path dependence provided above is to be useful to 
policymakers it needs to have some connection with the policies that are either being 
utilised already or might be available to policymakers. In addition, it is interesting to 
consider whether, and to what extent, existing policy instruments and policy 
goals/priorities already tend toward any of the approaches sketched above. Hence some 
aspects of the existing policy mix are discussed with reference to the categorisation 
responses provided in section 8.3. The objectives for this discussion are both to assess 
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whether existing policies comprise a coherent response to path dependence, and whether 
considerations linked to path dependence might be better incorporated into policy thinking 
through policy changes. For simplicity the discussion focuses largely on policies that 
directly relate to electricity generation mix and support for CHP, and are directly linked to 
climate change objectives, it does not deal with wider issues of energy market regulation. 
A relatively general list of policies linked to climate change was cited at the start of this 
chapter. However recent policy developments (November 2007) have focussed on a 
number of key technologies and technology/institutional areas that are relevant to this 
thesis. Focusing on those measures that target the stationary sector and are technology 
related these are (from (DTI 2006c; DTI 2006d; DTI 2007b; DTI 2007c; DTI & Ofgem 
2007)): 
- Support for nuclear power: `Facilitating measures' to reduce the regulatory risk 
associated with new nuclear power. The government has consulted on measures to ease 
the potential burden/ risk for investors in new nuclear power stations through changes 
to planning processes. For example site specific public enquiries would not be able to 
revisit issues related to reactor safety already assessed by the nuclear regulators or the 
strategic need for nuclear energy that had already been addressed through strategic 
policy decisions, such as the government's proposed National Policy Statements. The 
government also proposes to hold a strategic siting assessment process to identify 
locations where it is suitable for new nuclear to be built. Leaving aside any implicit 
subsidies related to accident liability limitation the government does not propose to 
provide financial support for nuclear power, but does stress the importance of a long 
term stable price for carbon, which it hopes to secure through negotiations over the 
future of the EU ETS. 
- Support for large scale renewables: `Banding' the Renewables Obligation and easing 
planning and grid connection constraints on the development of renewables. The 
government has consulted on proposals that would increase the amount of financial 
support that accrues to less developed technologies such as offshore wind and wave 
power whilst maintaining support for onshore wind and decreasing support for 
technologies such as land-fill gas generation that are technologically mature. It also 
proposes a number of other measures such as increasing the level of the Obligation up 
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to 20% with `guaranteed headroom' that aims to improve expected long term returns 
on investment in renewables. 
- Support for a range of micro-generation technologies. The government's low carbon 
buildings programme provides up to £86 million of subsidy for small scale generation 
of electricity and heat. The micro-generation strategy (and proposals in the subsequent 
review) also seeks to remove barriers to the adoption of small scale decentralised 
generation technologies, for example in terms of information provision, grid access, 
and ability to cost effectively secure the value of Renewable Obligation Certificate 
(ROC) sales under the Renewables Obligation. 
- Support for carbon capture and storage (CCS). The government has launched a 
competition for a demonstration scheme for CCS and has also examined barriers to 
CCS, assisted with amendments to the OSPAR convention on marine pollution to 
allow sub-sea CCS and is preparing a regulatory framework for CCS development. 
- Investment in networks. Since the Transmission System Operator and Distribution 
Network Operators are monopoly businesses their investments are tightly regulated. 
The government and the electricity regulator Ofgem have approved an expansion of 
investment in high voltage transmission capacity, largely as a result of the desire to 
expand renewables capacity in remote regions. Measures have also been proposed to 
facilitate offshore wind connections and to increase investment in local distribution 
networks. Ofgem has also indicated that it wishes to move toward `scenario planning' 
which would allow for future investment to be increased further, should the need arise. 
- Research and development. The government has increased direct funding for research 
in the energy arena, for example through the £27 million `Towards a sustainable energy 
economy' programme launched with the 2003 Energy White Paper, measures such as 
the £50 million Marine Renewables Deployment Fund (MRDF) and most recently 
through the creation of an `Energy Technologies Institute' joint funded by government 
and industry, with a current budget of £600 million, and a maximum budget of £1.1 
billion. 
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This list is not exhaustive. It neglects for example the government's contribution to various 
EU level research programmes, plans for renewable heat, and support for nuclear fusion. 
Nevertheless it suggests that the government favours the creation of a wide range of 
options. Indeed the Energy White Paper is explicit in its `aim to ensure that companies 
have a wide range of low carbon options available so we can retain a diverse energy mix. ' 
The government also has measures to directly price carbon, notably the Climate Change 
Levy and UK participation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. However it appears that 
existing policies do not follow Category 1 above, the `economic orthodox' approach alone. 
In seeking to promote a wide range of options the government also at least appears to be 
ruling out Category 4 above, the `picking winners' strategy. It therefore appears that at 
least at the time of writing the government is pursuing an approach that whilst embracing 
the notion of carbon pricing and perhaps most comfortable with the economic orthodoxy of 
Category 1 is in fact most compatible with Categories 2 and 3 above. At present the 
approach appears to be closer to Category 2, the White Paper talks of micro-generation 
largely in terms of its potential growth alongside conventional generation, for example. 
Government is actively pursuing option creation at present and various policy documents 
talk of the importance of creating options for industry to choose from. This emphasis on 
industry (private sector) choices appears to militate against moving policy closer to 
Category 3, which requires strategic (public policy) choices. However it is perfectly 
possible that government will in future revise its opinion of one or other of the 
technologies it currently supports, which would perhaps favouring further a perceived 
`leading contender' (not winner, of course). 
Despite this, it is important to note that the outcome of various policies in terms of path 
dependent development might be unexpected, and difficult to anticipate. The literature on 
path dependence provides examples where policies led to unanticipated lock-in, Cowan's 
example of lock-in to pressurised water reactors in civilian reactors appears to be the most 
often cited example (Cowan 1990). In favouring renewables (or indeed in failing to support 
them effectively due to deficiencies in the Renewables Obligation see (Gross, Heptonstall, 
& Blyth 2007; Mitchell & Connor 2004)), in seeking to bring forward new nuclear or 
support CCS, policies may have the effect of creating a cycle of increasing returns that 
rapidly renders one option greatly advantaged or excludes others from development. 
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The potential for `unwitting' commitment to a path of development brings us back, of 
course, to one of the central dilemmas of this thesis and indeed to the proposition at the 
end of Ch. 7- path dependent development is possible, hard to determine in advance, and 
can occur for a variety of reasons. Given that existing policy shows little awareness of path 
dependence it is not surprising that it is difficult to determine the path dependent effects of 
current policies. In the next section I consider a potential policy response to path 
dependence that might allow policymakers to direct policies deliberately towards Category 
3, above. However it is important to note that existing policies clearly do not fall into 
Category 1, nor do they appear to fall into Category 4 above. Irrespective of any direct 
attention to path dependence, policymaking has tended to steer away from both explicit 
winner picking and complete laissez faire approaches. 
Despite the uncertainty over outcome and at least apparent rejection of deliberate winner 
picking it is possible to speculate about the path dependent outcome of the relative weight 
of existing measures, or the centre of gravity in policy support. Subsidy for large scale 
renewables runs into the £l Os billion (cumulative support from the RO from now until 
2027) and the White Paper envisages a very substantive political and policy commitment 
to nuclear power. Yet concrete support for CCS is at present limited to a single 
demonstration scheme, the details of which are not known at the time of writing. Similarly, 
financial support for micro-generation is very modest in Britain in comparison with 
schemes in other countries (subsidies and feed in tariffs for PV in Germany for example 
(LEA 2003)) and the penetration of the most mature decentralised option - gas or biomass 
combustion based CHP - lags greatly behind leading countries (e. g. Denmark, which also 
uses feed in tariffs (DTI & Ofgem 2007)). The level of support available from the Low 
Carbon Buildings Programme is also relatively modest in comparison with the amount 
available for large scale renewables through the RO combined with various public 
spending commitments such as the capital grants for offshore wind and the MRDF. Hence 
it could be argued that whilst the government makes an ostensible commitment to diversity 
its policies actually already favour large scale renewables and nuclear power. Viewed 
through the lens of increasing returns and path dependence there may be potential for 
current policies to create an `early lead' for nuclear and/or large scale renewables, whilst 
more restricted policies to support decentralised generation lead to rather limited progress, 
and `lock-out'. One important question is whether outcomes such as this can be avoided, 
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given explicit policy attention to path dependence. The next section provides a discussion 
of policy responses to path dependence. 
8.3.4 A policy response to path dependence 
This section provides an examination of the possible implications of all the various issues 
discussed above, and in Chapters 4,6 and 7. The author suggests a four point approach to 
policy development in the light of path dependence: a new conceptual framing of the 
rationale for intervention; an attempt to assess the option value associated with diversity; 
the use of scenarios and models to explore path dependence; strategic choices in the light 
of improved information. 
Conceptual frameworks 
The first point that emerges from the analysis above is that policies need to explicitly 
embrace the notion that `history matters' and that because of path dependence we are 
already locked in to a high carbon energy system. Policy decisions can then be made 
explicitly on the basis of finding and pursuing routes forward rather than a static 
conceptualisation of `getting the prices right'. This reconceptualising has some policy 
precedent, particularly in the Stern Review (Stern 2006), but a relatively static economic 
analysis of climate change is still the predominant intellectual model in most countries and 
at the international policy level (Marechal 2007). 
Conceptual issues are not merely important from an academic perspective. They have 
profound implications for the nature of the policy mix. The `historical economics' (David 
2000) of path dependence provide a different starting point for policies; intervention is 
explicitly seeking to change the direction of technological change rather than correcting a 
market failure. Indeed to break out of lock-in to a high carbon system policy may even 
need to provide the conditions that create lock-in to a different system (Marechal 2007). 
The static economic approach characterised above as laissez faire (policy acts solely to 
price carbon), brings two distinct risks: The first is path dependent choice of `incumbent by 
default'. The second is that it requires that carbon prices need to increase dramatically 
before they can have any impact. A dichotomy is often manifest between economic 
modelling that draws upon `bottom up' engineering assessment of the technical 
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opportunities to reduce emissions and `top down' assessments that use equilibrium models 
of the energy economy. The former often highlights a plethora of low cost options, and the 
conclusion that if policies promote technological development mitigation costs will be low. 
The latter tends to focus on the short run inelasticity of demand in energy markets and the 
commensurate need for energy prices to rise to disruptive levels to precipitate change. 
Analysis that starts from historical analysis and allows for path dependence and lock-in 
provides a framework that explains how both approaches are correct. Effective utilisation 
of increasing returns processes will bring down costs, easing a transition to a different form 
of energy system, yet because lock-in is so profound use of prices alone will only work if 
prices are high enough to overcome lock in. The logic of path dependence also suggests 
that `backing a loser' can have profoundly negative consequences and attempting to pick 
winners (particularly at an early stage) is fraught with danger. Yet if policies are designed 
with the risk of wrong choices explicit and with overcoming lock-in as the primary goal, it 
is possible to devise strategies to overcome carbon lock-in. The objectives for policy have 
to be to create options, to allow flexibility to move between options and allow enough 
learning to take place in all options to provide the information to allow strategic choices to 
be made. 
Option value and transitions management 
The scenario analysis of Ch. 6 suggests that significant degree of co-existence of different 
options is possible from a network engineering perspective, although costs are associated 
with retaining the options (for example in maintaining long distance transmission capacity 
whilst building up decentralised generation). Ch. 7 contends that path dependence emerges 
primarily through increasing returns creating a situation of `winner takes all' or `lock-out' 
and as a result of complex and powerful institutional and psychological factors. Hence it is 
possible for policy to explicitly allow for `option value' when planning investment in 
electricity networks in particular. Techniques, such as `real options' to allow option value 
to be quantified might be utilised when assessing network investment (Blyth 2006; Blyth & 
Yang 2006; Dixit & Pindyck 1994). 
Explicit option creation/maintenance might also be feasible in terms of policies to create 
markets for new technologies, and in such instances techniques to assess the value of 
option creation could again be utilised. Policymakers could explicitly attempt to provide 
support for as wide as possible a range of potential low carbon technologies currently 
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under development. The preceding section noted that policies in Britain appear to lend 
greater support to large scale renewables than to small scale renewables. If this is correct 
then a first step towards an `option value' approach would be to even up the levels of 
support. 
A more sophisticated approach could make use of `strategic niches' as set out in work on 
`transitions management' to allow `learning spaces' (Foxon 2003; Kemp, Smith, & Becher 
1998). This approach would carefully target policies to technologies/options in order to 
facilitate learning. This approach has been trialled in parts of the Netherlands (Kemp & 
Loorbach 2005). As noted above it was also discussed by the author and colleagues in 
work for the DTI Renewables Innovation Review (Foxon, Gross, & Anderson D 
2003; Foxon & Gross 2003; Foxon, Gross, Chase, Howes, Arnall, & Anderson 2005). As 
discussed above the concept of a `niche' (inherently a relatively small market) may not be 
fully consistent with the idea that emerges from the analysis in this thesis that large scale 
adoption and increasing returns can combine to create `low carbon lock in'. Therefore it is 
important to consider carefully the extent to which the transition management approach 
overcomes the inherent tensions between picking winners and benefiting from increasing 
returns, and avoiding premature lock in as discussed above and in Ch. 7. A thoroughgoing 
analysis of the relationship between path dependence and transitions management is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but would provide a valuable extension to the work 
undertaken herein. 
Use of scenarios to assess path dependence 
If policy starts from the notion that lock-in is real and important it can make use of 
analyses that seek to understand its effects, and how policies will impact on it. For 
example, existing economic models (such as Markal, see the example of wind power in 
Ch. 7) can be used to explore some increasing returns effects such as learning by doing and 
using. More qualitative assessment is needed to explore the effects of institutional lock in 
and adaptive expectations described in Ch. 7. Taken together, such analyses could be used 
to build scenarios that explore path dependence in response to policies. Such scenario 
exercises would differ conceptually from the scenarios described in Ch. 6, since rather than 
seeking to examine the potential for path dependence they would seek to explore the 
results of policies (for example, policymakers could assess the implications of accelerated 
development of new nuclear, or wind, or CCS). The critical difference from existing 
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scenario activity would be in the attempt to make explicit representation of increasing 
returns and other path dependent processes in order to assess their implications for future 
energy systems. 
Strategic choices 
The primary objective of actions to create options, assess option value and to model path 
dependent outcomes is to provide enough information to allow strategic technological 
choices to be made. The logic of path dependence is that whilst option creation is a rational 
response to uncertainty at first the ultimate goal is to harness increasing returns in order to 
deliver low cost means to exit carbon lock in. This is the response to path dependence 
described in category 3 above, and is the trajectory indicated with an arrow in `Foray's 
quadrant' above. The policy goal is to combine experience and learning with scenario 
assessments to make informed choices about when to step up or scale down support. It is 
important to note that such judgements would be difficult to make consistent with the 
notion of technological neutrality in policy (not picking winners) discussed above. Slavish 
adherence to the notion that policy must not pick winners needs to be replaced with the 
development of policy processes designed to ensure that strategic choices are made on 
objective grounds, with transparency, freedom from political interference and to a 
predetermined timeline. A key requirement is to design and implement policy such that 
the strategic goal of creating options at first, then allowing winners to emerge is delivered 
without compromising investor confidence. 
8.4 Policy conclusions 
Path dependence and the existence of a range of potential energy futures have profound 
implications for policy, and policy can respond to the challenge of path dependent lock-in. 
However doing so requires a fundamental rethinking of the conceptualisation of 
intervention. Analysis needs to move from a static view to a dynamic or historical 
perspective and the notion of internalising external costs needs to be replaced, or at least 
augmented, by a new notion of exit from carbon lock-in. Designing effective policies to 
escape from carbon lock-in requires both the active pursuit of low carbon option creation 
and the development of processes that permit strategic choices between options, as 
information about their performance improves. New approaches to policy design will be 
required and a highly influential piece of received wisdom - that policy must never `pick 
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winners' - needs to be reassessed. Future policy analysis needs to assess path dependence, 
value options and develop policy processes that allow successful technologies to emerge. 
The final section of this thesis seeks to contextualise these policy conclusions within the 
main findings from the wider thesis and to provide a review of the main issues for further 
research. 
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9 Findings, conclusions and issues for further work 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to pull together the main findings from each of the sections above, 
particularly the review of the literature on path dependence (Ch. 4), assessment of low 
carbon options and scenarios for low carbon energy (Ch. 5,6) and review of implications 
for path dependence and policy (Ch. 7,8). It also provides an overview of the main 
limitations of the thesis, and issues for further work. Finally it provides a high level sketch 
of the `emergent conclusions' from the thesis, with a particular focus on the policy issues 
that the thesis grapples with. 
9.2 Summary of main findings 
This section reviews the main conclusions drawn in the chapters above, in some cases 
aspects of the chapter summaries are reproduced to aid exposition, but the section also 
seeks to synthesise across chapters in order to draw out more general conclusions. 
9.2.1 The importance of path dependence in energy analyses 
Path dependence and other developments in economics that seek to explain economic 
phenomena from an historical/evolutionary perspective have profound implications for 
analysis of future energy systems, including scenarios and other tools used to form views 
of the future. The conceptual underpinnings of arguments related to path dependence 
represent a marked departure from conventional `equilibrium economics', and path 
dependence has its critics. However, the arguments against path dependence do not deny 
the existence of increasing returns, but turn upon their importance, policy significance and 
whether lock-in to economically suboptimal outcomes can be anticipated ex ante, and 
avoided. These arguments have logical and epistemological flaws, but even if the 
arguments against path dependence can be upheld, they do not detract from its interest as a 
subject for scenario assessment. 
The case for lock-in to high carbon energy systems is particularly compelling, given the 
significance of increasing returns to adoption (as a result of both learning effects and 
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economies of scale), network externalities, adaptive expectations in investors, 
policymakers and consumers and mental frames in each of these categories and in 
technical specialists (see Ch 4 and 7 for definitions). However it is possible to assess the 
extent to which scenarios of energy futures might develop in a path dependent pattern, and 
a `test' for path dependence is presented in Ch. 4 and applied in Ch. 7. 
An important overall conclusion related to path dependence is that it matters greatly to 
energy policy, but is largely overlooked in mainstream energy policy analyses, perhaps 
because these usually follow a conventional economic route; assessing short run market 
failures and identifying externalities. In addition, it appears that it is the wide ranges of 
inter-related factors that can give rise to path dependence that in combination actually do 
give rise to path dependence. There is no single overriding source of path dependence, a 
point returned to below, in the light of the scenarios analysis. 
9.2.2 Low carbon options and scenarios 
Chapter 5 provides a review of low carbon technologies, and finds that there are both a 
wide range of options and a clear prima facie case for path dependence in the form of 
marked differences in the energy systems that different options best suit. Chapter 6 
explores these issues in detail, through two `low carbon worlds', `Big is Beautiful' and 
`Decentralised Gas'. Both worlds can deliver a 60% cut in CO2 emissions. Achieving the 
target emissions reductions throws up an interesting set of challenges, some scenario 
specific some generic. The generic challenge is the construction of a large amount of new 
plant, both electricity generation and for conversion of chemical, electrical or solar energy 
to heat (CHP and electric boilers). This is not a carbon emissions related challenge per se, 
since over a period of several decades new plant would be needed irrespective of climate 
change. The challenge for both scenarios is that the nature of the investment needs to be 
markedly different from what might be envisaged under `business as usual'. In addition a 
few generic points stand out: 
- Both scenarios require incremental technical progress. For example, to reduce the cost 
of renewables and expand the utilisation of CCS. 
- Both scenarios require the development of CCSfor the transport sector to supply 
hydrogen to large vehicles (buses and lorries). 
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- Neither scenario requires fundamental technological breakthroughs such nuclear 
fusion, hydrogen storage in cars, bio-hydrogen, superconductivity or advanced biomass 
based liquid fuels. Notably: 
- Neither scenario requires inter-seasonal storage of energy. 
The following points summarise the key scenario specific findings: 
The DGE world 
CHP and fuel cell efficiency and reduced losses were not sufficient to deliver deep 
emissions reductions. Achieving a 60% emissions reduction also requires extensive 
development of small scale renewables. Hence: 
Technological advancement in small renewables would be required. Several small scale 
renewable options are currently expensive in comparison to conventional generation, some 
markedly so (see Ch. 5). 
Development of fuel cell CHP or much more efficient micro turbines would be required. 
The scenario is predicated on CHP plants with high efficiency over a wider range of 
heat/power ratios that is typical of current designs of micro-CHP. 
Distribution networks must be upgraded. Electricity distribution networks will require 
upgrading and more sophisticated management of loads and decentralised generators. 
Storage is needed. Because of intermittency it is impossible to combine this world with a 
60% emissions reduction without electricity storage, probably embedded within 
distribution networks. 
Peaking plant is required. A relatively large capacity (14 GW) of peaking plant operating 
at a low load factor would be needed to maintain reliability and manage intermittency. 
The DGE world is not compatible with a large role for carbon capture and storage in the 
stationary sector since large power station point sources of CO2 emissions disappear. 
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The DGE world would be consistent with a considerable reduction in the capacity of the 
high voltage electricity transmission grid. Remote generating stations are removed, and 
much system balancing will be achieved locally. 
The BiB world 
The BiB world was able to deliver approximately 60% reduction in emissions through 
(approximate shares) 40% nuclear, 40% large scale wind and marine renewables and 20% 
CCS, and an expanded role for electrical heating. The following points stand out in 
comparison with the DGE world and with the year 2000 system: 
Technical advancement is required in marine renewables, nuclear power and CCS. The 
scenario is predicated upon a significant role for renewables that are at an early stage of 
development and CCS, which is unproven on a large scale. It also requires nuclear stations 
to partake in a degree of load following. 
Extension and expansion of electricity transmission is essential. The scenario requires an 
additional 26 GW and around 1000 km of transmission line capacity. However distribution 
network operation would be largely unaffected. The traditional unidirectional power flow 
local power networks would not need to be modified. 
Storage capacity could help manage intermittency, but is not essential. This is because the 
intermittency associated with the scenario could be accommodated by a combination of 
load following by CCS plants, peaking plant without CCS and a degree of load following 
by nuclear power stations. Management of loads would also help, since a significant 
problem is excess generation during periods of low demand. 
CCS infrastructure would be required. Logistically and economically it would make most 
sense if CCS stations were clustered around nodes for offshore piping of CO2 to 
repositories under the North Sea. This would also tend to favour the development of large 
or co-located stations, to optimise the use of CO2 pipelines. 
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Peaking plants are required. Whilst CCS plant could be installed in sufficient capacity to 
provide both system balancing and to maintain reliability the practicality and economics of 
CCS infrastructure militate against this. If CCS were to be operated on `baseload' then 
around 27 GW of peaking plant, operating at a very low load factor, would be required. 
The general issues for path dependence are summarised in Table 6.2, reproduced below. 
However it is important to note that the analysis of path dependence undertaken in Ch 7 
indicates that network incompatibilities are likely to be less significant than the combined 
effects of the other sources of path dependence. Given sufficient investment in network 
capacity it would be possible to develop both decentralised generation options and large 
scale renewables. Investment in networks has an option value, since it allows the continued 
development of a wider range of low carbon options. However it would impose additional 
costs, and may entail opportunity costs - particularly if cost reduction opportunities that 
might arise through series build, economies of scale or learning effects were foregone. 
Quantification of option value and costs would be a valuable area for additional research. 
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The scenarios deal solely with stationary energy use and use a particular set of energy 
service demand projection taken from the PIU Energy Review (2002). A wider range of 
demand scenarios would allow for an analysis of any relationships between path 
dependence in energy supply and trends in energy efficiency and conservation. For 
example would resource constraints impact upon the potential of the either scenario and 
impose a `both scenarios' energy system? This would provide a useful and interesting 
addition to the analysis provided in Ch. 6. The stationary sector was explicitly selected as a 
case study for path dependence, as was the focus on large vs small scale generation. 
However, the value of a study of transport path dependence was highlighted in Ch. 6 and it 
may be that other forms of path dependence in the stationary sector could emerge - for 
example divergent developments between different renewable options irrespective of their 
scale. Future work could also examine the potential for path dependence shared between 
the power and transport sectors, for example in the development of a CCS infrastructure 
serving both. Indeed it would be valuable to explore scenarios differentiated by the 
presence or total absence of CCS. The assumption of its presence in a transport sector 
common to both scenarios is a limitation of this thesis. 
The principal methodological limitation of the scenarios is that they deal with energy flows 
rather than power flows on the electricity network. As a result important issues related to 
system balancing and reliability could only be discussed with reference to existing 
literature. Another extension to the work undertaken in this thesis would be to assess the 
scenarios using an engineering model of the electricity network. An engineering-economic 
model would allow the costs and option values associated with different network 
configurations to be assessed. 
9.2.3 Implications of the scenarios for path dependence and implications of path 
dependence for policy 
Chapter 7 argues that when taken in the round there is significant potential for path 
dependent development that differs between the scenarios developed in Ch. 6. It is possible 
that several of the path dependence driving effects could be over-ridden. As noted above, 
networks appear less significant than other factors, since both large and small scale 
technologies could be integrated into the electricity network given adequate investment. 
Other sources of path dependence appear to be more difficult to overcome; particularly the 
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risk of `lock-out' if learning does not take place and the influence of `mental limits' or 
technological paradigms on how technologies are viewed by experts and investors. 
However, the sum and interaction of different potential sources of lock-in is also 
important; it is the combined impact of a range of individual effects that is likely to result 
in lock-in. 
Implications for policy 
If, as seems reasonable, we accept the existence of path dependence that is differentiated 
by scenario, the question arises as to how best policymakers should deal with it. The first 
point that emerges from the analysis above is that policies need to explicitly embrace the 
notion that `history matters' and that because of path dependence we are already locked in 
to a high carbon energy system. Policy decisions can then be made explicitly on the basis 
of finding and pursuing routes forward rather than a static conceptualisation of `getting the 
prices right'. 
Policymakers can take active steps to ameliorate, guard against or delay the risk of making 
the wrong choice. Physical networks could be made compatible with a broad range of 
technologies, whilst education provision and institutions could be designed as far as 
possible to be inclusive of a wide range of system types. It is less clear how adaptive 
expectations amongst investors and consumers could be managed by government, but both 
are partially determined by institution and regulation. Avoiding lock-in would have costs - 
direct costs (infrastructure, technology learning) and opportunity costs (since some 
increasing returns would be foregone). Sooner or later it is not economically rational to 
attempt to avoid lock-in altogether. One important implication of path dependency analysis 
is what some analysts have described as the `paradox of entrenchment'; in order to escape 
from a condition of lock-in to one system or technology the conditions that allow lock-in to 
another must be created. A key requirement is to design and implement policy such that the 
strategic goal of creating options at first, then allowing winners to emerge is delivered 
without compromising investor confidence. This means that the inherent tension between 
supporting innovation in new technologies and `not picking winners' needs to be faced up 
to. So called `transitions management' theory may provide one means by which to address 
such issues. The role and potential of the transitions approach could be reconsidered in the 
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light of the implications of the analysis set out in this thesis; this represents an important 
potential area of future research. 
Limitations on analysis and issues for further research 
The analysis in Ch. 7 is indicative rather than quantitative. A range of approaches could be 
tried in order to quantify path dependence precisely. A first step would be to endogenise 
some increasing returns effects, such as learning rates, in numerical models like Markal. 
It might be possible to build some form of `agent based' model of the energy system, 
which incorporates some of the more behavioural positive feedbacks described above and 
in Ch. 4. Multiple model runs would allow any tendency toward path dependence to be 
explored. Arthur (1989) models the impact of learning effects quantitatively, finding 
multiple equilibriums under conditions of increasing returns. Similar effects can be 
demonstrated using a range of `random walk' and `choice games' such as `bandit games' 
(from `one armed bandit' gambling machines) (Cowan 1991). An agent based model 
would extend and enrich such analysis to include the behavioural drivers of path 
dependence. 
It is also possible for policy to explicitly allow for `option value' when planning 
investment in electricity networks in particular. Techniques, such as `real options' to allow 
option value to be quantified might be utilised when assessing network investment and 
policies to allow learning to take place in a range of competing options. Scenario exercises 
could seek to explore the results of policies (for example, policymakers could assess the 
implications of accelerated development of new nuclear, or wind, or CCS). 
Policy analysis needs to consider the means by which the kind of strategic rethinking of 
policy might be delivered in reality. This is closely bound up with the more general 
conclusions that emerge from the thesis, discussed in the final section of the thesis, below. 
9.3 Overarching conclusions: Issues for policy 
The sections above provide a detailed review of findings and relate these to topics for 
future work. However, it is also interesting to reflect upon the overall thrust of the analysis 
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when the thesis is viewed not as a collection of parts but as a whole, looking for something 
analogous to what philosophers refer to as an `emergent property'. The thesis seeks to 
inform policy analysis, and it therefore makes sense to consider the policy issues that the 
thesis illuminates. This section sketches these highest level conclusions. In addition, the 
author's own thinking on the subject has evolved. Initially, technological specificities 
dominated (which systems and options were compatible with which others) to one where 
the relationship between the economic models of the world that underpin policy analysis 
and the real world dominates. In short, the real issue is whether inadequate conceptual 
frameworks for policy development are preventing the UK in particular from taking real 
steps to address the carbon/climate problem. 
Perhaps the most significant issue of all is the relationship between path dependent 
analyses, rooted within a school of thought that might be described as `historical' or 
evolutionary economics, and policy. The path dependent approach fundamentally recasts 
the climate policy problem. Instead of seeking to internalise an externality we are seeking 
to escape from carbon lock-in. This has been recognised in the policy literature (Unruh 
2000; Marachel 2007) but is only beginning to be recognised in policy developments. It 
features to a limited extent in the Stem Review but is not a feature of the Energy White 
Paper or Energy Review (DTI 2006e; DTI 2007b). The policy implications of path 
dependence are profound, since `correction' is not merely a matter of putting a price on a 
particular environmental cost but of providing the means by which low carbon options can 
develop to a point where lock-in can be broken. As a result policymakers need to do far 
more than price carbon, important though this is, and more than create options, important 
though this is, as I explain below. 
The case for carbon lock-in is compelling; fossil fuel based systems have benefited from 
nearly two hundred years of increasing returns to adoption, augmented by a range of other 
lock-in reinforcing effects such as co-evolution of networks and technologies. Future 
developments will also be subject to path dependency and lock-in, and there are 
convincing reasons to expect that the various low carbon options that are emerging now 
will compete with one another, that there will be winners and losers, and that path 
dependence will play an important part in the competition. 
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Explicit recognition by policymakers of path dependence and the concomitant importance 
of promoting innovation directly (notably through the work of Dennis Anderson and Chris 
Taylor in the Stern review (2006)) is welcome. However this thesis also suggests that 
policy will need in time to do more than create options, it will need to provide the means 
by which the most promising options begin to dominate, such that they can benefit from 
increasing returns and themselves become as cheap, reliable, ubiquitous and as 
unremarkable as petrol engines and power stations are today. What has been described as 
the `paradox of entrenchment' (because overcoming lock-in ultimately requires the 
conditions of lock in be recreated for incoming technologies (Marechal 2007)), can be 
harnessed to overcome the carbon problem. But only if policymakers engage directly with 
issues related to technology choice and technological strategy. Along the way some 
important shibboleths of existing economic policy will need to be destroyed, not least the 
notion that policymakers can never, and must never even seek to, `pick winners'. 
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ANNEX: DESCRIPTION OF THE ENERGY MODEL 
1. Energy service demands in the PIU model 
The starting point for all the scenario analyses described in Ch. 6 is a model of energy 
service demand developed by Nick Eyre and Jake Chapman of the PIU Energy Review 
team and agreed with the cross governmental Interdepartmental Analysts Group (IAG). 
The model starts with a set of energy service demands from year 2000, using government 
statistics. These are shown in Table A. 1, below. 
Table A. 1: Energy service demands 2000 
2000 Energy Use 2000 Energy Use 
Category Mtoe TWh 
Heating fuel! Power Transport fuel! Heating fue Power Transport fuels Total 
Domestic Space hei 27.4 0.0 0.0 319 0 0 319 
Domestic Water heE 10.6 0.0 123 0 0 123 
Domestic Lights 0.0 1.5 0.0 0 18 0 18 
Domestic Appliance: 0.0 6.3 0 73 0 73 
Domestic Total 38.0 7.8 0.0 442 91 0 533 
Service Sector 14.4 8.4 0.0 167 98 0 265 
Cars (inc m/c) 0.0 0.0 27.5 0 0 320 320 
LGVs 0.0 0.0 3.1 0 0 36 36 
HGVs 0.0 0.0 9.9 0 0 115 115 
PSVs 0.0 0.0 1.2 0 0 14 14 
Road Transport 0.0 0.0 41.7 0 0 485 485 
Air Transport 0.0 0.0 11.0 0 0 128 128 
Other Transport 0.0 2.2 0 0 26 26 
Transport Total 0.0 0.0 54.9 0 0 638 638 
Industry heat 30.0 0.0 0.0 349 0 0 349 
Industry power 0.0 10.0 0.0 0 116 0 116 
Industry Total 30.0 10.0 0.0 349 116 0 465 
Other 0.0 0 0 0 0 
UK Total 82.4 26.2 54.9 958 305 638 1902 
The model then used scenario assumptions described in detail in (PIU 2001a; PIU 2001b) 
to derive a set of energy service demand multipliers and technology (energy efficiency) 
multipliers. The multipliers represent the effects of technological improvement (generally 
increasing energy efficiency) and a range of demographic, social and economic factors on 
energy service demands between now and 2050 (the PIU scenario date). These are shown 
in Table A. 2. The acronyms WM, PE, GS, LS refer to the PIU's exploratory scenarios 
World Markets, Provincial Enterprise, Global Sustainability, Local Stewardship. The 
multiples of the technology and energy service multipliers provide an energy multiplier as 
shown in Table A. 3. The energy multiplier is then used to generate a set of energy service 
demands, disaggregated by end use type as shown in Table A. 4. 
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Table A. 2 PIU Technology and service demand multipliers by scenario from (PIU 
2001a; PIU 2001b). 
Services Multipliers Technology Multipliers 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS Category 
2.06 1.60 1.72 1.40 0.51 0.64 0.46 0.48 Domestic Space heating 
1.40 1.30 1.21 1.04 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.58 Domestic Water heating 
2.04 1.58 1.59 1.28 0.65 0.57 0.49 0.41 Domestic Lights 
1.60 1.16 1.30 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.69 0.69 Domestic Appliances 
1.84 1.47 1.54 1.26 0.60 0.68 0.53 0.53 Domestic Total 
1.55 1.30 1.34 1.22 0.80 0.90 0.60 0.70 Service Sector 
1.85 1.70 1.11 0.65 0.51 0.74 0.39 0.46 Cars (inc m/c) 
3.19 2.92 2.39 1.00 0.61 0.77 0.58 0.65 LGVs 
2.48 2.28 1.86 1.00 0.74 0.85 0.71 0.80 HGVs 
1.63 1.63 3.58 2.39 0.62 0.77 0.58 0.71 PSVs 
2.09 1.93 1.45 0.81 0.58 0.77 0.49 0.56 Road Transport 
7.11 2.69 2.69 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.70 0.90 Air Transport 
1.66 1.29 2.75 2.75 0.80 1.00 0.50 0.75 Other Transport 
3.08 2.05 1.75 0.93 0.63 0.82 0.53 0.64 Transport Total 
1.15 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.44 0.55 0.36 0.44 Industry heat 
2.21 2.11 1.80 1.25 0.72 0.78 0.61 0.72 Industry power 
1.42 1.35 1.13 0.84 0.51 0.60 0.42 0.51 Industry Total 
Other 
2.11 1.61 1.48 1.04 0.62 0.74 0.51 0.58 UK Total 
Table A. 3 PIU Energy multiplier by scenario (PIU 2001a; PIU 2( 
Energy multiplier 2050 
Category WM PE GS LS 
Domestic Space heating 1.05 1.03 0.79 0.67 
Domestic Water heating 0.91 0.88 0.76 0.60 
Domestic Lights 1.33 0.90 0.78 0.52 
Domestic Appliances 1.46 1.06 0.90 0.69 
Domestic Total 1.08 0.99 0.80 0.65 
Service Sector 1.24 1.17 0.80 0.85 
Cars (inc m/c) 0.94 1.26 0.43 0.30 
LGVs 1.95 2.25 1.39 0.65 
HGVs 1.84 1.94 1.32 0.80 
PSVs 1.01 1.26 2.08 1.70 
Road Transport 1.23 1.49 0.76 0.48 
Air Transport 5.69 2.69 1.88 0.90 
Other Transport 1.33 1.29 1.38 2.06 
Transport Total 2.13 1.73 1.01 0.63 
Industry heat 0.50 0.60 0.33 0.30 
Industry power 1.60 1.64 1.09 0.90 
Industry Total 0.77 0.86 0.52 0.45 
Other 
UK Total 1.38 1.23 0.80 0.63 
)Olb) 
Table A. 4 PIU demand for energy services in 2050 (TWh/yr) (categories as above) 
(PIU 2001a; PIU 2001b) 
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Energy use 2050 (Fuels) Energy use 2050 (Power) Energy use 2050 (Transport Fuels) 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS 
334 327 253 215 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
112 109 94 74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 23 16 14 9 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 106 77 65 50 0 0 0 0 
446 436 347 289 130 93 79 59 0 0 0 0 
207 195 134 143 122 115 79 84 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 302 402 138 96 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 81 50 23 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 211 223 152 92 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 18 29 24 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 597 724 369 235 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 727 344 241 115 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 33 35 53 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1359 1101 646 403 
175 210 114 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 186 191 127 105 0 0 0 0 
175 210 114 106 186 191 127 105 0 0 0 0 
828 841 595 538 437 399 285 248 1359 1101 646 403 
2. Energy supply in the PIU model 
The mix of supply technologies utilised to meet energy service demands was scenario 
dependent in the original PIU spreadsheet, as shown in Table A. 5. The spreadsheet takes 
demands from the demand multiplier tables shown in Tables A. 2 -4 and allocates a set of 
power generation, heat conversion and transport fuel options to them as shown in Table 
A. 5. The shares of different energy supply and conversion options, and fuels, is based upon 
a set of scenario assessments described in (PIU 2001a; PIU 2001 b). 
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2000 as 2050 2000 ach 2050 2000 actun 2050 2000 actual 
Fuels Power Transport Total 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS 
Raw demand 958 828 841 595 538 305 437 399 285 248 638 1359 1101 646 403 1902 2624 2341 1526 1 
elecfor LT heat -66 -100 -66 -10 -10 46 46 46 46 46 00000 -54 -20 36 
elec for transport 000099999 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 -16 -16 -16 
adjusted demand 892 728 775 585 528 360 492 454 340 303 613 1334 1076 621 378 2554 2305 1546 1; 
with elec losses 892 728 775 585 528 389 531 490 367 327 613 1334 1076 621 378 1895 2593 2342 1573 1; 
2000 2050 
WM PE GS LS 
Fuels 
PV 0 0 0 0 
onshore wind 0 0 0 0 
offshore wind 0 0 0 0 
energy crops 0 0 0 0 
Wave 0 0 0 0 
Hydropower 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 
Renewables 0 0 0 0 
M, cro-CHP 0 0 0 0 
Other CHP 0 0 0 0 
CHP 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 
Coal with sequestration 0 0 0 0 
Coal 0 0 0 0 
oil + seq 0 0 0 0 
oil wlo seq 0 0 0 0 
Gas with sequestration 0 0 0 0 
Gas fuel cells 0 0 0 0 
Gas Combined cycle 0 0 0 0 
total fossil slec 0 0 0 0 
elec from H2 0 0 0 0 
Imports 0 0 0 0 
Total elec 0 0 0 0 
hydrogen prodn 0 0 0 0 
residual electricity 0 0 0 0 
H2/CHP heat 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass/CHP he 1 10 21 104 83 
coal) CHP heat 26 0 0 0 0 
oil/ CHP heat 5 0 0 0 0 
gas/CHP heat 50 357 178 388 203 
H2 heat 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass heat 8 0 0 0 0 
coal heat 144 90 120 0 20 
oil heat 132 50 60 0 30 
gas heat 526 221 396 93 212 
total heat 892 728 775 585 528 
biofuels 0 0 0 0 
hydrogen 0 0 0 0 
gas 0 0 0 0 
petroleum 0 0 0 0 
total transport fuels 0 0 0 0 
total energy sup 892 728 775 585 528 
2000 2050 
2000 WM PE GS LS 
Power 
0 50 0 100 0 
1 8 8 30 50 
0 25 50 200 100 
0 5 10 50 30 
0 0 0 50 10 
5 5 5 5 10 
4 5 17 5 45 
10 98 90 440 245 
0 74 25 114 23 
23 41 23 80 60 
23 115 48 194 83 
85 0 100 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
117 0 100 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 100 0 
0 0 0 0 50 
138 318 152 0 50 
257 318 252 100 100 
0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
389 531 490 734 428 
0 0 0 -367 -101 
389 531 490 367 327 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
389 531 490 367 327 
2000 2050 2000 2050 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS 
Transport Total supply 
00000 50 0 100 
0000188 30 5( 
00000 25 50 200 101 
000005 10 50 31 
0000000 50 1( 
00005555 1( 
000045 17 5 41 
0000 10 98 90 440 24! 
00000 74 25 114 2: 
0000 23 41 23 80 6( 
0000 23 115 48 194 8: 
0000 85 0 100 0 
00000000 
o000 117 0 100 0( 
00000000( 
00002000( 
0000a00 100 ( 
00000000 5( 
0000 138 318 152 0 5( 
0000 257 318 252 100 IN 
00000000 
0000 14 000 
0000 389 531 490 734 421 
00 294 81 00 -73 "2( 
000 81 389 531 490 367 401 
00000000 
00001 10 21 104 6: 
0000 28 000 
00005000 
0000 50 357 178 388 20: 
00000000 
00008000 
0000 144 90 120 0 2( 
0000 132 50 60 01 
0000 528 221 396 93 21: 
0000 092 728 775 585 521 
000000000 
000 294 81 000 294 8' 
0000000001 
613 1334 1076 327 297 513 1334 1076 327 M 
613 1334 1076 621 378 613 1334 1076 621 371 
All 4111 41178 C1. A.. .... 1501 1111 4511 111, 
The assumptions made by the PIU team are described below (Box A. 1). 
Box A. 1 PIU Explanatory comments (from original model) (PIU 2001a; PIU 2001b) 
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General approach 
" Raw demand is taken from the demand sheet 
" Demand is adjusted to take account of actual use of electricity in transport and heating and 
T&D losses - this then drives supply 
" Each category of supply (heat, power and transport fuels) is set to meet demand. 
" Supply estimates are made for different options, but one options needs to be set as 
'backstop', and calculated as (demand) minus (other supply). 
" These backstops are gas for heating, CCGT for power and petroleum liquid fuels for transport 
" The only exception to this is for power in GS and LS where there is 'over-production' of low 
carbon electricity which is then used for hydrogen production. 
Power supply 
" Renewables are based on (PIU 2001d) 
" Micro CHP based on (PIU 2002a) 
" CHP based on best guesses (the 2010 target of 10 GW would deliver 41 TWh) 
" Nuclear is 100 TWh in PE only 
" Coal is 100 TWh in PE only 
" Gas with sequestration based used in GS only - 100 TWh is arbitrary 
" 50 TWh of each of fuel cell and CCGT in LS 
" CCGTs used as default option in PE and WM - large reliance in the latter. 
" No use of hydrggen for power and no imports 
" In GS and LS excess power is converted in H2 for use in transport 
Heat 
" These are the fuel input not the heat output 
" For CHP technologies, it is assumed that the fuel input for power is (power output/ total 
efficiency), so the fuel input for heat is (heat output/ total efficiency) 
" Biomass CHP is 1.5 times the energy crops power output, based on elec: heat: losses of 
30: 50: 20 
" Coal and oil CHP not used 
" Heat from gas CHP based on micro CHP at efficiencies in MCHP paper and other 35: 50: 15 
(much better elec eff than now) 
" Coal and oil for heating are guesses based on reductions from 2000 figures of 144 and 132 
Transport fuels 
" All hydrogen in GS and LS used for transport 
" No liquid biofuels in any scenario 
" No use of gas in transport 
" Petroleum does the rest 
Scenario analysis for this thesis utilised the Global Sustainability scenario, as described in 
Ch. 6. The PIU assumptions were changed or adjusted as appropriate in order to develop 
the model to meet the needs of the questions in the thesis. 
3. Carbon emissions in the PIU model 
The model calculates carbon emissions on the basis of energy use by technology type and 
the following assumptions: 1. Coal, oil gas carbon contents are 83,67,50 gC/kWh; 2. Coal 
power efficiency is 45% 3. Gas CCGT efficiency is 55%. Emissions from renewables and 
nuclear power are assumed to be negligible (full lifecycle emissions are neglected). Some 
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sensitivities were explored in the author's model runs, these are discussed below. Table 
A. 6 provides the PIU modelling results for C emissions. 
Table A. 6. C emissions calculations in the PIU model 
2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS 
Fuels Power Transport Total supply 
PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
onshore wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
offshore wind 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
energy crops 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
wave 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
other RE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
total RE electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MCHP 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 6 
other CHP 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 5 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 5 
total CHP electricity 0 0 0 0 1 7 3 11 5 0 0 0 0 1 7 3 11 
nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
coal+seq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
coal w/o seq 0 0 0 0 28 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 18 0 
oil + seq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
oil w/oseq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas + seq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas fuel cell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas CCGT 0 0 0 0 15 29 14 0 5 0 0 0 0 15 29 14 0 
total fossil elec 0 0 0 0 43 29 32 0 8 0 0 0 0 43 29 32 0 
elec from H2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
elec imports 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totalalec 0 0 0 0 45 35 35 11 13 0 0 0 0 45 35 35 11 
hydrogen prodn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
residual electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H2/CHP hei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass/CF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
coal/ CHP h 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
oil/ CHIP he, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas/CHP he 3 18 9 19 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 18 9 19 
H2 heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass hei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
coal heat 12 7 10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 7 10 0 
oil heat 9 3 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 4 0 
gas heat 26 11 20 5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 11 20 5 
total heat 52 40 43 24 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 40 43 24 
biofuels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hydrogen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
petroleum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 89 72 22 20 41 89 72 22 
total transport fuels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 89 72 22 20 41 89 72 22 
totalcarboi 52 40 43 24 24 45 35 35 11 13 41 89 72 22 20 138 165 150 57 
WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS WM PE GS LS yr 200I WM PE GS LS 
Fuels Power Transport Total supp ly 
z 
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4. Energy supply and demand modelling for this thesis 
The PIU scenarios for World Markets, Provincial Enterprise and Local Stewardship were 
not utilised further (although cells and derived demands for WM were left in the model in 
order to allow for future model runs with higher demands for energy). Instead two main 
scenario variants were run, DGE and BiB 1. These utilised the principal set of energy 
service demands developed in the PIU GS scenario, but with some important adjustments. 
The share of electricity for space heat was adjusted (see Ch. 6 for details) and losses were 
differentiated to reflect the high proportion of decentralised generation utilised in the DGE 
scenario (transmission losses reduced to 6% in the DGE compared to 8% in BiB). 
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In order to test the demand side effects in each scenario the supply mix from year 2000 
were also modelled using energy service demands in each scenario. The contribution from 
each generating option utilised in yr 2000 was scaled to match the scenario demands for 
BiB and DGE in 2050. This results in a 14.5% reduction in emissions in the DGE 
scenario. This is because both the amount of fuel used directly and electricity are reduced 
slightly in the GS scenario, whilst transport fuel use increases slightly. In the BiB scenario 
emissions reductions are lower, around 6%. This is almost entirely due to the fact that 
demand for stationary heat is reduced in absolute terms relative to year 2000. However, 
this reduction is offset because the scenario has a larger share of electrical heating, much of 
which comes from fossil sources if we assume a yr 2000 mix. 
The modelling also discontinues the notion that excess electricity is used to make hydrogen 
for the transport market and instead ensures that electricity supply meets demand by 
adjusting supply. A fixed share of transport hydrogen is modelled, which is produced from 
natural gas with the C02 sequestered. Sensitivity to greater levels of decarbonisation is 
explored, as discussed below. Various additional sensitivities are explored in the model, 
which are discussed in the text in Ch. 6. The scenario variants and sensitivities assessed are 
as follows: 
DGE 'CHP' world: Gas CHP is exploited to the maximum potential discussed in Ch. 6, 
largely displacing conventional generation (CCGT provides the shortfall). Small scale 
renewables do not play role. This scenario cannot achieve a 60% cut in emissions. Four 
sensitivities were also tested: 
- DGE 'CHP' world + CCGT efficiency increases to 70% 
- DGE 'CHP' world + CCGT efficiency increases to 70% and zero 
transmission losses (100% decentralised, high electrical efficiency 
scenario) 
- DGE `CHP' world 50 + 50% decarbonisation of transport (using CCS) 
- DGE `CHP' world + 100% decarbonisation of transport (using CCS) 
DGE `CHP rich' world: In this scenario small scale renewables displace CCGT. It cannot 
deliver a 50% emissions reduction. 
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DGE `CHP and renewables' world: Gas fired CHP is scaled back and PV and biomass 
CHP are scaled up. This scenario delivers a 58% cut in emissions and is the DGE variant 
discussed further in Ch. 6. 
The BiB world: A mix of nuclear, coal and gas with CCS and large scale renewables. This 
scenario delivers a 59% reduction in C emissions and is discussed further in Ch. 6 
Each model run is saved as a separate spreadsheet on the attached DVD. Table A. 7 
provides a summary of the range of supply mixes modelled for the main scenarios. 
Table A. 7. Energy supply mix for BiB and DGE scenarios (DGE 'CHP and 
renewables' scenario) 
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2050 Energy Supply estimates (TWh/yr) 
Direct use Electricity Transport 
Fuels Power Fuels 
DGE BiB1 DGE BiBI DGE BIBI 
Raw demand 595 595 285 285 646 646 
elec for LT heat -33 -194 30 175 0 0 
elec for transport 0 0 9 9 -25 -25 
adjusted demand 562 401 324 469 621 621 
with elec losses 562 401 340 506 621 621 
DGE BiB1 DGE BiB1 DGE B iB1 
PV 0 0 100 0 0 0 
onshore wind 0 0 40 10 0 0 
offshore wind 0 0 0 100 0 0 
energy crops 0 0 100 0 0 0 
Wave 0 0 0 60 0 0 
Hydropower 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 17 0 0 
Renewables 0 0 240 190 0 0 
Micro-CHP 0 0 50 0 0 0 
Other CHP 0 0 50 2 0 0 
H-CHP/balancing 0 
CHP 0 0 100 2 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 200 0 0 
Coal with sequestration 0 0 0 60 0 0 
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
oil + seq 0 0 0 0 0 0 
oil w/o seq 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas with sequestration 0 0 0 54 0 0 
Gas fuel cells 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas Combined cycle 0 0 0 0 0 0 
total fossil elec 0 0 0 114 0 0 
elec from H2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Imports 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total elec 0 0 340 506 0 0 
hydrogen prodn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
residual electricity 0 0 340 506 0 0 
H2/CHP heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass/CHP heat 209 0 0 0 0 0 
coal/ CHP heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
oil/ CHP heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas/CHP heat 195 3 0 0 0 0 
H2 heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
biomass heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
coal heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
oil heat 0 0 0 0 0 0 
gas heat 158 398 0 0 0 0 
total heat 562 401 0 0 0 0 
biofuels 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hydrogen 0 0 0 0 124 124 
gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 
petroleum 0 0 0 0 497 497 
total transport fuels 0 0 0 0 621 621 
total ener supply 562 401 340 506 621 621 
5. Power and capacity in the modelling for this thesis 
The thesis is also concerned with issues related to system reliability and system balancing. 
Whilst the model is not able to assess power flows in the manner of electricity network 
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simulation it is able to impute a capacity mix from the combination of energy supply 
technologies postulated for each scenario and their expected load factors. These 
relationships are described in Ch. 6. They allowed assessment of the relationship between 
peak demand (pro rated from yr 2000 levels) and installed capacity. In addition, the 
amount of `firm' capacity was assessed based upon a literature review of the probability 
distribution of availability at peak for intermittent renewables. Both scenarios have 
capacity margin deficits as a result of the large contribution from intermittent renewable 
sources. A range of possibilities for meeting peak demands and assisting with system 
balancing were modelled including a role for peaking plant (CCGT) and the potential to 
increase the installed capacity of CCS plant in order to meet peak demands. Energy 
spilling was also assessed. Hence the model has a sheet that assesses capacity implications 
and capacity margins. 
Each model run to assess issues related to capacity is stored as a separate spreadsheet on 
the attached DVD. 
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THE END 
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